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Förord 
To dare is to do.  
Denna historia börjar kanske på en parkeringsplats i Petalax. Min gymnasierektor 
ropade “skicka mig din avhandling sen”, och jag antog att han menade 
doktorsavhandling. Eller möjligtvis under de kandidat- och magistersemiarier som jag 
tyckte var ovanligt roliga (!), och där jag insåg att jag hittat ett tema jag ville lära mig 
mer om. Även om det fortsättningsvis finns stunder när jag funderar över varför jag 
skriver en doktorsavhandling, så vet jag i alla fall hur man på bästa sätt genomför ett 
sådant åtagande. Man omger sig med personer som är briljanta, kreativa, generösa 
med sin kunskap, samt som besitter en någorlunda bra humor. Människor som tror 
på dig och får dig att bli bättre än vad du någonsin drömde om att vara. Jag har lyxen 
att vara omgiven av precis sådana människor.  
Jag vill rikta ett särskilt stort tack till min handledare, professor Göran Djupsund, 
som är expert på att se helheter, samt att erbjuda uppmuntran i precis rätt ögonblick. 
Om design är att skapa lösningar är jag speciellt glad för att du gav min 
forskningsdesign möjligheten att få en experimentell lösning. Det är tack vare dina 
idéer och din hjälp som detta projekt alltid har känts genomförbart. Tack för att du är 
mittfältsmotorn som alltid slår den öppnande passningen! Det underlättar också att i 
korridoren på B4 jobba sida vid sida med docent Tom Carlson och docent Kim 
Strandberg. Era alltid lika insiktsfulla kommentarer levereras snabbt och har fått 
arbetet med avhandlingen att flyta på – och plötsligt en dag var allt klart. Tack för att 
ingen fråga är för liten eller för stor och för att ni alltid tagit er tid! 
Avhandlingens förhandsgranskare, professor emerita Marie-Louise von 
Bergmann-Winberg från Mittuniversitet och docent Fredrik Bynander vid 
Försvarshögskolan i Stockholm, poängterade många viktiga lärdomar som jag tar med 
mig, men gav mig också ett självförtroende gällande det arbete jag gjort. Ett ödmjukt 
tack för er kunskap!  
PM Janne Berg, utan våra dagliga diskussioner av varierande vetenskaplig grad 
hade livet som doktorand varit bra mycket ointressantare. Du är fantastisk på många 
sätt och jag uppskattar att du alltid säger ja till nya äventyr, diskuterar allt från metodik 
ii 
 
till doktorandångest och gärna skålar i rödvin då det har behövts. Tack för att du hejar 
på mig de dagar då solen inte skiner ända till andra sidan av korridoren!  
Till alla kollegor i Vasa, i Åbo, på Försvarshögskolan och i den finlandssvenska 
forskarskolan – ni har förgyllt mina dagar såväl intellektuellt som imponerat på 
dansgolvet. Jag är djupt tacksam för all hjälp och uppmuntran! Så många personer har 
bidragit till att förbättra avhandlingen, och jag vill speciellt lyfta fram PM Joni 
Kyheröinen och språkgranskare Paul Wilkinson. Joni var den bästa forsknings-
assistent man kan tänka sig, med exemplarisk noggrannhet i kombination med roliga 
diskussioner under långa arbetsdagar i labbet. Paul bidrog förtjänstfullt till att det 
engelska språket i avhandlingen flyter smidigt. 
Slutligen vill jag lyfta fram min stora och fina familj, utan er alla vore livet tråkigt. 
Tack mamma och pappa för att jag alltid fått gå min egen väg. Jona, du som har läst 
min avhandling flest gånger av alla och hållit mig nere på jorden gällande alltför 
invecklad akademisk jargong, samtidigt som du är den person som alltid, alltid får mig 
att skratta. Tack för att du tror på mig, det hade aldrig gått utan din hjälp. Jocke, 
inledningsvis förtjänar du (och Sören!) en applåd för all assistans i labbet. Du är 
extremt bra på att förklara hur saker hänger samman och det är till stor del din 
förtjänst att jag tycker att experimentell forskning är det roligaste man kan hålla på 
med. Vi är båda lika nyfikna, så jag ser det som en enorm styrka att kunna diskutera 
forskning, Solex 32/32 TDID-förgasare, såväl som universums mysterier hemma i 
soffan. Tack för att du finns i mitt liv. 
* * * 
Arbetet med denna avhandling har möjliggjorts genom ekonomiskt stöd från 
Victoriastiftelsen. Ett innerligt tack för att jag kunnat jobba heltid med min forskning! 
Jag har också uppskattat de resebidrag och stipendier från Högskolestiftelsen i 
Österbotten, Makarna Eks fond, Rektorn vid Åbo Akademi och Svensk-
Österbottniska Samfundet som gett mig möjlighet att berika min forskarvardag 
genom att delta i nationella och internationella konferenser. 
Vasa, 12 januari 2016 
Jenny Lindholm 
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1. Appetite for destruction?  
Introducing the research field 
 
 
Virtually every aspect of politics has a potential negativity bias. This means that 
information about negative events plays an important role for political 
communication and forms our political behavior. A never-ending stream of events 
occurs on a daily basis; however, limited resources, information intake, or agenda 
space filter out some events, while emphasizing the importance of others. The whole 
process of recognizing a problem, evaluating the different dimensions of the dilemma, 
and sorting out potential solutions is about making choices. It all boils down to the 
allocation of attention; we can attend to only a limited amount of issues at one time 
(Jones & Baumgartner 2005, 275).  
However, neurological processes are greater when dealing with negative events, in 
comparison to positive events (Soroka 2014, 8–9). From a neurological and biological 
perspective, this can be explained as an evolutionary feature – it has been more 
important to develop attention systems that give preference to stimuli such as fear and 
danger (ibid.).  From a social science perspective, issues that are important for the 
general public, issues related to serious societal problems and issues receiving 
extensive attention in the media are all plausible issues that will rise onto the formal 
political agenda (Wolfe, Jones & Baumgartner 2013, 2). When combining these three 
criteria, as well as the importance of negative events, we encounter a focusing event. 
This is an event that is sudden, unusual, and has negative consequences to a large 
number of people. Citizens favor negative information, media reports on negative 
events (often using a negative tone) and politicians sometimes indulge in negative 
campaigning (Strömbäck 2008). Although such negativity bias is a biological necessity 
for human beings, as mentioned earlier, it can also be derived from how we have built 
our society and designed the political institutions. For example, the media’s role is to 
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monitor errors and problems, and to search for the negative – a function also present 
in the design of many political institutions (Soroka 2014, 108).  
But why are focusing events so important? A key aspect is that focusing events raise 
emotions, and emotions are essential in the allocation of attention (Jones & 
Baumgartner 2005, 12). A limitation to political behavior is our cognitive lack of 
responsiveness, and the gateway to gain awareness is through emotions. If a tree falls 
in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound? This phrase is a 
common philosophical thought experiment.1 The question as to whether objects of 
sense only exist when perceived is perhaps an infallible conjecture. However, the 
question does point to an important aspect of politics – the importance of attention. 
In this light, a re-writing of this phrase was made by Goss (2001, 8) – “a focusing event 
is the tree we heard fall, not the hundred that we didn’t”.  According to this reasoning, 
the importance of a potential focusing event is greatly diminished in a political sense 
if no one is affected by the event. Some events, such as the Indian Ocean tsunami, 
receive massive global attention, while the 2013 Asian floods (with 7000 deaths) never 
make it to the global spotlight (Yan & Bissell 2015, 2). Another aspect that points to 
the importance of disaster research is the increasing amount of vulnerability in 
societies. Physical, social, cultural, economic, technological, and political factors are 
contributing to, as well as creating, a world where the possibility of disasters and crises 
are here to stay (McEntire 2001, 192).  
Focusing events are important for “the legitimacy of the authoritative allocation 
process” (Olson 2008, 158), which is ultimately the existence of a political system. As 
such, focusing events are virtually impossible to keep away from societal agendas, and 
the more attention they receive, the more difficult it is to deal with them. Furthermore, 
these events create a fruitful environment for change. The vast majority of the actors 
in a system have an understanding of the event and the problems related to it 
(Birkland 1997, 25−26).  
 
                                                            
1 The concept is mentioned in a similar phrasing by George Berkeley (1710) and William 
Fossett (1754). 
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There are three questions of importance in the aftermath of a focusing event, and these 
questions explain the politicization process of an event. The first one is: What 
happened? This starting point defines the event (Olson 2008, 154), which can be 
understood as the meaning-making process or framing of the event (e.g. Boin et al. 
2005, 13). However, we should keep in mind that the cause of an event is often 
constructed rather than found. When Pekka-Eric Auvinen killed eight people in the 
first Finnish large-scale school shooting, was it because he had access to a weapon? 
Alternatively, maybe it was because he idolized Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, two 
previous school shooters? Perhaps the school shooting was a result of the shooter 
being bullied? The construction of a cause is about identifying the necessary 
conditions for the observed effects to be able to occur (Hollnagel 2004). As such, the 
framing and contextualization affect citizens’ perceptions of the event and determine 
the level of institutional attention (Fry 2003, 84). The second aspect in the 
politicization process highlights the losses and responsibilities following an event, and 
is often framed in a negative way as too high losses or an inadequate response (Olson 
2008, 154−155). Thus, the second question concerns who is accountable or 
responsible? Thirdly, political leaders provide the answer to the question: What will 
happen now? The attention turns to discussing how the problem can be prevented in 
the future, and how to best recover from inconveniences – namely, the solutions 
presented to the problem and how to allocate resources to solve it. Disasters are of key 
interest since they deal with questions of agenda control together with the question of 
accountability; they place new issues on the agenda and raise demands. This 
combination of questions is essentially what politics is all about (Olson 2008, 155).  
In March 2011, an earthquake and tsunami swept over the coast of Japan, killing 
tens of thousands of people and destroying entire towns. At the same time, the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear facility experiences a meltdown in three of its nuclear 
reactors. Tokyo Electric Power (Tepco), the plant’s operator, said that the meltdown 
was initiated solely by the 14-meter waves; however, the parliamentary investigation 
panel concluded that:  
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Although triggered by these cataclysmic events, the subsequent accident at the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant cannot be regarded as a natural disaster. It 
was a profoundly manmade disaster – that could and should have been foreseen and 
prevented. (The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 
Investigation Commission 2012, 9) 
 
If we revisit the three questions of politicization: 1) the framing concluded that the 
event was not a natural disaster. Rather, it was a man-made event exacerbated by a 
natural phenomenon. This framing of the problem leads us to the question of 
responsibilities: 2) the losses are seen as too high, since the responsibility lies on the 
company and the political institutions that could have prevented the issue, but did 
not. The safety measures conducted were not adequate with the risks of earthquakes 
or tsunamis hitting the area. The question concerning what will happen now is stated 
in the report as follows: 3) new safety regulations, a permanent committee overseeing 
the regulations as well as an independent investigation commission and a reformation 
of the crisis management system. All in all, the first question is of vital importance for 
the politicization process, since a different answer to that question would have given 
the subsequent discussion another twist. 
  
Early research on disasters and crises was often initiated by the occurrence of a specific 
event; hence, there was a lack of a systematic approach to the research in question 
(Birkland 2006). Although progress has been made in recent years – disaster research 
has exploded in a wide range of scientific approaches and research questions, from 
crisis communication to designing resilience – unanswered questions still remain. 
Today, this interdisciplinary field brings together both new insights as well as 
challenges. Previous research, to a great extent, has only been carried out in an 
American context; typical examples of events that have been studied exhaustively are 
9/11 (e.g. Birkland 2006; Entman 2003; Leffler 2011) or the Columbine school 
shooting (Haidel-Markel & Joslyn 2001; Muschret 2007).  
A common approach in disaster research is to study either the media agenda or the 
political agenda, or to use a combination of both (e.g. Birkmann et al. 2010; Birkland 
1997; 2006; Boin 2009; Fleming 2012; Nohrstedt 2007; Nohrstedt & Weible 2010; 
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Wood 2006; Worrall 1999). Moreover, other researchers have looked at aspects of 
disasters affecting the citizen arena, e.g. public opinion (Goss 2001; Vane & Kalvas 
2012). However, there is still a need for political scientists to study other aspects of 
disasters than the “policy” problems (e.g. Olson 2008, 167), since disasters offer a clear 
insight into the political processes and the priorities of governments when layers of 
semantics, symbolism, or processes are stripped away. In this respect, Olson (2008, 
156) asks: “Why has it been so difficult to gain sustained, systematic attention to the 
political aspects of disasters?” Even though there is a political aspect to most policy 
domains, for instance welfare or pollution – somehow the politics of disaster is 
neglected. Firstly, this might derive from political scientists perceiving disasters as 
engineering problems, or political epiphenomena, in combination with disaster 
research previously being perceived as a subject for sociologists or geographers. 
Secondly, it is only in the last two decades that the political science community has 
accepted crises and disasters as “political occasions”, albeit mostly through a policy 
study lens. One interesting explanation for this is the existing view that there should 
not be any disaster politicization, since this subject has a negative connotation (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, when a political system responds to an exogenous shock, the leaders 
must not only explain what has happened, but why it happened. Hence, focusing 
events are always part of a framing contest; i.e. “crises are political at heart.” (Boin, et 
al. 2005, ix). 
Although studies that combine all the three arenas have been made (e.g. Soroka 
2002), they are few in number. Hence, Wolfe et al. (2013, 4) argue that studies 
involving all the three arenas are still needed and that such a research area will gain 
valuable insights by looking at the relationship between them. Furthermore, looking 
only at legislative proposals and policy change, which have been the dominating 
approach during the 21st century, might not capture the understanding and 
(re)definition of a problem. In this respect, Birkland (2006, 21) acknowledges that 
signs of political learning must include the news media coverage of the event as well 
as interest groups’ appearances at congressional hearings, albeit the importance of the 
citizen arena is left out. At the same time, it can be difficult to say that a policy change 
was initiated by a particular focusing event, as previous events or the particular goals 
of actors might have influenced the process, alongside other factors. Moreover, the 
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contextualization of an event – the perception as to whether a problem can be solved, 
and what the best solution is – precedes legislative documents. This means that the 
process preceding potential change is of high importance in disaster research.  
In the early 21st century, there was an interesting turn in the academic use of the term 
“focusing event”. This was seen as a broadening of the concept, whereby US state 
elections (Walker & Waterman 2010), the tobacco master settlement agreement 
(Wood 2006), and poor school performance by Danish children (Jensen 2011) were 
also seen as focusing events, with a reference to Birkland’s (1997; 2006) definition. The 
broad appliance is understandable in the sense that the linguistic concept is very clear 
and easy to grasp, i.e. it is an event that is highlighting a certain problem. Nevertheless, 
there is a grey zone in the definition, with no clear line concerning whether an event 
can or cannot be considered as a focusing event. Instead, it becomes more fruitful to 
discuss the potentiality and magnitude of focusing events. This means that although 
it is difficult to tell which event will have a major focal power, we can still define the 
potential characteristics of an event to receive extensive political attention. As such, 
we see researchers using the concept in the broadest form on one hand – as events 
drawing attention to a specific problem or issue (e.g. Vánê & Kalvas 2012), while, on 
the other hand, there are those who accept Birkland’s (1997; 2006) narrower criteria 
mainly focusing on disaster research (e.g. Farley, Baker, Batker, Koliba, Matteson, 
Mills & Pittman 2007). When using the broad definition, it is possible that almost any 
event can be defined as a focusing event in some aspect; i.e. any event may receive 
attention or be framed as an important and highly interesting question. Still, although 
many researchers use the concept and the theory of focusing events, the theoretical 
aspect is not always the central point in previous research. If the starting point is to 
contribute to a theory that says something about focusing events and their influence 
on political processes in general, it is impossible to adopt a broad definition. In such 
cases, we end up with events that have nothing in common and are virtually 
impossible to compare.   
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1.2 Research interest and aims of the dissertation 
 
The following chapters will shed more light on the unanswered questions 
highlighted in the previous section. Specifically, the chapters concern how focusing 
events are defined and the discourse surrounding them. Moreover, as the subject 
of this thesis concerns the influence of focusing events on political processes within 
three societal arenas, the goal is to address the suggestions raised in earlier research 
by McEntrie (2001, 192) and Wolfe (2012), who state that a broader approach is 
needed in disaster research. Here, a broader approach refers to not limiting the 
studies to natural or technological hazards, and to include all actors, including the 
public. Furthermore, in this thesis, a broad adoption of the politicization of events 
in society is emphasized, ranging from the citizen’s perspective to the 
parliamentary discussion.  
A focusing event is understood as a phenomenon that has suddenly achieved 
public attention and is being discussed in the media, which increases the pressure 
on decision makers to do something. As such, focusing events pinpoint the 
importance of agenda setting; i.e. which issues are up for debate, who gets to speak, 
and who is held responsible. It is worth noting that in social sciences, disasters and 
crises are deemed important for many reasons. However, one of the most important 
aspects is the ability to loosen up the policy-making processes – allowing change to 
happen. Moreover, these events are undesirable, and society is interested in 
mitigation and in preventing similar events from happening in the future. As such, 
a focusing event will become the catalyst for a debate on how to perceive social 
problems. It is in this light that researchers have studied focusing events and 
subsequent policy change (Birkland 2006; Fleming 2012; Soroka 2002). Thus, 
political learning can draw from previous events, either by making the focusing 
event in question the “tipping point” (Wood 2006), or by contributing to the event 
with a spillover effect from other policy domains, i.e. a major change in one domain 
influences other domains (Kingdon 2003). In this respect, focusing events can 
create pressure and force politicians to “do something”, adopting policies with little 
connection to the problem at hand (Birkland & Lawrence 2009, 148). In other cases, 
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a careful analysis of the situation is made, albeit with no policy change, perhaps as 
a result of economic or bureaucratic realities (ibid., 149). Additionally, all the 
groups, with their own agendas and pre-existing goals, try to influence the 
aftermath of a focusing event (Wood 2006, 433−434). Clearly, there is more to the 
big picture than just an event taking place, followed by policy change.  
 
In view of the above, I suggest that we now take a step back and initially look at the 
processes preceding potential change. Although it can be virtually impossible to 
find an x → y relationship between a focusing event and a policy change, we can 
establish that in order for a focusing event (x) to lead to a policy change (y), the 
event must be defined and framed in such a way that (y) is a possible solution. This 
is in line with recent calls made by Yan and Bissell (2015, 21–22), as well as Birkland 
and Warnement (2013, 21). In this regard, Yan and Bissell call for studies that 
identify the details of the stories presented in the media – how focusing events are 
framed and how the framing connects to societal attributes. Likewise, Birkland and 
Warnement point out that previous research lacks a careful textual analysis of the 
discourse surrounding focusing events. In this regard, Alexandrova (2015, 5) makes 
an important notion: in a European context, the overall analysis of the extent that 
focusing events influence political agendas is extremely rare, even though “40 % of 
the large punctuations in attention are related to focusing events (whereas elections 
and leadership change seem not to matter)” (van Assche 2012).  
Since the great majority of studies are performed in a US context, it is of interest 
to further test the ideas in a European setting2. A third aspect pointing to the 
importance of the subject is the confusion of concepts – on the one hand there is 
the use of a “focusing event”, as discussed in the introduction, while on the other 
hand there is a huge variation of similar concepts, such as crises, disasters, or 
exogenous shocks (see Chapter 2.2). Therefore, it is important to continue to 
develop the theoretical and conceptual understanding of focusing events. 
                                                            
2 However, a recent study by Alexandrova (2015) analyzed the prioritization of focusing 
events on the European Council over a period of 20 years.  
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The overall aim of this thesis is to reach a deeper understanding of how focusing 
events influence societal processes. This is done through a discussion of the 
definition of focusing events, as well as through studies of how these events 
influence the citizen arena, the media arena and the parliamentary arena. The 
starting point is that focusing events are of interest due to the characteristics of the 
events, and not because of the processes following the event. Moreover, focusing 
events are not inherently dichotomous, in the sense that they are focusing or not 
focusing. Instead, they vary in magnitude; events have a stronger or weaker degree 
of focus. Likewise, the origin of focusing events differs; some events are created by 
natural phenomena while others originate from human actions – which possibly 
influence the subsequent discussion of the event.  
 
1.3 Disposition  
 
A brief outline of the disposition of the thesis is presented here. The first part, The 
Introduction, consists of three sections. Here, a mapping of the research problem 
and a general introduction to the subject are presented. This is followed by Chapter 
2, which begins by introducing a theoretical discussion of the concept of focusing 
events and ends with a presentation of the general research questions.  
The second part, Defining the context, outlines the three societal arenas that are 
studied. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 address the main contributions from previous research 
and conclude with a discussion of how to study the effects of focusing events within 
the citizen arena, the media arena and the parliamentary arena.  
In the third part, Design, methods and studies, the research design is presented 
as well as methodological considerations, followed by the three studies.  
Study 1: Citizens’ Emotional and Cognitive Responses to Focusing Events – An 
Experimental Study 
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When focusing events occur, it is essential that citizens trust that their society can 
provide credence toward managing these situations. In this study, the citizen arena 
is examined through a controlled laboratory experiment. The research questions 
investigate the manner in which the origin and strength of focusing events affect 
the emotional and cognitive reactions of citizens. The emotional reactions are 
studied through self-reported emotions as well as psychophysiological reactions, 
and the cognition dimension consists of questions about societal responsibility in 
the wake of a focusing event.  
 
Study 2: Media framing and blame attribution of focusing events 
The media coverage of focusing events plays an important role in the sense that 
comprehensive coverage can be linked to increased attention both on the political 
arena and among citizens. Moreover, the coverage affects the framework used to 
understand and explain the event in terms of what happened, who is responsible 
and how the problem should be solved. The aim of the second study is to compare 
the media coverage following four focusing events with a varying degree of strength 
and origin, by way of a content analysis of news articles and images. The research 
questions investigate the basic characteristics of the coverage along with framing 
and blame attribution in the media coverage.  
 
Study 3: Threat or opportunity? The politicization of focusing events in the 
parliamentary arena 
A focusing event provides an opportunity for change because of the emotional 
impact of the event. The aim of the third study is to analyze the politicization of 
focusing events within the parliamentary arena, and the research questions 
investigate whether there are differences between events with a varying degree of 
strength and origin. Parliamentary debates during plenary sessions are studied 
according to four main themes: 1) the framing, 2) the blame attribution, 3) 
emotions used in the argumentation and 4) solutions presented to the problem. 
 
In the final part, Conclusion, the results are summed up and concluding remarks 
discuss the overall importance of focusing events in a society. 
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2. Jigsaw puzzle –  
Defining focusing events in a societal context 
 
 
Indeed, the problem of “what is a disaster” will never be solved by more fieldwork. 
The real work to be done with respect to definitions of disasters has to do first with 
conceptualization: one needs to decide what disaster means. (Perry 2007, 15) 
 
2.1 A crisis of definition?  
 
A focusing event represents an exogenous shock to the political system with the ability 
of pushing issues onto societal agendas. Naturally, there are many different concepts 
used to represent such events, and in contrast, there are also many definitions for each 
of the concepts. In the following chapter, I will discuss the concept of focusing events 
on a theoretical level. Moreover, I will address and define other reoccurring concepts 
in this dissertation, for instance the concepts of “crisis” and “disaster”, and how they 
are related to the debate on focusing events.  
 
Disaster research is a broad subject that can be approached from many different 
angles, and the “what is a disaster?” question is a fundamental academic discourse as 
well as a research area of great importance to societies trying to reduce the impact of 
such events (McEntire 2001, 189). As a review of the whole field would be a formidable 
task, this review will instead briefly introduce the different areas, albeit emphasizing 
the political context. In a historical perspective, the perception of the disaster concept 
has evolved over time. In past cultures, many disasters were seen as acts of God. As 
such, the physical destruction or deaths of people were seen as a punishment from a 
higher power (Drabek 1991). However, when a deeper understanding of the 
environmental processes behind many natural phenomena (and resulting disasters 
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and catastrophes) became the prevailing belief, natural hazards emerged as the 
definition of a disaster (Cannon 1994). Yet, the role of humans in the disaster 
discourse was still downplayed, that is until the field of disaster research moved 
toward the social construction of events (Quarantelli 1998). Nevertheless, this also 
resulted in researchers sometimes downplaying the importance of natural 
phenomena, and McEntire (2001, 190) advocates the importance of a holistic 
perspective on disasters, taking into account multiple sources, as well as the physical, 
technological and social processes that interact in society. This means that the concept 
of crises and disasters also includes events such as unintentional disasters created by 
humans, e.g. accidents, or intentional human acts, such as terrorism, alongside natural 
hazards (ibid.).  
Looking at disasters from a political perspective, three research traits emerge 
(Enander 2010). However, the first division concerns the research subjects; risks on 
the one hand and crises on the other. Risks and threats have a prominent role in 
today’s information society, and there is a demand for better risk resilience (ibid., 4). 
An effect of this is seen in the high expectations citizens have toward political leaders 
concerning the management of negative events (Pidgeon 1998; Renn 2008). The first 
research trait deals with the individual’s ability to manage risks, and citizen behavior 
during crises and disasters (Enander 2010, 6–10). This type of research concerns both 
the early risk stage, as well as the aftermath of a focusing event. The second trait 
focuses on the professional actors dealing with crises and disasters (Enander 2010, 11–
14). Hence, both municipal and regional actors all the way up to the formal political 
agenda are studied in a leadership perspective. Interestingly, the need for the study of 
emotions and their impact on disaster management is brought up as an understudied 
aspect (Enander 2010, 12), since there are relatively few studies on the use of emotions 
by leaders during crises, and the impact on the media and citizens (e.g. Olofson & 
Öhman 2009; Madera & Smith 2009). The third and final research trait is the 
interaction between professional actors and citizens. On the one hand, there is the 
communication between the societal arenas and how to integrate citizens into risk and 
disaster management (Enander 2012, 15), while on the other hand there are the 
expectations, as well as myths, concerning the interaction in emergency situations. 
This dissertation aims at involving all three traits to some degree. It will do this by 
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focusing on how crises and disasters affect citizens, communications (media arena) 
and the response from the professional actors (parliamentary arena). 
The concept of a focusing event was brought forward by Kingdon in the mid-1980s, 
defined initially as crises and disasters that bring attention to a problem (Kingdon 
2003, 95). These events work as powerful symbols, since many problems are not self-
evident in a societal context. In a broad sense, the basic starting point for the 
discussion of focusing events is how “sudden, unpredictable events […] influence the 
public policy-making process” (Birkland 1997, 1). These lines of thoughts were not 
new, rather, they had been formulated by Cobb and Elder (1972, 19), discussing how 
demands must be converted into concrete issues to visualize a problem and mobilize 
actors, and within the theory of punctuated equilibrium stating that politics (at least 
in an American context) was characterized by longer periods of stability, “punctuated 
by short bursts of institutional change leading to important changes in outputs” 
(Baumgartner, & Jones 1993, 102). In the early life of the concept of focusing events, 
the idea was discussed because these events were seen as important factors influencing 
the political processes. Nevertheless, a specific theory and a more profound definition 
were elaborated by Birkland in the late 1990s.   
In the books After Disaster (1997) and Lessons of Disaster (2006), Birkland explains 
the reasoning of what a focusing event is, and how these events influence political 
processes. He does this by bringing together elements from many different theoretical 
disciplines like agenda-setting, media logic and competition between different groups 
in the political arena. An important aspect of the early work by Birkland is also a new 
dimension of focusing events – “the potentially focusing event”. Indeed, not all events 
containing the characteristics that classify a focusing event become truly focusing. 
Hence, we need to discuss the potentiality of events. By creating a definition of events 
that include the potentiality aspect we eliminate a problem present in previous disaster 
research, specifically, earlier work often used post hoc constructions of what was or 
was not a focusing event (Birkland 1997, 21−22). The thoughts behind the potentiality 
discussion were to (1) find policy domains where these events were important, and 
(2) rely on a definition and description of these events instead of picking random 
events over a broad spectrum and relying on heavy empirical analysis (ibid.). At the 
same time, this means that despite the fact that an event has all the characteristics of a 
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focusing event, ultimately it is not always focusing. In light of the above, the definition 
of a potential focusing event is constructed as follows: 
 
A potential focusing event as an event that is sudden, relatively rare, can be 
reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater 
future harms, inflicts harm or suggest potential harms that are or could be 
concentrated on a definable geographical area or community of interest, and that is 
known to policy makers and the public virtually simultaneously. (Birkland 1997, 22) 
 
For an event to have the potential to become focusing, it needs to happen suddenly, 
and be somewhat different from the everyday constant flow of events. At the same 
time, the event has to affect many people to obtain political attention. Another 
definition of focusing events relates to the four characteristics identified for man-
made events, with a specific focus on terrorist attacks: novelty, unpredictability, 
criminality and intended use of violence (Worrall 1999, 320). Hence, here we see a 
consistency between the two definitions concerning the first two characteristics of 
novelty and unpredictability, even though criminality and violence can be seen as 
causing harm to a community – there is a difference in the origin of an event. When 
all these aspects are taken into consideration, we can conclude that the magnitude of 
an event, or the focal power, might vary in intensity – albeit that it is not a dichotomy 
variable. An example could be how an earthquake happening in India would never get 
the same focal power as an earthquake destroying Los Angeles. (Birkland 1997, 23; 
2006, 2). The other important notion is that the origin of the event affects the 
definition – a discussion that I will return to in more detail. 
As pointed out in the beginning of the chapter, focusing events are of interest 
because they highlight certain issues, and push them onto agendas. For example, 
Worrall (1999, 335) found that a criminal and violent event receives more attention 
in the media; and more attention means higher demands for policy change. Another 
aspect that makes these events intriguing is the “window of opportunity” they offer 
(Kingdon 2003, 165െ196), i.e. a legitimate and relatively quick way of changing policy. 
In Finland, there are 45.3 civilian guns per 100 residents, which is the fourth highest 
in the world (Karp 2011). The firearms act and laws attached to it were changed in 
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2011, following two school shootings in Finland in 2007 and 2008. However, the 
debate in the parliament and in the media raised concerns from hunters and sports 
shooters (HE 106/2009 vp). When the second school shooting occurred, less than a 
year after the first, not much had been done in the parliamentary arena, which sparked 
a critique. Hence, the question was quite controversial. Even though a focusing event 
might not always be enough to create policy change, an event might bring the 
perception of earlier problems to the surface and demonstrate the existence of 
problems in a society (Kingdon 2003, 98), as seen in the Finnish cases. Although 
focusing events generate attention in different arenas, for policy change to occur, the 
discussion needs to mobilize actors like the media, public opinion and politicians. 
However, strong focusing events, like deadly terrorist attacks, need no assistance to go 
high on the formal political agenda, as such issues are often self-evident in the political 
debate (Worrall 1999). For the most part, however, it is virtually impossible to say 
whether a particular focusing event is the only trigger for a specific policy change – a 
political crisis might have been waiting under the surface for a long time. Nevertheless, 
we cannot disregard the fact that “social change and conflict are often punctuated by 
sharp, sudden events” (Birkland 1997, 2).  
 
Accidents, natural disasters or crises are often imprinted into our memories, and 
many people remember exactly what they were doing when they learned that two 
planes had flown into the World Trade Centre or when they heard about the school 
shooting in Jokela. This is because the picture in our head is most likely created by the 
images and texts presented to us by the media (e.g. Lippmann 1922), and the media 
tries to explain why and how something incomprehensive has happened, and how 
society can learn from its mistakes, especially if we are dealing with a man-made 
disaster. As a result, focusing events introduce issues, and the media or the public 
agenda might put forward demands for policy change (Birkland 1997, 2).   
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2.2 Risks, crises, disasters and catastrophes 
 
The use of the terms crisis, disaster and catastrophe is common in everyday life and 
in the media’s jargon – and since these terms are used frequently in this dissertation, 
I will provide several attempts by previous researchers to define the concepts, and 
discuss how they relate to focusing events. Besides the “normal” crises and 
catastrophes, researchers are dealing with “external events” (Sabatier & Jenkins 1993), 
“external shocks” (Albright 2011; Ostrom 2005), “focusing events” (Birkland 1997; 
2006; Kingdon 2003), or “critical junctures” (Hogan & Doyle 2009). Thus, we are 
studying a wide range of phenomena. One difference between these concepts is that 
external events, shocks and perturbations often aim at broader processes, with no 
specific focus on the behavior of different actors. Conversely, focusing events and 
critical junctures seek to understand societal and political processes (Nohrstedt & 
Weible 2010, 5). As such, studying politics in the form of policy change is dealing with 
complexity; the challenge is “how to simplify, what to emphasize, and what to ignore?” 
(ibid.). 
A simple place to start when exploring the relationship between crises and disasters 
would be the following: in today’s world we encounter a constant flow of risk. A risk 
can be seen as a perception or consciousness about a possible threat that has the 
prospect of affecting individuals, groups or societies. A catastrophe is the condition 
where the risk has materialized, which can subsequently turn into a crisis (Jarlbro 
2004, 10). The main difference between a crisis and a disaster is that a crisis occurs 
through the actions of organizations or actors, while a disaster has its origin in external 
human actions or natural phenomena (Birkland 2006, 3). Crises can be seen as heavily 
produced by the media and society, looking for scapegoats or attributing blame (Nord 
& Strömbäck 2005). Furthermore, there is a difference between the English words 
“disaster” and “catastrophe”, wherein a catastrophe is more profound and affects 
society to a greater extent than a disaster (ibid., 4). Another distinctive difference 
concerns how catastrophes and disasters occur suddenly, while a crisis might build 
over a longer time period, e.g. as the result of political leaders not solving the aftermath 
of a natural disaster in a satisfying way. Nevertheless, since it is most likely that 
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disasters and catastrophes occur in the near future, it is essential that policy makers 
handle these situations in a way that reduces the likelihood of a political crisis 
(Birkland 2006, 6).  
Disasters can be divided into natural disasters (such as hurricanes or floods), 
disasters related to technique (such as airplane crashes or nuclear accidents) and man-
made violence (such as terrorist attacks and school shootings) (Saylor, Cowart, 
Lipovsky, Jackson & Finch 2003, 1623). Hence, disasters are, on the one hand, man-
made and, on the other hand, dependent on natural phenomena (Kroll-Smith & 
Couch 1993, 79−80).  Other researchers (e.g. Leivik Knowles 2001, 3), point out a 
confusion of ideas when too many events are characterized as disasters, or even more 
frequently as crises, when a more suitable concept could be “extraordinary events”. 
Depending on how much the event differs from the normal state, we can speak of 
either serious disturbances, accidents, catastrophes or an extreme stress on societies 
(ibid., 4−5). Hence, focusing events are by definition extraordinary events since they 
differ from the normal political routine. Another concept used to describe this is “a 
serious event” (allvarlig händelse), which is an event that differs from the everyday 
routine and challenges society’s functions (Wall 2011, 5). The different semantic 
concepts represent a variation in magnitude. However, it is still not relatively clear 
what separates a disaster from a catastrophe or an extraordinary event. Thus, instead 
of using a wide variety of words, trying to explain a variation in magnitude, I find it 
more fruitful to use the same concept – a focusing event – and then discuss in detail 
how there are “weaker” or “stronger” degrees of focus.  
Crises, in contrast to disasters, can be defined as situations where societal 
structures and values are threatened, and policymakers have to make fast decisions 
with a degree of uncertainty (Boin et al. 2005, 2). “No country in the world is free from 
hazards and risks, disasters and calamities, conflict and turmoil, revolt and 
revolutions, riots and terrorism” (Rosenthal, Boin & Comfort 2001, 5). This means 
that we cannot avoid crises and disasters in today’s society; rather, such focusing 
events are a distinguishing feature of today. History is filled with dramatic events, 
affecting and changing our systems. Earlier, some events and crises were seen as “an 
act of God” (Rosenthal et al. 2001, 5), virtually impossible to influence. Defining an 
event as an act of God, meaning outside the possibility of human control, is 
 26 
 
convenient since the extension is that political accountability is perceived as low and 
blame attributions is not present (Olson 2008, 160). Today, it is hard to separate a 
crisis from a society, thus, a fruitful definition is “periods of upheaval and collective 
stress, disturbing everyday patterns and threatening core values and structures of a 
social system in unexpected, often unconceivable ways” (Rosenthal et al, 2001, 6). 
From this definition, it follows that crises receive attention on the political agenda 
quite quickly, but that it can be difficult for actors to find consensus concerning which 
actions should be taken and how to define the event. Using this definition, we include 
the disaster concept into a crisis. As such, natural disasters and terrorist attacks can 
both be seen as crises on a societal level. This means that a crisis situation, for instance 
the aftermath of a natural disaster, can be seen as a threat against prevailing values – 
or as an opportunity to bring about change (Boin et al. 2005, 4). In summary, what 
defines a crisis is that it contains some kind of threat to society’s cornerstones: 
security, welfare, health or integrity, and includes an aspect of uncertainty. 
Furthermore, as many forms of crisis are trans-boundary (such as the financial crisis 
or natural disasters), sometimes it is hard to tell the beginning and the end of a crisis 
situation (ibid.). 
Crisis situations can be divided into three types (Boin, McConnell & t’ Hart 2008, 
19). Incomprehensible crises are types of mega-crisis like 9/11 or the tsunami 
catastrophe of 2004. Such events create a big confusion in society, thus allowing 
different actors to frame the crisis according to their own preferences. Mismanaged 
crises take the form of failures inside the bureaucratic machinery, either as an 
indication of a problem or as a real problem. This second type of crisis exposes 
weakness and shortcomings in the management, which often serves as an opportunity 
for the media or opponents to try to change the status quo. Thirdly, agenda-setting 
crises are a type of crisis that can hit a sensitive spot in society, thus raising feelings of 
fear and vulnerability. Examples of agenda-setting crises are nuclear accidents and 
riots (Boin et al. 2008, 19−20). Furthermore, when an event has a clearer underlying 
cause, like a hurricane or a school shooting, it is easier for policy makers to avoid 
blame. Mismanaged situations or accidents, on the other hand, are harder to make 
excuses for. However, the common denominator for all crises is:  
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The impossible conditions they create for leaders: managing the response operation 
and making decisions while essential information about causes and consequences 
remains unavailable (Boin et al. 2005, 4). 
 
As stated above, it is possible to realize that a catastrophe can turn into a crisis. 
However, a question to now consider is whether it is possible to have a catastrophic 
situation without necessarily experiencing a crisis. The relationship between the two 
concepts is developed in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between catastrophes and crises. 
 
The first box represents situations when a catastrophe has occurred and developed 
into a crisis. Policy makers have not been able to take sufficient actions to narrow the 
negative impact of the event. These situations bring about the important question of 
legitimacy, since citizens might lose confidence in their leaders. A good example of 
this is the Swedish handling of the Asian tsunami catastrophe in 2004, where the 
political actions, or inactions, turned into a prolonged political crisis that caused the 
Social Democratic Party to lose votes in the national elections (Henderson & Sitter 
2007, 207; Jääsaari 2009, 57). The second box represents the occurrence of a 
catastrophe, but no subsequent crisis. Somehow leaders and policymakers have been 
able to avoid blame, for instance through the promise of policy change or by framing 
the event as a one-time phenomenon. In the third box, society experiences a crisis 
situation; however, no single event or catastrophe can be seen as the catalyst. An 
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example is how the economic situation might worsen over time – until we are 
suddenly talking about an economic crisis. As discussed by Nord and Strömbäck 
(2005), a crisis situation is often a result of the media coverage, which is drawn toward 
negative events (Soroka 2014). Hence, situation one, two and three, can be seen as 
potential focusing events, because of a crisis or catastrophe taking place. However, the 
actions of political leaders or responsible actors, the media coverage as well as public 
opinion are important in determining the result of the event, i.e. whether the framing 
of the event focus is on blame attribution or heroic actions.  
 
In bringing the discussion of crises, disasters and catastrophes to a concluding remark, 
I take note of Perry’s (2007, 1) points. Since the research is interdisciplinary, it is fully 
understandable that we confront a variation of different definitions of disasters and 
crises. The important task in this respect is to first specify the aim of the research and 
the audience in question. The second step is to then adopt a meaningful definition 
that responds to the context. Despite this, it is nevertheless important to remember 
that there are many different attempts of definition when it comes to crises and 
disasters within social sciences, all of which “represent a legitimate attempt to either 
capture the meaning or operate within the meaning of disaster” (ibid., 4). Therefore, 
as the overall aim of this particular dissertation is to enhance the knowledge of how 
focusing events affect political processes, the definitions need to proceed from a 
societal context. My understanding of the way these extraordinary events affect society 
is as follows: first of all, we need to acknowledge the importance of threats and risks 
in today’s world, since we are living with a constant flow of potential focusing events. 
The perception of these risks, together with actual events when the risks materialized, 
are brought to us by the media. A risk represents a potential threat that may develop 
into a catastrophe, disaster or crisis; the presence of nuclear power, for example, 
implies the possibility of a nuclear accident occurring, which, in turn, could develop 
into a focusing event of a strong magnitude.  
The words disaster and catastrophe are used synonymously in this dissertation; the 
only difference between the two concepts being the degree of magnitude, i.e. a 
catastrophe is more profound than a disaster. However, although the exact difference 
between the two concepts is somewhat impossible to determine, this is not a problem 
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in this study. This is because I use the concept of focusing events to include both 
disasters and catastrophes, and then define the variation in magnitude within this 
concept. A disaster or catastrophe is a focusing event; sudden, rare and with negative 
consequences that can be caused by natural phenomena, or man-made actions – 
intentional or accidental (e.g. Birkland 2006; Saylor et al. 2003).  
The term crisis is understood in the light of the theoretical discussion presented 
above (e.g. Birkland 2006; Boin et al. 2008; Boin et al. 2009; Nord & Strömbäck 2005; 
Rosenthal et al. 2001). A society experiences a crisis when prevailing values are 
threatened or questioned. Furthermore, crises can be created, at the very least 
aggravated, by extensive media coverage. The concept of a crisis can include 
everything from natural disasters to economic crises or terrorist attacks; however, the 
origin of a crisis is the actions of an organization, actor or institution. So even if a 
hurricane can be the starting point for a crisis, it is not the event per se that created 
the crisis situation, but the handling of the event by leaders or policy makers. A 
catastrophe may develop into a political crisis if the citizens lose confidence in the 
government and its ability to handle the situation. Additionally, there is a difference 
in the time dimension; whereas a disaster or catastrophe often occurs suddenly 
without any warning signs, a crisis may develop over a longer period of time – or even 
exist without being preceded by a catastrophe. The important common denominator 
between crises, disasters, and catastrophes, in a political science context, is that these 
events imply challenges as well as opportunities for decision makers, consequently 
affecting the framing, blame attribution and solutions presented to the problem.  
 
2.3 The song remains the same? – Waiting for the next 
disaster 
 
There have been several previous attempts to discuss the phases of disasters, and the 
variation sometimes depends on a different starting point. For instance, when 
discussing the societal impact of rapidly-evolving disasters; the (1) pre-impact, is the 
time preceding the event, leading up to (2) the impact, seen as the hours/days when 
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the direct physical loss on society takes place, followed by a (3) response, when trying 
to minimize the impact of the event, a (4) recovery, when basic utilities, for instance 
water and electricity, are repaired, and a (5) reconstruction or rebuilding of the society 
(Olson 2008, 156). When discussing disasters with a slightly slower onset, the first two 
phases could be defined as a pre-recognition and recognition. The point is to see the 
occurrence of disasters in society as a cyclical process, where the fifth phase of 
reconstruction is also the pre-impact of the next crisis or disaster (ibid.). Hence, we 
should see the political discussion about mitigation or preparedness not only in the 
light of the event in question, but as an emphasis on future, feasible focusing events.  
Another attempt to separate the disaster phases is to distinguish the (1) preparation 
phase, where the forthcoming disaster is usually hypothetical, from the (2) warning 
phase, when the threat is impending and cautions might be given in the media 
(Nohrstedt 1999, 261−262). This existence of a warning phase is sometimes present 
during natural disasters, since many phenomena can be predicted; for instance 
warnings about heavy storms or floods in the media. However, when discussing other 
types of disasters, such as terrorist attacks or accidents, the risk of these events 
occurring sometime, somewhere, is real – albeit a similar warning phase, as with 
natural disasters, is not possible.  
If we look at focusing events from a comprehensive societal perspective, two 
distinct phases occur. The first phase is characterized by the impact of the event and 
the media coverage that follows. This phase is important because a broad and 
extensive coverage is linked to more institutional attention. Another important aspect 
of media coverage is a detailed examination of social issues (Birkland 2006, 29). The 
second phase includes a lengthier discussion as well as policy implications. In this 
respect, different groups are mobilized, which is an opportunity for actors, who 
otherwise find it difficult to be heard in the political arena, to highlight issues of 
importance (ibid.). 
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2.4 Different kinds of focusing events  
 
The definitions of a crisis, disaster and catastrophe are closely linked to the definition 
and understanding of focusing events. A disaster or catastrophe is clearly an 
important aspect of a focusing event as they always occur without warning. However, 
a crisis sometimes develops over longer periods of time. Nevertheless, a crisis situation 
often includes sharp turns and surprising punctuations that can be defined as focusing 
events. Finally, it is important to remember that even though a disaster, catastrophe 
or crisis occurs, it is not inevitable that the event will receive great attention. I find it 
most important to emphasize that a focusing event is defined according to 
characteristics of the event. Even though the subsequent political processes might 
influence the magnitude of the event in ways we cannot always predict, the starting 
point for an event with the potential to become focusing is tripartite (Birkland 1997; 
2006; Kingdon 2003): 
 
1. Sudden and surprising 
2. Rare 
3. Involve a threat or direct negative consequences for a large number of people 
 
In the original definition, Birkland (1997, 22) emphasizes that information about the 
event reaches policy makers and the public at virtually the same time. However, in my 
opinion, the characteristic of a sudden and surprising event includes the aspect of 
citizens and politicians receiving information about what has happened at exactly the 
same time. The fourth aspect has certainly been important during earlier years, when 
the media coverage was a slower and more regulated process. However, in the internet 
age, when most people have a cell phone with a camera – it is hard to hide something 
affecting a large number of people. Thus, the first criterion is that an event needs to 
be sudden and surprising. As seen in the agenda-setting literature –the salience of 
problems rises and falls on the societal agendas, with a striking competition. However, 
an event that is unexpected and surprising is more likely to highjack the political 
processes and be less dependent on competition between actors and groups (Cobb & 
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Elder 1972, 84). The second criterion, rarity, can be understood through an example: 
if we compare car accidents and airplane crashes, the latter is much rarer, whilst we 
experience car accidents virtually every day. Hence, an airplane crash is more likely to 
be discussed on most societal agendas than a car accident, even if the same amount of 
people would be injured. Thirdly, a focusing event affects a large amount of people 
negatively. Logically, an event that affects only one or two people can be seen as a 
personal disaster, but for an event to be considered a societal crisis or disaster, core 
values in society must be threatened. (Birkland 1997, 23−27).  
An interesting question to consider concerns whether sudden and rare focusing 
events can be positive– i.e. in terms of instigating positive outcomes for a large number 
of people. An example of this could be the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which 
brought about positive political change for many people. Such events are rare in 
history, which means that they are difficult to study on a general level, no matter how 
individually interesting they might be. Instead, we can discuss the deviance of an 
event, meaning the characteristics separating the event from other events (Shoemaker 
& Cohen 2006, 13); the deviance can be either positive, so-called good news, or 
negative, in the form of bad news. Hence, events can be framed as positive or negative. 
Another aspect is that the theory of focusing events highlights media logic – and the 
media, as well as politicians and citizens have a bias towards negative news (Soroka 
2014).  
The dimension of potentiality makes a definition of focusing events possible, while 
avoiding post hoc constructions. For instance, the geographical location and 
proximity to a specific political system influences the focal power of the event. This 
can be seen in the discussion of natural disasters – as long as they occur in densely 
populated areas, they are seen as more severe. However, the discussion of potentiality 
includes challenges, since it is almost impossible to measure or identify potentiality; 
instead, we can discuss expectations. In the light of previous research, we can 
formulate expectations concerning events that will have a high or low focal power; 
likewise, empirical studies will show which events actually became focusing. The 
combination of expected influence and actual influence can be constructed as follows 
(Figure 2):  
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Figure 2. Expected and actual influence of focusing events. 
 
The second box represents potential focusing events – events that, according to 
theory, should become focusing. In reality, the potential events will end up in both the 
first and the second box. Some events do receive focal power, while others fade away 
quickly. Furthermore, in the real world there is a fourth box for events that have a low 
expected influence – however, due to favorable actions, lobbyists or media coverage 
they reach a critical point where they are seen as societal problems that require actions. 
The difference between the second and the fourth box is the dividing line between 
focusing events that can be characterized according to properties of the event – and 
events with subsequent processes that resemble those of a focusing event. Hence, the 
process that follows a crisis or a catastrophe should not be the defining aspect of a 
focusing event. Instead, the three necessary variables: rarity, suddenness and 
negativity for a large number of people, are the distinguishing qualities of a focusing 
event, and not the fact that an event receives extensive attention on the three societal 
arenas. The attention is a result of the characteristics the event possesses. 
 
Having discussed focusing events in a broad perspective, I will now turn to a more 
detailed discussion concerning the characteristics of focusing events and how they 
differ from each other. Starting from a policy process perspective, and how events 
influence these processes, focusing events can either be, “normal”, “new”, or 
“common events under uncommon circumstances” (Birkland 1997, 145−147). A 
normal focusing event is “normal” in the sense that it will most likely occur sometime 
in the near future, like most natural disasters do every year, or technical disasters – 
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even though we are not able to predict when or where. New focusing events are a 
completely new phenomenon, due to societal or technological changes in society – for 
instance, when the space shuttle Challenger disintegrated during take-off. A common 
event under uncommon circumstances is an event that possesses some kind of unique 
feature to make it more newsworthy and interesting for policy making, like accidents 
or violent crimes. However, after studying several different focusing events, Birkland 
points out that the mechanisms controlling policy change are often more complex, 
subtle, and contingent, than what first appears to be the case (Birkland 1997, 149). The 
problem with comparing different kinds of focusing events according to this tripartite 
model is that new events are very rare, making empirical investigation difficult. 
Another comment is that it could be hard to separate “normal” events from “common 
events under uncommon circumstances”.  
Even though we use the more narrow definition, the concept of focusing events is 
still broad, including everything from natural disasters to terrorist attacks. Hence, I 
will further discuss the importance between 1) the origin of events and 2) the 
magnitude of events. First of all, the origin of events differs – and the simplest 
classification is that it is either a natural phenomenon or man-made actions that cause 
or initiate the event, much like the definition of different disasters and catastrophes. 
On the one hand, we have natural disasters, e.g. hurricanes, floods or storms. These 
are predictable events occurring annually, albeit we are sometimes surprised by the 
magnitude of a particular event in this category. On the other hand, we have man-
made events, both accidents and errors such as airplane crashes, and the intended use 
of violence, such as school shootings or terrorist attacks. On a side note, an interesting 
discussion to consider, that I will not elaborate on at this time, concerns how man-
made actions may negatively affect the magnitude of natural disasters. In disaster 
research, there is a discussion suggesting that “natural” disasters do not exist (Boin 
2008, xx), since it all boils down to human preparation failure (Quarantelli 1998). 
However, although we have years of experience, risk perception and research – it is 
virtually impossible to prevent all crises and disasters (Boin, Comfort & Demchak 
2010, 3). Given this, I still find it fruitful to separate natural disasters from man-made 
disasters. Moreover, another reason for making the division between events 
originating from nature or from man is that when discussing what to do about heavy 
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rains or a school shooting, the blame attribution, responsibility, and solutions 
presented might be different because of the origin of the event. I use the word “might” 
because previous research sends a mixed message. After all, actor-based threats mean 
that a clear underlying factor can be identified and elucidate different problems that 
caused the event (Eriksson & Noreen 2004). Moreover, Alexandrova (2015) found 
that man-made disasters have a higher likelihood of reaching the formal political 
agenda of the European Council, compared to natural disasters. Conversely, disasters 
caused by natural forces can have a major impact on civilians because injuries are 
often visible and tangible, which, in turn, causes the question to be prioritized by 
decision makers (Williams 2008). This means that discussing natural disasters might 
be difficult because we cannot stop them from happening. However, sometimes the 
physical destruction following natural disasters makes them symbolic and easier to 
grasp. Natural disasters are sometimes discussed as more value-free than man-made 
disasters since these events are “blind to politics” (Keshishian 1997, 332), and not 
limited to a specific ethnic group or political orientation. This notion is supported by 
research on how the media cover natural disasters. In this respect, the pattern seems 
to indicate that the media arena adopt similar standards in the evaluation of natural 
disasters and their news value (Yan & Bissell 2015, 17). This means that it is the events 
itself and the effects on society that determine whether a natural disaster ends up in a 
news story. Another way of categorizing focusing events is to separate the different 
policy domains where focusing events occur (Birkland 1997, 148−150; 2006, 27). 
However, since I am interested in looking beyond the policy agenda, identifying 
broader societal and political processes, I choose to define events according to their 
origin, since the handling of these events (man-made versus nature) might differ. In 
conclusion, the origin of focusing events can be understood as follows (Figure 3):  
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Figure 3. The different origins of focusing events.  
 
The second important division between different kinds of focusing events is the 
magnitude of events. Discussing the magnitude of an event is important when 
thinking about the politicization of focusing events, i.e. the higher the magnitude, the 
higher the political stakes. The degree of severity of an event and the deviance it has 
from normal politics are important when determining which international and 
national disasters gain publicity (Yan & Bissell 2015, 17). For policymakers, it is 
important to “control the political stakes, to keep the events from crossing the 
thresholds to increasingly problematic political levels” (Olson 2008, 157), thus, 
avoiding an overload of the political system. Through Birkland’s definition of a 
potential focusing event, we know that the degree of focus is not a dichotomous 
variable, but a floating index of events with the possibility of becoming mega focusing, 
or fading away with no political impression. Alexandrova (2015) makes an important 
contribution to the discussion of the determinants of attention to focusing events on 
the formal political agenda, and finds that both exogenous and endogenous factors are 
important, as with man-made events where many lives are lost or events occurring 
locally. However, she points out that further research is needed to locate the successful 
ingredients of potential focusing events to become “effective focusing events”. In 
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particular, research should “concentrate on developing a more fine-grained measure 
of magnitude” (Alexandrova 2015, 23).  
 
“The squeaky wheel gets the grease” is an American saying, which can easily be applied 
to focusing events and the following societal processes. What matters is to be heard 
and seen. Foremost, a focusing event must receive attention on different societal 
arenas. Secondly, a massive amount of attention increases the likelihood of demands 
saying that something must be done. The magnitude of an event can be discussed 
according to the response requirements (e.g. Birkland 2006; Quarantelli 1987). For 
example, an accident can be seen as only requiring the activation of established 
response organizations, while an emergency expands to the necessity of latent 
response organizations. Likewise, a disaster can be when expanded organizations such 
as search and rescue are included, while a catastrophe is when we experience the 
introduction of entirely new organizations. Using different words representing the 
magnitude of an event is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, we encounter a 
semantic problem. Birkland, for example, uses three different words representing the 
degree of focus: crisis, disaster and catastrophe, while in other languages, e.g. Swedish, 
the translation of the words disaster and catastrophe is the same. Secondly, Birkland 
gives no clear answer to the operationalization of the catastrophe concept, only that it 
is “more profound than disasters” (2006, 3). Another way to define the magnitude of 
an event is by the number of deceased (Oh & Oetzel 2011, 666), or by a combination 
of death tolls and economic losses (Yan & Bissell 2015, 5). Events become more 
powerful when the number of deceased increases (Alexandrova 2015). This becomes 
a problem, in a Nordic context, since many natural disasters have few, if any, deaths, 
in comparison to natural disasters on a global scale that might include hundreds or 
thousands of deaths. Another example is how the Jokela High School shooting in 
Finland resulted in the deaths of nine people, a death toll that is very small in a global 
comparison – albeit the school shooting is still a strong focusing event in a Finnish 
context. Therefore, one of the important theoretical discussions in this dissertation is 
how to define the magnitude of a focusing event. This is done by identifying 
characteristics found through previous research, combining them and creating an 
empirical instrument that measures the magnitude of a focusing event.  
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The first step in defining the magnitude is to look at the characteristics that are 
necessary for distinguishing between events that are focusing or not. According to the 
definition of a focusing event applied in this dissertation, three variables are needed 
for the existence of a focusing event: rarity, suddenness and negativity for many people 
(e.g. Alexandrova 2015; Birkland 1997; 2006). Beyond these necessary variables, I now 
introduce two more variables to further intensify the magnitude; geographical and 
cultural proximity (e.g. Alexandrova 2015; Birkland 1997; 2006; Nohrstedt & Weible 
2010; Worrall 1999). Hence, I suggest that the magnitude of focusing events can be 
discussed according to a variation in the three necessary variables plus two 
intensifying variables. Starting from the definition of the focusing event, I have already 
presented the three characteristics; however, I will now briefly discuss their 
relationship to the magnitude of an event. If an event is sudden and surprising, and 
reaches the awareness of policymakers and citizens at the same time, the degree of 
focus increases. As pointed out earlier, events that are sudden and severe may reach 
an agenda rapidly and are more likely to remain there until solved (Cobb & Elder 
1972). Likewise, if an event is rare and somehow distinguishes itself from the constant 
flow of information, then the event gains more attention, which increases the 
magnitude. The occurrence of a disaster or catastrophe is one of the most obvious 
indicators that an event will receive coverage on the media agenda (Johansson 2004). 
When discussing natural disasters, events are always rare in the sense that they do not 
occur on a daily basis. However, it can also be presumed that such events can occur 
almost every year. To explain this seeming paradox it is worth noting that, although 
the odds of certain types of natural disasters occurring on a specific geographical 
location vary across the continents and countries, it is still virtually impossible to 
predict when and where an event will take place, as well as the specific magnitude 
(Hyndman & Hyndman 2014, 5). Moreover, the same thing can be anticipated for 
man-made disasters, albeit we might not have as good an eye for what kind of disaster 
we will face. Nevertheless, it is possible to predict that there will be accidents or the 
intended use of violence. If we revisit the thoughts of Birkland, presented at the start 
of this chapter, it is possible to realize that, although we face new focusing events as 
well as common events under uncommon circumstances, we seldom encounter totally 
new focusing events. Thus, the discussion of rarity is based on the notion that these 
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events will happen eventually, or as Holt (1878) puts it, “it is found that anything that 
can go wrong at sea generally does go wrong sooner or later, so it is not to be wondered 
that owners prefer the safe to the scientific”.  The third criterion, that an event is 
negative for a large amount of people, affects the magnitude in two ways. Firstly, the 
larger the amount of people affected by the event, the greater is the pressure to do 
something (Alexandrova 2015), especially if there is violence or death involved 
(Worrall 1999). Secondly, a negative event has a higher news value (Galtung & Ruge 
1965; Maguire et al. 2002). When all these three necessary variables are taken into 
account, the result is an event that is likely to generate attention on different societal 
arenas. A high score on all three variables increases the magnitude, thus making the 
event harder for decision makers to ignore.  
When the three necessary variables are present, and we are indeed dealing with a 
focusing event, there are certain other aspects still to consider that might affect the 
magnitude of the event. If citizens and decision makers can identify, culturally or 
geographically, with the problems and issues brought forward by the event, the degree 
of focus increases (Nohrstedt & Weible 2010). In other words, we are more affected 
by the event when there is the feeling that this is something that could happen to my 
loved ones or me. An emotional response may, for instance, cause citizens to learn 
more about a particular issue, demand policy change or perhaps distance themselves 
from the problem (e.g. Atkeson & Maestas 2012; Graber 2007, 265). Moreover, if an 
event takes place in the immediate proximity, the society experience a feeling that 
crucial societal values are threatened, or economic interests of location and trade are 
affected (Alexandrova 2015, 22). Not surprisingly, studies have found a negative 
correlation between geographic distance and the amount of media coverage (Wu 
1998). However, recent studies point to a disappearing role of geographical proximity, 
as more objective news standards are adopted in the coverage of natural disasters (Yan 
& Bissell 2015). One reason for the diminishing importance of geographic space is the 
removal of physical barriers in global communication (Yan & Bissell 2015, 19). 
Although neighborhood geographical location appears to have an effect on the 
magnitude (Alexandrova 2015, 22), this is more so concerning man-made events. For 
example, man-made intentional acts of violence in a neighboring country can 
motivate a political response, since there is a threat that the conflicts can be 
 40 
 
transferred. Although geographical proximity is easily understood, cultural proximity, 
on the other hand, can be more difficult to comprehend. Nevertheless, regarding 
cultural proximity, a common language, socio-cultural and historical proximity have 
been shown to be important determinants of the relevance of an event (Volkmer 
2008). As such, when the importance of an event is manifested through either 
geographical or cultural attributes, the magnitude grows.  
 
2.5 General research questions  
 
The theoretical discussion on focusing events places emphasis on two aspects of 
crisis and disaster. Firstly, events differ in origin; while some events are created by 
natural phenomena, others originate from human actions. As discussed earlier, this 
division can potentially affect the framing and blame attribution of the event, as 
well as the discussion concerning possible solutions. Secondly, as the magnitude of 
such events differs, this dissertation distinguishes between events with a stronger 
versus weaker degree of focus. It achieves this by adopting the empirical tool 
developed in the previous section. A stronger degree of focus is connected to more 
attention being given to the issue, which has possible political implications in the 
handling of the event. The differences between focusing events are emphasized in 
the two main research questions: 
 
1. How does the magnitude of focusing events affect societal processes? 
2. How does the origin of focusing events affect societal processes? 
When studying the effects of focusing events on societal processes, two research 
areas can be identified. On the one hand, there is the initial, often unconscious, 
response among citizens in the form of emotions (Soroka 2014). Focusing events 
are nearly always negative, which triggers an initial biological response in the brain, 
in the form of affection. People might experience anger, fear, sadness or hope – 
feelings that are relevant for motivating, directing, as well as prioritizing (Neuman 
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et al. 2007, 12−15). After the initial response, we talk, discuss, evaluate, make 
predictions and try to find solutions. This is done through the use of a complex 
interaction of emotions and cognitive abilities. There is a broad consensus in the 
areas of psychology concerning the importance of emotions for our social and 
mental life (Oatley 1999, xviii), and this notion is finally reaching the field of 
political science with the study of affective intelligence (e.g. Altheide 2002; Brader 
& Valentino 2007; Marcus et al 2000; Marcus et al. 2011; Neuman et al. 2007). 
Emotions relate to our personal state in the form of goals and concerns, and to our 
interaction with the world through events, people or things. Moreover, emotions 
have an effect on memory, reasoning and attention (Oatley 1999, xviii). Connected 
to our emotions is cognition, which stimulates the capacity for deliberation, an 
important aspect of political processes (Neuman et al. 2007, 15). When studying 
how focusing events affect political processes, it is therefore profitable to include 
both an emotional and a cognitive dimension. Thus, this dissertation emphasizes 
the importance of including affective analysis units, since previous research has 
focused mainly on the cognitive aspects of political processes. Nevertheless, the 
initial response in our body is an emotional one, and in crisis situations, the media 
and political leaders use emotional attributes to encourage or downplay the framing 
of an event. Hence, a fearful event brings other policy solutions than an event 
emphasizing pride and hope. This means that in order to study the effects of 
focusing events on the political processes, we need to look at two aspects: 1) the 
emotional reactions and 2) the cognitive reactions.
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3. When the levee breaks –  
Focusing events on societal arenas 
 
 
This chapter focuses on defining the important concepts in the research questions. 
Specifically, the chapter will focus on how political processes are expressed in different 
arenas, what a political issue is, and how agenda setting works. The theoretical starting 
points define the three scenes where politics are played out: the citizen arena, the 
media arena and the political arena. The concluding section of this chapter will bring 
together the insights regarding how focusing events are expected to affect different 
domains in a society.   
 
3.1 On the premise for societal processes 
What is politics and how is it expressed and shaped in different societal arenas? A 
formulation that still stands today even though it was coined back in 1936 is: “who 
gets what, when, how”, together with: “who says what, in which channel, to whom, 
and with what effect?” (Lasswell 1936). What a political issue is can be defined by 
the surrounding society. In other words, political processes exist within a society, 
and are affected by the surroundings and different systems. The concept of a society 
can be understood as all the interactions between individuals, as well as systems to 
combine the activities (Lundquist 1971, 14). Thus, we often speak of a political 
system, consisting of political activities, an economic system, or a cultural system. 
When talking about the political process where political decisions are made, firstly, 
there is a contextualization of the problem. This is followed by alternative solutions, 
and in the end, an implementation of a chosen policy (Sabatier 2007, 3). We can 
revisit Easton’s model of the political system, or “those interactions through which 
values are authoritatively allocated for a society” (Easton 1965, 21). The starting 
point for the understanding of politics, according to this model, is that the citizens 
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have to consider that both the government and the policy decisions made are 
legitimate – resulting in a constant interaction between the different parts of the 
surrounding society. Mainly, a political system is a process where citizens’ demands 
and support for a certain kind of value allocation lead to political decisions (Easton 
1965, 17). For a system to survive, it is important that flexibility in the occurrence 
of disturbances is permitted. In this respect, inputs from the surrounding society are 
filtered by gatekeepers, i.e. those who decide which issues should reach the media 
agenda, while outputs are the resource allocations or policies implemented. Easton’s 
model includes a feedback loop from society with information about how the civic 
arena perceives the system (ibid., 26−32). According to this model, a major demand 
overload might be the result of an excessive volume stress or content stress. Focusing 
events are interesting because they simultaneously cause both types of stress. Crises 
and disasters cause physical harm as well as social disruption (Kreps 1989, 219). 
Moreover, they cause a huge amount of demands while making it hard for the 
system to respond (Olson 2008, 156). 
Undoubtedly, the transfer of inputs and outputs in an ideal process works 
smoothly. Nevertheless, during a normal process, the interest articulation is done 
by groups and individuals situated between the citizen and the policy makers 
(Lundquist 1971, 15−18). Although demands or support gain a more profound 
form through the works of interest groups, political parties or the media, this 
process might still be influenced by power structures or affected by the actors’ own 
interests. As Lundquist (1971, 13−14) points out, it is important to be aware of 
actors’ power distributions as well as social, cultural and physical patterns. One of 
the important conclusions is therefore that a political system is dependent on its 
surroundings and is embedded in the society. Hence, studying a political process 
separated from the rest of the societal context is problematic (ibid., 13−25). The 
same thought can be applied to focusing events, i.e. if we only study the political 
processes on the formal political arena, we might miss important connections to 
the way the media contextualized either the event itself or the demands presented 
by the citizens.  
Furthermore, it is important to highlight the importance of emotions, especially 
negative attention, as a driver for individual information processing, political 
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behavior and policy making (Maor 2014; Soroka 2014). Although studies show that 
citizens are drawn to negative information, and political institutions are designed to 
favor negative information (Soroka 2014), previous research has mainly focused on 
institutional or cognitive factors. The model of agenda setting becomes even more 
vital if we consider that citizens favor negative information, and that negative 
feelings affect the evaluation of leaders. In this light, it is worth remembering that 
the media is designed to serve as a watchdog, looking for someone to blame. 
Furthermore, policy making and discussions about solutions to problems are a 
mixture of the framing, blame attributions, and emotions used to contextualize the 
event. Some researchers now claim that we are experiencing a revolution when it 
comes to decision making and the influence of emotions (Kahneman 2011; Mauer 
2014, 3). Hence, we are not only looking at real-world indicators affecting the 
political processes; we are also looking at a strong societal appetite for all that is 
negative.  
 
Initially, there is a distinction between focusing events and non-focusing events in a 
societal context. For example, the distinction between normal day-to-day media 
coverage and disaster news is that the latter is embedded with emotion (Pantti 2010, 
222). Both global and national news coverage on focusing events can have a strong 
emotional effect on a huge amount of people (Scherer 2001, 136). Mega disasters (like 
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident), terrorist attacks (like 9/11), or natural 
disasters (like Hurricane Katrina), are typical examples of focusing events discussed 
and studied in the literature of crisis and disaster research (e.g. Birkland 2004; Gomez 
& Wilson 2008; Lawrence & Birkland 2004; Malhotra & Kuo 2008; Wittneben 2012). 
At the same time, there are examples of how events with a much weaker magnitude 
can be the starting point for a political discussion and raise issue attention on the 
parliamentary arena. For instance, in the late 1980s, dead seals started drifting onto 
shores in Sweden, sparking an environmental debate that exploded on the media 
agenda and created an opportunity for the Green Party to enter the Parliament 
(Strömbäck 2000, 158). On a global scene, the environmental movement, as well as 
the civil rights movement, has often grown in importance whenever a particular crisis 
or disaster has highlighted certain problems in society – creating a mobilization that 
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is punctuated by “sharp, sudden events” (Birkland 1997, 2). In order to understand 
why focusing events are important in society, we must first comprehend how issues 
gain access to the civic, the media and the formal political arena.  As will be discussed 
later in this chapter, focusing events are important to everyone from your next-door 
neighbor to the political leaders of a country. Hence, it is of interest to discuss the 
societal processes following such events.  
 
3.1.1 On the concepts of arenas, agendas and salient issues 
The occurrence of a focusing event draws attention to specific issues or problems. 
During this process, a struggle often develops between different perspectives on how 
to understand the reality of the situation at hand (Lawrence 2001). There are 
different arenas in a society where the understanding of problems, issues and events 
is constructed. One example of this is the media discussion on gun legislation 
following a school shooting. In this case, the media arena becomes the scene where 
the debate is taking place. A fundamental definition of an arena is that we are dealing 
with “a scene of action, a field where events take place, or a sphere of intense social 
activity” (Hjerpe & Linnér 2006, 9). On the one hand, an arena is the venue where 
the interactions between citizens, actors, organizations, or institutions take place, 
and on the other hand, the concept of an arena can be understood as the interaction 
itself (ibid.).   
The concept of agendas is of vital importance in today’s political sphere. However, 
it was not until the late 19th century and an increase in legislative work in Europe and 
America that agendas were emphasized in social sciences (Riker 1993, 1). The 
complexity of today’s political processes makes agenda formation a significant part of 
politics. An agenda can be understood as “a general set of political controversies that 
will be viewed at any point in time as falling within the range of legitimate concerns 
meriting the attention of the polity” (Cobb & Elder 1972, 14). Although the number 
of issues that are important and interesting to different actors in a society is huge, not 
all issues can be dealt with at the same time. At any given moment, there are always 
issues that are more salient than others – and determining which issues are important 
at a given moment is the result of a dynamic interaction (Dearing & Rogers 1996, 2). 
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Hence, issues rise and fall in importance on agendas. One reason for this is simple, as 
humans, we cannot pay attention to all issues and problems at once (Princen 2009, 
20). The limitation derives from factors like time, energy, knowledge and attention – 
and the result is the construction of agendas. Simply put, an agenda consists of the 
issues that are deemed important over a given period of time. However, as pointed out 
by Hinnfors (1995), there is width and variation in the definitions of the concept of 
an agenda that might be problematic. Specifically, when discussing a specific agenda, 
questions arise as to what, whom, when and where. Hence, Hinnfors (1995, 79) argues 
that it is important when defining an agenda to include answers to these questions: 
what – statements about specific issues that should be the subject of society’s value 
allocation; whom – by specific actors; where – on specific arenas; and when – at certain 
moments in time during the allocation.  
In social science, there is a main classification of three types of societal agendas 
– a formal political agenda, a media agenda, and a general public agenda, understood 
as the agenda on the civic arena (Princen 2009, 21). For instance, the civic agenda 
concerns issues that citizens consider to be of importance to themselves 
(intrapersonal agenda) and discuss with each other (interpersonal agenda), together 
with important social issues (Strömbäck 2009, 104). The media agenda pertains to 
the questions that the media collectively pay a lot of attention to. Moreover, the 
formal political agenda is divided into an institutional agenda and a system agenda. 
The institutional agenda consists of the specific issues that are salient at that 
moment, while the system agenda is more abstract and includes all the issues in the 
political sphere deemed important by the citizens as well as for the maintenance of 
the government’s legitimacy (Cobb & Elder 1972, 14).  A further development of the 
formal political agenda is discussed by Kingdon (2003), who specifies the 
institutional agenda as a governmental agenda containing the issues that officials 
are paying attention to, and the decision agenda, consisting of issues that are moving 
into position. Moreover, Olson (2008, 160) includes an agency-level 
implementation agenda.  
“Just what is a political issue is itself a political issue” (Riker 1993, 3). On the one 
hand, a political issue can be understood as a reflection of the objective problems 
that exist in a society; these are issues that extend over a long period of time. On the 
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other hand, there are issues brought forward by interest groups or lobbyists – actors 
are working hard for a specific issue to gain salience. At other times, it is the 
occurrence of a disaster, for example, or an economic crisis that highlights certain 
problems (ibid., 5). Political issues are often bisectional, representing some kind of 
conflict between different viewpoints in addition to a struggle concerning power and 
resource allocation (Dearing & Rogers 1996, 2). Even if an issue is unilateral, as for 
instance with environmental issues where there is no clear pro or con division, there 
might be actors working for a decrease in attention on different agendas, instead of 
raising a clear voice against the issue. Nevertheless, exposure and attention on the 
media agenda is connected to the legitimization of the problem by the general public 
(ibid.). Moreover, there is a difference between events and issues (e.g. Shaw & 
McCombs 1977, 7; Soroka 2002, 5–6). Events are always bound to one moment in 
time, whereas issues are part of a cumulative debate. A focusing event, such as a 
school shooting, might be discussed in terms of gun legislation. However, the issue 
of gun legislation and the debate that follows may include many other events where 
guns are involved.  
In this dissertation, the understanding of the concepts of arenas, agendas and 
issues are closely related, as discussed in the sections above. However, an agenda 
consists of issues that are prioritized during a specific moment in time (e.g. Cobb & 
Elder 1972; Dearing & Rogers 1996; Princen 2009). Furthermore, issues are defined as 
social problems, often including some kind of conflict or power struggle. Attention to 
an issue is an important part of legitimizing the issue and moving it up or down an 
agenda. Likewise, as Hinnfors (1995) points out, it is fruitful to define other aspects of 
an agenda, namely the “where” aspect. The places where the construction of the salient 
issues in the studies of this dissertation take place are the civic, media, or 
parliamentary arenas. The “who” part consists of the interactions between different 
actors, and the “when” aspect is defined more closely in the different studies, but often 
concerns the immediate aftermath of a disaster. 
 
Agenda setting, or issue salience, can be understood as a constant interaction between 
the media agenda, the public agenda and the formal political agenda (Dearing & 
Rogers 1996, ix). Setting the agenda is part of a political process, where different 
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amounts of attention from the media, the public, and politicians are paid to certain 
issues. Hence, the process is not neutral, objective, or rational, but a struggle to define 
problems and ultimately create what are seen as possible solutions (Birkland 1997, 11). 
Advocates for different issues try to push some issues higher up on the agendas, while 
downplaying others. Agenda setting is therefore a question of the rise and fall of issues 
over time (Soroka 2002, 5). Naturally, the more attention an issue receives, the more 
likely it is to enter the formal political agenda (e.g. Smith 1996). A definition of agenda 
setting can thus be constructed as follows: 
 
Agenda setting is an on-going competition among issue proponents to gain the 
attention of the media, professionals, the public and policy elites. […] Agenda 
setting offers an explanation about why certain issues, and not other issues, are 
available to the public in a democracy; how public opinion is shaped, and why 
certain issues are addressed through policy actions. (Dearing & Rogers 1996, 1−2). 
 
Nevertheless, in agenda setting research there is an immense use of dependent 
variables (e.g. Soroka 2002, 7).  In public agenda setting literature, following the 
seminal work of Lippmann (1922) and Cohen (1963), and in communication and 
media research, the concept of agenda setting is discussed as a theory of the impact of 
the media agenda on the public agenda, concerning which issues are salient (first level 
of agenda setting). In addition, attribute agenda setting, or the salience of the 
attributes of objects of attention (second level of agenda setting), and a networked 
agenda setting (the third level of agenda setting), is furthermore identified (e.g. 
McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver 2014, 782). The concept of media agenda setting 
emphasizes how an audience adopts the issues that are seen as important depending 
on which issues are prioritized on the media arena. Protess and McCombs (1991, 2) 
explain the process as: “a relational concept specifying a positive connection between 
the emphasis of the news media and the perceived importance of these topics to the 
news audience.” This does not imply that people blindly believe all that is said on TV 
or displayed on the internet – but that people “co-construct what they see, read, and 
hear from the media with information drawn from their own lives” (Dearing & Rogers 
1996, 5). However, for an issue to reach the media agenda it has to be considered a 
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social problem. Sometimes spectacular events or tragedies affect the agenda setting on 
the media arena (Dearing & Rogers 1996, 29), as seen during the aftermath of a 
focusing event. Furthermore, citizens play an important part in legitimizing 
governmental actions. If citizens have faith in the political leaders, it helps provide the 
government with political capital to take action (e.g. Hetherington 1998), which is 
especially vital in the wake of a crisis. For instance, positive emotions of hope and 
pride in the aftermath of a crisis have a positive relationship to confidence in 
government, as well as support for policy measures (Gross, Brewer & Aday 2009, 120).  
Another aspect of agenda setting is the theory of “agenda building” (Cobb & Elder 
1972), explaining how the formal political agenda is influenced by the media and 
public opinion. The theory tries to explain how different issues reach the formal 
agenda and why there is a difference in the amount of attention given to certain 
specific problems while others are quickly forgotten. A conflict between two opposing 
groups or extensive media coverage can often make an issue reach the formal political 
discussion (ibid.). Sometimes, issues are discussed on many different political levels 
simultaneously, which might be the case especially when a focusing event occurs 
(Princen & Rhinard 2006). An example of this is how the subject of bioterrorism was 
discussed in Europe following an anthrax attack in the US in 2001. Since the event in 
question was a highly dramatic focusing event, the issue concerned both the top 
leaders of the EU, members of the European Parliament, and different regional 
political institutions, who all interacted and worked together (ibid.). Therefore, 
focusing events might initiate a new dynamic concerning how issues are treated on 
the formal political agenda.  
All in all, we are dealing with a complex issue. When discussing how the three 
societal agendas create and are created in interaction with each other, we might even 
have to expand the model of agenda setting (Soroka 2002, 270). The three primary 
societal arenas are defined according to their agendas and the causal connections 
between them. The media agenda (news media, influential media, polling agenda and 
entertainment media), the public agenda (interest groups, influentials, family and 
friends) and the policy agenda (president, political parties, government, parliament, 
bureaucracy) all have arrows running in both directions, displaying a mutual 
influence in the expanded agenda setting model. However, no connection is visible 
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from the formal political agenda to the public agenda, since politicians are most likely 
to affect the citizens through the media or through real-world factors. Besides 
emphasizing the interaction, real-world indicators are important, an example being 
single-variable indicators such as the unemployment rate. These indicators are often 
seen as an index of how severe social problems are (Dearing & Rogers 1996, 18) and 
how they are affected by the formal political agenda. Moreover, such indicators are 
able to affect all three agendas. (Soroka 2002, 11)  
 
3.2 Emotional rescue? – The civic arena 
 
The concept of a general public can be seen as non-private actions taking place in 
the public domain, where everybody should have an opportunity to participate in 
political processes (Grossberg et al. 2006, 378). However, there is skepticism towards 
the public and citizens’ engagement in politics in western democracies, expressed, 
for instance, through a low participation in elections (e.g. Cobb & Elder 1972; 
Grossberg et al 2006). Nevertheless, the understanding of the concept of the civic 
arena is evolving as society changes; some researchers see an opportunity for change 
as internet and social media provide new forms of political participation (ibid., 384). 
At the same time, political actors have adopted media logic and organizations such 
as Greenpeace arrange deliberately spectacular events (Jansson 2004, 380). Hence, 
the opportunities for citizens and organizations have blurred the boundaries 
between the media producers and the media audience (ibid., 381). The media arena 
is closely connected to the public since it is the media that provide a vast amount of 
the information, as well as a forum for debate. However, sometimes the media 
reporting on political news lacks a deeper understanding of how society works 
(Grossberg et al. 2006, 382). 
Discussing a “public opinion” is a philosophical question concerning how 
democratically elected representatives should work for the people and follow the will 
of the people (Dye 1987, 325). Unsurprisingly, the answer to this question is different 
depending on where you start. When defining a public opinion, the opinion implies 
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subjectivism and cannot be considered a fact. Furthermore, public opinion is seen as 
a prevailing state, i.e. something that always exists (Strömbäck 2000, 93−95). However, 
there is no natural group that can be called a public opinion, rather “publics have to 
be created, they do not just arise” (Grossberg et al. 2006, 379). As such, although the 
discussion of a public opinion is seen as important for a democracy, a true and 
coherent public opinion seldom exists. Do politicians follow public opinion and 
translate it into policy change? Or is it instead the political actors who try to stir up 
public opinion (ibid., 393)? For instance, when natural disasters occur, politicians 
choose to argue for a greener agenda (Bishop 2012, 17). According to the spiral of 
silence, humans are more prone to adapting their opinions to the surrounding climate; 
the willingness to express an opinion is easier when you share the views of the majority 
(Strömbäck 2000, 121). At the same time, an opinion that receives strong support 
from media coverage is often perceived as the majority opinion, even if this is not 
always the case. Public opinion can also be unstable and oscillate over a period of a 
few weeks (Dye 1987, 326), making it very difficult for policy makers to know what 
the public opinion actually is. 
According to Abelson et al. (1982), emotions are important in determining 
political attitudes as well as in response to information (Kühne & Scheme 2015). 
People will often forget the content and detail of a news story, but their emotional 
reactions may be more permanent (Soroka 2014, 29). We remember what we did, 
how we felt, or what happened, after reading or hearing about a mega catastrophe. 
Hence, the emotional reactions as well as the cognitive ones are important for the 
information processing (e.g. Conover & Feldman 1986). Negative stories get 
citizens’ attention, as well as keep the interest going. Indeed, “the negativity biases 
in politics and political communications are a product of biases in the ways in which 
humans react to positive and negative information” (Soroka 2014, 96). Concerning 
citizens’ reactions to both negative and positive news stories, psychophysiological 
reactions show that people are more activated and show greater attentiveness when 
watching a negative story (Soroka 2014, 104). Intense media coverage of an oil spill 
with wildlife and nature soaking in oil, for example, can create a strong emotional 
response in people, which can result in a mobilization of the public (Bishop 2012). 
However, negative emotions are not the only emotions visible in the aftermath of a 
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crisis. Positive emotions of gratitude, interest or love can also emerge (Fredrickson, 
Tugade, Waughn & Larkin 2009), e.g. feelings of gratitude for someone’s safety. In 
this light, positive emotions can broaden people’s thoughts by strengthening 
intellectual resources. Hence, the ability to have positive thoughts is important for 
trait resilience (ibid.).  
What kind of expectations do citizens have on politicians and social institutions in 
the wake of a focusing event? And moreover, are their demands always realistic? 
Perhaps it is the perception of how citizens believe politicians will or will not act that 
affects the citizens’ actions in connection to a focusing event (Chamlee-Wright & 
Storr 2010, 254). Most citizens are aware of the threats, risks, crises or disasters that 
can affect a society, since the media often emphasize coverage of such issues (Boin & 
t’ Hart 2003, 545). However, while citizens are aware of the focusing events taking 
place, they often have a rather simplistic approach to the complexity of today’s crises 
and the idea that decision makers can protect us against all threats (ibid.). The 
expectations on politicians are connected to trust in the political system and 
institutions, which have declined due to demonstrations of mismanagement and 
incorrect policy decisions in the past (ibid.).  Hence, there is a contradiction in the 
expectations following focusing events. On the one hand, there is the expectation that 
our leaders will make everyday life return to normal, while on the other hand, crises 
and disasters are sometimes portrayed as an opportunity for change and reform (Boin 
& t’ Hart 2003, 545). Moreover, many crises today are complex due to societal 
modernization processes, i.e. the speed of information and communication as well as 
the rapid rates and distances that people travel.  
 
3.2.1 Citizens’ political power  
A question worth consideration when contemplating the relationship between the 
three societal arenas and agendas concerns the influence citizens have over the media 
or political decision-making (Jansson 2004, 367−372). Although the articles or the 
programs one chooses to consume can be an ideological positioning, many of the 
choices we make are subconscious, or dependent on a high education correlating to a 
higher consumption of political news (ibid.). On the other hand, people chose content 
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they can identify with, and popular culture can be a social resistant against 
unattainable political ideals (ibid., 375). Therefore, the influence over the media 
agenda through consumption can be both passive and active. In previous studies of 
agenda setting, it is often assumed that the media influences public opinion by placing 
more attention to certain issues (e.g. McCombs & Shaw 1972; Dearing & Rogers 1996). 
However, could the relationship be reversed? Originally, the media’s role in society 
has been to create good citizens. Today, however, the economic situation, as well as 
intense competition, has forced the media arena to focus on issues that the audience 
wants to read about (Uscinski 2009, 811). 
The lack of empirical data concerning how the public agenda influences the media 
agenda is partly because the theory of agenda setting is not designed to control for this 
issue (Uscinski 2009, 797). Previous researchers have not been able to investigate the 
relationship from two angles simultaneously. Thus, we might have overestimated the 
power of the media agenda (ibid.). In other words, although the media covers events 
that are spectacular, such as focusing events, it also reports on events because they are 
relevant to citizens, which indicates that the public influences the media agenda (ibid., 
798). Nevertheless, the media choose issues that will attract a large audience. 
Therefore, “the type of events that comprise issue arenas will determine why the issue 
is covered and what type of causal impact that issue will have” (Uscinski 2009, 811). 
Instead of discussing who influences whom, it is of more interest to analyze the 
coverage from the starting point of the nature of the event. Moreover, when discussing 
focusing events, the reality is that the event will most certainly receive extensive 
attention, as well as be considered important on the civic arena. The combination of 
issue salience on both arenas can advance demands for policy change and influence 
the formal political agenda.  
Looking at the influence over the formal political agenda, citizens can influence 
decision making through different channels, such as elections, interest 
organizations, political parties, the media (Lundquist 1992, 221), or in rare cases 
through violence (Mitchell 1962, 281−284). Nevertheless, a political system with 
violence as the dominant way of expression will have troubles surviving. In the 
aftermath of a focusing event, citizens can use the various channels to influence 
politics; by voting in elections, providing feedback to politicians and organizations, 
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by taking part in protests, demonstrations or direct actions (Almond, Powell, 
Dalton & Strøm 2008, 62−63), or by using the media channel.  The influence can 
be divided into a positive or a negative approach, where a positive approach means 
that politicians advocate certain issues because they know that many voters are 
interested in the issue, and a negative approach advocates demands from the public 
towards taking political actions (Kingdon 2003, 66). Thus, dissatisfaction amongst 
citizens can initiate an issue on the political agenda. However, citizens seldom have 
any power over what solutions and alternatives are discussed, rather, public 
opinion can merely help to initiate a discussion on the political agenda (ibid., 66). 
Furthermore, although citizens have the opportunity to initiate decision-making, 
there are some researchers that have a more skeptical view toward the power of the 
public (Dye 1987; Kingdon 2003), e.g., by emphasizing how it is mostly well-known 
politicians and experts who make up the issues, and people “come aboard” 
(Kingdon 2003, 67).  
 
3.2.2 How problems reach our awareness 
People rarely focus on one question for a very long time, even if the problem is a 
serious social issue. Most questions reach the agenda very suddenly; stay there for a 
short time, and fade away, even though the problem may remain unsolved. Moreover, 
this is true for both the public and the media agenda. The cycle of issue attention can 
be identified through five phases (Downs 1972):  
 
1. The pre-problem stage. During the first phase, there are unfavorable social 
conditions, known to experts and interest groups, but not to the general public. 
2. Alarmed discovery follows when one or several focusing events raise the public 
opinion and create anxiety and other emotions. The initial debate is often enthusiastic 
concerning how society should solve the problem(s). 
3. Realizing the cost of significant progress, means that both policy makers and the 
public realize that solutions often imply a high price, sometimes in terms of financial 
input, but also in sacrifices for some groups in society. 
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4. Gradual decline of intense public interest. If solutions to the problem are viewed as 
expensive and difficult, the public might lose interest in the question by becoming 
discouraged, threatened or tired of the problem. At the same time, there is probably a 
new crisis gradually gaining more attention.  
5. The post problem stage occurs when the issue no longer receives attention, but 
sporadic interest. The difference between the first and the last phase is that policy 
changes might have been created or set in motion. Once the problem has reached the 
public agenda, it is likely to capture the attention of the public, “therefore, problems 
that have gone through the cycle almost always receive a higher average level of 
attention, public effort, and general concern than those still in the pre-discovery stage” 
(Downs 1972, 39−41).  
 
An important feature that makes issues likely to pass through the issue-attention 
cycle is sensationalism (ibid.). One example of this is that as long as the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) were able to create exciting and 
spectacular events, such as men walking on the moon, the public support for NASA 
was strong. Nevertheless, as time went by and no new dramatic events occurred, the 
interest declined. Focusing events are important reminders of social problems. Yet, 
intense media coverage might cause the general public to become emotionally numb 
and tired of issues (ibid., 41−43). The idea of the issue attention cycle relies on the 
same theoretical starting points as agenda setting. There are situations when news 
media strongly influence public opinion during the so-called “alarmed discovery” 
phase. For instance, during the 1990s, the fear of crime rose in Texas and polls 
showed an increase from two to fifteen percent of worried citizens, during one year. 
The real problem of crimes committed showed that a negative trend – fewer crimes 
were taking place. However, an increased reporting of crime-related news in the 
major newspapers affected the public opinion (McCombs 2004, 22−29).  
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3.2.3 Mobilization of citizens in the wake of focusing events 
Mobilization of groups is often seen as a necessity for issues to receive greater 
attention on different agendas, especially when focusing events occur (Birkland 1997; 
Goss 2001). The situation during a crisis or disaster creates opportunities for groups 
that usually do not get as much attention on the mainstream agenda to bring forward 
their messages (Birkland 1998, 54). However, this also means that groups can use 
focusing events to draw attention to their own purposes and agendas.  
In the theory of focusing events, the importance of mobilization was initially 
highlighted. However, the question to now consider is whether mobilization is always 
necessary for the success of focusing events on the formal political agenda. Originally, 
Birkland (1997) pointed out that mobilization was an important part of event-related 
policy learning and policy change. Conversely, when studying different disaster 
domains, such as airplane accidents, hurricanes and earthquakes, he found that 
mobilization does not always take place (Birkland 2006). This holds true especially in 
domains where citizens are not as involved, for instance hurricane mitigation, where 
expert opinions are needed. Instead, citizens become involved during oil spills, or 
nuclear accidents that cause widespread public resistance (ibid.). The starting point is 
that the more attention an event gets, the more opportunities there are to influence 
political processes. Hence, group mobilization can be an excellent advance for policy 
change. However, when discussing natural disasters, it is not always obvious how these 
events are connected to citizens’ political decision making. The problem is that “there 
are few conditions under which reasonable people can actually believe that the 
government was responsible for a flood, an earthquake, or a tornado” (Arceneaux & 
Stein 2006, 43). Citizens might choose to attribute responsibility, especially on a local 
level, if the government is not doing enough after a disaster or not providing 
protection (ibid., 44). 
When Birkland (1997; 2006) discusses group mobilization in connection to 
focusing events and political learning, the main emphasis is on the formal political 
arena. Group mobilization is seen namely as various proposals by interest groups on 
how to solve a problem. However, many disaster policy domains require expert 
knowledge, which citizen groups might not have. If group mobilization is seen on a 
more general level, for example on the civic arena, citizens write letters to the editor, 
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sign petitions, or engage in different groups. A more broad form of mobilization was 
present after the first large school shooting in Jokela, Finland, where journalists and 
the media arena received major criticism for the coverage of the crisis. The criticism 
in the form of a petition was aimed at pictures and videos showing too much 
information, and journalists pressing shocked adolescents for information. Two 
newspapers were found guilty by the Council for Mass Media in Finland. This decision 
influenced the coverage following the school shooting in Kauhajoki a year later, which 
was much more cautious (Raittila, Haara, Kangasluoma, Koljonen, Kumpu & 
Väliverronen 2009; Raittila, Johansson, Juntunen, Kangasluoma, Koljonen, Kumpu, 
Prenu & Väliverronen 2008).  
 
As a summary, it is somewhat difficult to know what the public opinion on the civic 
arena is. Is there a general opinion amongst citizens? Or is the public opinion merely 
influenced by the media or elite opinions? Issues move up and down the agenda in 
cyclical movements (Downs 1972), and especially when dramatic and unexpected 
events occur, the emotional impact causes citizens to react and be aware of problems. 
It can be difficult to find solutions to problems because of high economical costs, or 
new problems wanting attention (Downs 1972). At the same time, citizens’ 
expectations of decision makers in times of crises might be too high (e.g. Boin & t’ 
Hart 2003). The emotional framing of an event can be an important contributor to 
how citizens evaluate leaders and whether policy solutions are viewed as legitimate. 
The media agenda has a strong influence on the citizens’ agenda, or more 
specifically, which issues are perceived as important (e.g. McCombs & Shaw 1972; 
Uscinski 2009). Hence, the combination of issues gaining attention on both the media 
agenda and the public agenda should, according to democratic foundations, result in 
attention on the formal political agenda. Politicians need to address issues and 
demands in order to avoid a crisis of confidence.   
 
 
 
 
 61 
 
3.3 Paint it black? – The media arena 
 
Making is the primary activity of media: making money, making everyday life, 
making meaning, making identities, making reality, making behaviour, making 
history. And it is in these various activities of making the media themselves are 
made. (Grossberg, Wartella, Whitney & Wise 2006, 7) 
 
A fundamental aspect of politics is how to legitimize and enforce decisions. The media 
arena plays an important part in this activity, especially when it comes to building 
images and selling policies (Louw 2010, 8−15). In this light, the media arena is a 
central starting point when a focusing event occurs, since these events have a high 
news value and will gain publicity and attention. Media attention is of particular 
importance, since a comprehensive reporting can be linked to increased attention on 
the parliamentary arena and among citizens (e.g. Smith 1996). This chapter discusses 
the media’s role in society and the media’s influence over the public agenda and the 
political agenda according to theories of agenda setting, framing and priming. 
Furthermore, media logic and news values are discussed with concluding remarks on 
how focusing events are perceived on the media arena, and what effects they generate.  
 
3.3.1 Defining the media arena 
The Latin word “medium” means an intervening agency or instrument for publishing 
(Nieminen & Pantti 2009, 14). On the one hand, the concept is used for individual 
media companies or platforms, while on the other hand, it represents an umbrella 
term for mass communication, including everything from production and 
distribution to interpretation. Hence, the concept of media includes the press, radio, 
television, internet and social media, as well as photographs, films, audio and video 
recordings (ibid.). Media has a technical ability to convey information, which includes 
social and cultural patterns of how we use media, even though new technology forms 
offer new ways to communicate (Berglez & Olausson 2009, 10). This means that the 
definition of media is becoming increasingly fluid and elusive as a result of 
technological developments. In this dissertation, the use of the concept pertaining to 
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media and media arena is two-fold. Firstly, media represents the technical aspect of 
conveying information through communication. Secondly, this communication 
occurs in an interaction with the rest of society. As such, although the media affects 
the public cognitively, the media is also affected by social and cultural patterns in the 
system, and by different actors. 
As a society, we need information and different opinions. Therefore, the media 
exists to make us aware of risks and dangers and entertain us – all in all, we live in a 
mediatized world since most of our knowledge and understanding is based on what is 
in the media (Nieminen & Pantti 2009, 15−16; Louw 2010, 194). Media actors are 
especially powerful when deciding what information is given to the public, as well as 
which issues reach the agenda (ibid.). Consequently, the use of the concept 
mediatization is widespread, and the definitions are numerous (see e.g. Hjarvard 
2008). A comprehensive definition that summarizes the arguments presented in this 
chapter is provided by Hjarvard (2008, 113): 
 
By the mediatization of society, we understand the process whereby society to an 
increasing degree is submitted to, or becomes dependent on, the media and their 
logic. This process is characterized by a duality in that the media have become 
integrated into the operations of other social institutions, while they also have 
acquired the status of social institutions in their own right.  
 
Society is permeated by communication processes taking place at different levels in 
the political system and in all forms of politics (Strömbäck 2000, 31−34).  As such, 
communication can be understood as a transfer of content using some kind of means; 
there are several theories attempting to explain communication on the media arena 
(ibid., 34).  An early departure was the notion that communication is transmitting a 
message from one person to another or from one place to another (Grossberg et al. 
2006, 17). As an example, the media coverage following the school shooting at 
Columbine High School could be interpreted as follows: 
“who says” – Marilyn Manson or violent video games 
“what” – the songs or the video games 
“through what channel” – music or computer games 
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“to whom” – the impressionable youth 
“with what effect” – the murder of 13 people and two dead offenders 
 
Another important aspect affecting communication is the result of sharing a common 
culture (Strömbäck 2000, 39). People are constantly trying to give meaning to their 
experiences and the cultural model sees “communication as the construction of a 
shared space or map of meaning within which people coexist” (Grossberg et al. 2006, 
22). This notion has common points of reference with agenda setting theory; whereas 
the media does not tell us what to think about a certain issue, it gives the issue salience 
in our mind. Likewise, recipients are not merely at the mercy of the media, but are 
active in the construction of an understanding of the message (ibid.). Lastly, 
communication can be commercial or directed at a certain issue or be produced to 
gain attention for certain causes (ibid., 39).  
 
Clearly, the media arena faces a variety of constraints and challenges. It is impossible 
to report on everything that happens in a society. Instead, media actors pinpoint what 
they consider to be of greatest importance in the information surplus. A second 
challenge is a deficit of attention amongst the public, resulting in a constant 
competition for the audience and their attention (Nord & Strömbäck 2004, 15). The 
world is experiencing hostility between different cultures and different ethnic groups, 
an increase in focusing events, and a crisis in trust and confidence in decision makers 
(Nieminen & Pantti 2009, 11). Research shows that our bodies respond more 
attentively to negative events than positive events; one explanation for this is that 
evolution favors this kind of behavior since our attention systems need to prefer signs 
of danger (Soroka 2014, 8−9). It is also well documented that the media prefer a 
negative viewpoint and negative events (Soroka 2014, 72). The negativity bias can be 
measured according to real-world indicators. Yet, even when the negativity is 
measured and compared between different domains and countries, the same patterns 
emerge: “there is roughly twice as much negative information in news content as there 
is in reality” (Soroka 2014, 95). 
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The media arena is often the source of information that people use to gain 
knowledge about society and politics; a fact that applies to citizens as well as to 
journalists and politicians (Nord & Strömbäck 2004, 14). This notion means that 
political actors reach out to citizens through the media; i.e. politics is played out in 
and through the information flow on the media arena (Wheeler 1997, 1). Hence, the 
media can be seen as one of the institutions in society; an important communicator 
between the state and the rest of society, influencing the public’s perception of the 
world (Drotner, Bruhn Jensen, Poulsen & Schrøder 1996, 348; Strömbäck 2001, 35; 
Wheeler 1997, 2), while blurring the line between political institutions and the media 
arena (Strömbäck 2001, 37).  
 
To try to isolate the media from other parts of lives – as if we could talk about media 
and politics, media and culture, media and society, media and economics, or media 
and audiences – even for the purpose of study is an oversimplification. For the 
media are already implicated in these other realms: The media are already involved 
in making them what they are, even as these other realms are involved in shaping 
the media. (Grossberg et al. 2006, 7) 
 
The term “media making” (Grossberg et al. 2006) can be understood as the media 
producing information, while simultaneously being affected by societal influences. 
Comparable to Easton’s (1965) view of the political system – it is not possible to study 
the media as being separate from the rest of society, since the media is influenced by 
social, economic, political, cultural, and historical conditions (Grossberg et al. 2006, 
7). 
Three tasks are often attributed to the media. Firstly, the media arena is an 
accommodator of information. Secondly, the media arena is about monitoring the 
social life, and thirdly, the media arena provides a forum for open debate and opinion 
formation (Nord & Strömbäck 2004, 11). This means that the media produces a 
dialogue between policy makers and citizens, which is important for the formulation 
of opinions (Nieminen & Pantti 2009, 26−27). Hence, the media arena has two overall 
roles – the first is to provide information to participants in society, and the second is 
to monitor those in powerful positions – to be a watchdog for democracy (ibid., 25). 
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In light of the above, questions are inevitably raised concerning how society can 
ensure that its citizens have equal opportunities to participate in public debates, or 
that the information provided is versatile enough. Many western democracies today 
have applied a neoliberal approach, whereby the media market should be free from 
societal influence (Harvey 2002), which can be difficult to combine with the media’s 
role in society (Nieminen & Pantti 2009, 13).  
 
3.3.2 Why are focusing events important in the media? 
As established, there are huge amounts of events taking place every day, which means 
that the media have to be selective concerning what to cover. Hence, there are certain 
characteristics that generate wide publicity. The media tend to increase their reporting 
when an event is violent, unusual and dramatic (Johansson 2004, 225; Maguire et al. 
2002). Hence, negativity is important since accidents, disasters or terrorism involving 
injuries and fatalities will increase the news value. Moreover, negative issues or 
conflicts are also easier to absorb (Galtung & Ruge 1965, 69; Johansson 2004, 226). 
Although crises and disasters occur frequently, they are still anomalies, and therefore 
newsworthy. However, it is important that the issue is relevant to the audience. 
Meaningfulness, both as a geographic and cultural proximity, increases identification 
as well as clarity and coherence with prevailing norms. In other words, the story must 
be representative to the audience. Moreover, events relating to a large number of 
people obviously receive a great deal of media coverage (ibid., 228;); visible damage 
also works well in the media arena (Birkland 1997, 33−34).  
Another type of unexpected event covers situations created by different actors; e.g. 
groups performing actions they want the media to report on (ibid.), terrorist attacks 
or school shootings. Therefore, there is a division between news originating through 
accidents and disasters and news created by actors with a specific purpose. 
Consequently, it is no surprise that studies show that any increase in media coverage 
is proportional to the amount and time an issue stays on the agenda when the 
magnitude of an event is greater (Yan & Bissell 2015, 12). However, due to limitations 
in terms of attention and space, most of the media resources are often monopolized 
by only a few big events, leaving only a fraction of remaining space available for the 
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majority of other events (ibid., 17). For example, the Indian Ocean tsunami received 
abnormal coverage, taking into account that Indonesia is often hit hard by natural 
disasters. One explanation for this is that many Westerners were affected by the 
disaster. 
When focusing events occur, the media face several dilemmas. Firstly, there is a 
conflict between the media’s two main tasks: to inform and to review (Nohrstedt 
1999). On one hand, the media is expected to act as an information channel, which is 
of the utmost importance during emergency situations. On the other hand, the role of 
the media (as the fourth estate) means that the media should critically and 
independently review the state, which can do more harm than good during the 
emergency phase. The second dilemma is quick versus accurate information (ibid.). 
In worst-case scenarios, if the information is reviewed carefully, the time for action 
can be too late. A third dilemma is newsworthiness versus evaluation (ibid.). During 
a disaster, the acute phase receives the most attention, while the recovery phase and 
evaluation of solutions is uninteresting, since new newsworthy events have already 
taken place. Hence, sometimes a careful evaluation of disaster preparation and 
management is lacking in the media coverage (Nohrstedt 1999).  
 
3.3.3 The media’s power position  
How do the media respond when a disaster strikes? There is a distinction between 
those who portray the media as “naive lambs” that believe anything, and others who 
see the media as “lions” wanting to create opinion (Boin et al 2005, 75). Are the media 
merely “responding to their surrounding environment” (McCombs 2004, 21)? Or, are 
the pictures in our head simply a pseudo reality (Lippmann 1922)? Since it is 
impossible to capture and report on everything that happens, journalists and media 
agents use various techniques to decide on what is important when it comes to 
providing us with a limited view of a multifaceted reality. This means that the media 
has the power to choose which issues to pay attention to, together with the power over 
who gets to speak up (Berglez & Nohrstedt 2009, 25−26). Especially in the event of a 
disaster, actors normally not having great power can sometimes be given space in the 
media (Birkland 2005, 92).  
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Media policy can be defined as “the systematic attempt to foster certain types of 
media structure and behaviour” (Freedman 2008, 1), and the media arena is a 
battleground over both material advantages and ideological legitimation (ibid., 3). 
One of the most important factors regarding the media and political processes is 
therefore the media’s influence as an agenda setter, since there is a positive correlation 
between news coverage and institutional attention (Birkland 2005, 91). However, the 
media do not only highlight problems; as they are able to reach out to a broad 
audience, they can also increase the pressure on policy makers to deal with an issue. 
A side effect of the economic situation – news media have to make a profit – is that 
the media increasingly tends to report on dramatic events, such as murders, accidents 
and crimes (Birkland 2005, 92). This can be exemplified with Soroka’s (2014) study, 
where a positive tone made newsstand sales drop by more than half, compared to 
using a negative tone. Negativity in news content is also dependent on consumer 
interest (ibid., 99). Nevertheless, although the media are often very selective, three 
characteristics can always generate widespread media attention (Maguire, Weatherby 
& Mather 2002): violent events, unusual events, and high death tolls. The media’s 
preference for dramatic and negative content has been shown in a large number of 
studies (for a review, see Soroka 2014, 19), and in different forms of media, print as 
well as television.  
Still, there is no clear answer as to why the media – as well as all other aspects of 
politics – favor negative information. Perhaps the answer can be found in the fact that 
we are dealing with financial structures or journalist behavior and priorities, which 
might result in an increase in the use of a “problem frame” (Altheide 1997). This, in 
turn, may create certain expectations in the audience. Another explanation is a bias in 
the human brain; we are more interested in negative news. Or a design factor; the 
media’s institutional function in the political system is to operate as a whistleblower 
and identify problems (Soroka 2014, 21). Moreover, media coverage regarding 
focusing events is influenced by political ideology, prevailing policy preferences and 
reporting styles and traditions (Boin et al. 2005, 75). Political factors, such as the 
proximity in time to elections or institutional factors, influence the agenda setting 
(Walgrave & Van Aelst 2006; Van Aelst, Brants, Van Praag, De Vreese, Nuytemans & 
Van Dalen 2008). The danger of media coverage focusing on negative news is that the 
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public’s risk perception can be distorted. The more intensive and negative the 
coverage is, the more likely it is to result in some kind of public pressure (Birkland 
2005, 93−94).  Another problem is that a simplified or polarized picture of reality can 
distort the perception and undermine a deeper understanding of the problem 
(Birkland & Lawrence 2009, 1406). To conclude, while some researchers suggest that 
the media do not tell us that to think, but merely control which questions get agenda 
space (Birkland 2005, 94), other researchers point out that since the media represent 
the public’s primary source of information about politics and politicians, the influence 
over the perception and attitudes is considerable (Strömbäck 2001, 185).  
 
3.3.4 Setting the agenda 
 
For the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for 
direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much 
variety, so many permutations and combinations. And although we have to act in 
that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can 
manage with it. (Lippmann 1922, 11) 
 
 
Agenda setting can be described as the media giving the audience clues on which 
issues are important right now. If the audience receives the message and incorporates 
it into their thoughts, the agenda setting is deemed successful (Wanta 1997, 1). The 
media arena is our window to the world, and influences our cognitive maps. Hence, 
public opinion is created not (only) by reality, but by the reality we perceive through 
the news. Namely, the media arena can be a servant of democratic institutions or 
exploit social disorganization (Lippmann 1922, 229). Firstly, politicians use the media 
to reach out to people, and secondly, the journalists produce the information – when 
taken together, citizens use this information to make political decisions (McCombs & 
Shaw 1972, 176). The more often a message is repeated, no matter what the forum or 
form is, the more powerful the message becomes and the significance of the issue rises 
(McCombs 2004, 8). This means that the news media is important in influencing the 
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public agenda; not in determining how people think, but what they think about (ibid., 
2). This should obviously be the case in reasonably open and democratic systems. 
There are certain general characteristics regarding agenda setting (Dearing & 
Rogers 1996). One such characteristic is the fact that there are always certain issues 
having a more prominent role in the media at any given moment in time. However, 
this does not mean that different media actors emphasize exactly the same things 
about the issue (ibid., 91). Another characteristic is the fact that the connection 
between real-world indicators – the variable that measures the severity of a particular 
social problem – and media coverage is often negative. One famous example is how 
the media reports on drug abuse increased, although actual drug abuse decreased 
(Iyengar 1994). More important than real-world indicators are powerful actors or 
triggering events (Dearing & Rogers 1996, 91−92). In addition, the placing of a news 
story on the front-page and the graphic design are important. Although some research 
shows that television and newspapers have different agenda setting effects (Walgrave 
& van Aelst 2006, 92−93), it is almost impossible to answer the question as to which 
form of media has the greatest influence on public opinion. In contrast, in disaster 
situations, the coverage of an event will be fairly equal in most media forums – which 
increases the agenda setting effect (Paletz 1998).  
 
Agenda setting works because people have a need to understand and organize their 
environment, especially in unfamiliar situations or when facing a dilemma. We often 
turn to different media sources to find information, especially if the issue is relevant 
to us or contains uncertainty (McCombs 2004, 53). This is because the media 
construct various social problems when emphasizing specific aspects of reality 
(Birkland & Lawrence 2009). The theory of framing is derived from psychological 
studies (e.g. Iyengar & Kinder 1987), discussing how a certain frame highlights some 
aspects, while downplaying others. Although this construction is needed if we are to 
understand a diverse and complex world, there are usually several ways to explain a 
problem, how to resolve it and who to blame. The framing of a problem is the starting 
point in the search for solutions (Birkland 1997, 11).  Sometimes the 
overrepresentation of dramatic events undermines a more long-term and holistic 
analysis of various phenomena.  Political processes and decision making is about 
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framing issues in a certain way, which is especially visible when dealing with 
controversial issues (Birkland & Lawrence 2009, 1406). Framing is a problem if the 
media coverage distorts the public’s perception of an event and discourages a deeper 
understanding of various problems (Muschert 2007, 65). The media arena and the 
political arena is a competition on which issues are considered important (Lawrence 
& Birkland 2004). Although both arenas pay attention to exceptional events, it is not 
clear that a problem will be defined in the same way on both arenas Foremost, it is not 
clear how much the two arenas influence each other; both arenas receive feedback 
from the other and follow each other. Secondly, the media arena is merely a stage for 
discourse, while the formal political discussion is followed by actions. Hence, the 
parliamentary discussion does not always deal with the problem formulation brought 
forward on the media agenda, since it cannot be realized by laws and directives. 
Therefore, the parliamentary debate is more often limited, and less outspoken than 
the medial discussion (ibid., 1194−1195). Moreover, the media arena is more 
concerned with the newsworthiness of events, rather than the public policy actions. 
The politicians perspective might be that the domains and areas hit most often by 
disasters require more actions than the few mega events that receive the most attention 
(e.g. Yan & Bissell 2015, 21).  
 
Priming is another central theory concerned with the relationship between external 
stimuli, such as media content, and assessments made by people (Strömbäck 2000, 
207).  The theory highlights that prior knowledge and beliefs can influence the 
formation of opinion. Priming can be defined as the media paying more attention to 
certain issues and not to others, which helps to activate and emphasize some cognitive 
schemas over others (ibid., 208). This means that the media influence the standards 
by which citizens judge politicians, public officials, and political parties (Iyengar & 
Kinder 1987, 63; Strömbäck 2000, 208). As the issues receiving the most attention in 
the media are those that citizens consider to be important, thus the political struggle 
over the media agenda is of importance (Strömbäck 2000, 208). An example of this is 
a political party emphasizing environmental issues; as long as the media mainly 
focuses on environmental policies, other issues play a minor role. Overall, citizens’ 
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views of politics are based on thoughts that are convenient and close at hands (ibid., 
209).  
 
3.3.5 The attention struggle 
An agenda cannot usually contain more than five issues during the same period of 
time (McCombs 2004, 38). This limitation is due to limited resources in the public’s 
perception – time wise, in terms of cognitive capacity and the result of a gigantic flow 
of information (Ghersetti 2004). The exception is the internet, with a theoretical 
possibility of an unlimited flow of information; however, the public’s attention span 
has the same limit here (McCombs 2004, 50−51). Given the restrictions of the 
audience and the media arena, media content must capture the readers interest 
(Ghersetti 2004), as well as be profitable – resulting in the tabloidization of news 
(Nieminen & Pantti 2009, 21). A general trend, due to the commercialization of the 
media, is an increased focus on entertaining the audience, providing an oversimplified 
picture of the reality (ibid, 22−23).  
In order to capture the audiences’ attention, there are a number of journalistic 
approaches used by the media (Asp 1986; Hernes 1978; Nord & Strömbäck 2002, 
34−35). Sharpening or aggravating an issue is important; otherwise there is a risk of 
the news story drowning in the information flow. Simplification is important since 
everyone should be able to understand the meaning of an article, even if the issue is 
complex. Polarization maintains the attention and evokes emotions, especially if the 
issue emphasizes a conflict. Intensification, concreteness, impersonation and 
stereotyping are other approaches used by the media to connect the audience to the 
story in the first place, and maintain the attention. Contrary to the more negative view 
on emotions in media coverage, research shows that emotions can facilitative citizens’ 
information intake (Bas & Grabe 2015). Emotions are important in news stories for 
different reasons; firstly, because of sensationalism and the attentive aspect of 
emotions, as discussed above. Secondly, arousing and negative events are often 
associated with negative news, which has been shown to stimulate information 
seeking (Brader 2005), and memory consolidation (Hamann 2001; Cahill & McGaugh 
1995). Research has even shown that emotional and personalized news increases the 
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encoding, memory and retrieval of news information for citizens from both the higher 
and lower education groups, with especially strong benefits for the lower groups (Bas 
& Grabe 2015, 176).  
 
3.3.6 The media response to a focusing event 
Every day, an extensive amount of events occurs – with some events having an 
advantage in being considered as important news. The media favors certain types of 
issues – such as those that are rare and unpredictable, dramatic, or negative events 
affecting large numbers of people (Asp 1986; Hernes 1978; Maguire et al. 2002; Nord 
& Strömbäck 2002). This concludes that focusing events are important due to news 
values, which influence how much attention the issues receive on the media agenda.  
Overall, the impact of the media’s influence on political processes is due to the 
media’s role as an agenda setter. Media actors decide which issues are brought up for 
discussion in the community, and by extension, this often means that the media shape 
which issues citizens contemplate. At the same time, the media have the power to act 
as a watchdog in society and review policies and decisions, putting pressure on the 
politicians. In conclusion, the media’s influence derives from several aspects (Berglez 
& Nohrstedt 2009, 16; McCombs & Shaw 1972): the media arena can influence our 
perceptions of power and issues, as well as determine which power struggles are seen 
as important. Hence, the media arena takes part in the reproduction of power 
relationships in societies. However, the media arena is influenced or controlled by 
other actors, such as shareholders, advertisers or the state.  
Journalists contribute to the framing of an event by using certain approaches, such 
as simplification or conflict frameworks, to catch the audiences’ attention. However, 
with this approach there is a danger that if the media coverage presents social 
problems in an oversimplified or polarized way, a deeper understanding of the 
problem will not take place (Birkland & Lawrence 2009). The contextualization of 
social problems is an important fight for audience attention, because most citizens as 
well as politicians acquire their information from the media. As such, the framing and 
priming of an event in the media lays the basis for the political dialogue and which 
solutions are viewed as possible. The role as a critical reviewer of society is a task that 
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is especially problematic and important during crises and disasters; it is a challenging 
task to present correct and fast information as well as to know when to scrutinize the 
actions of decision-makers (Nohrstedt 1999).  
 
3.4 All Apologies? – The parliamentary arena 
 
How do different issues reach the formal political agenda, and how come some are 
successful, while others fade away quite quickly? This is the overall important question 
when discussing the formal political agenda (Mitchell 1962). As defined earlier, the 
formal political agenda consists of an institutional agenda with concrete and specific 
issues debated at a particular moment in time, and a system agenda with all questions 
important to the political system (Cobb & Elder 1972, 14). The ability to cope with 
problems is vital for the existence of the formal political agenda (ibid., 15); when a 
disaster strikes, politicians quickly have to deal with demands arising from the public 
or from the media arena.  
When defining the formal political arena, important aspects to consider are the 
organization, power distribution, decision-making processes, and how they are all 
influenced by different groups. As pointed out earlier, the political system and the 
formal political agenda exists in interaction with the surrounding society, where 
demands, support and feedback are central variables to the survival of the system. 
However, there is not always a clear path between demands and attention on the 
political agenda – instead, demands must be transformed or explained according to 
substantial issues to visualize the problem and mobilize actors (Cobb & Elder 1972, 
19). The process where demands either succeed or fail in the quest of reaching the 
formal political agenda is affected by gatekeepers, in the form of persons, institutions 
and groups (Easton 1965, 133−137). Thus, a central part of agenda building is 
“occurring at the boundaries of the system and its subsystems” (Cobb & Elder 1972, 
22).  The problem is not the existence of many different groups inside the political 
system, but that “each group reinterprets its interests to be synonymous with the 
general interest” (ibid., 33). Thus, conflicts between different groups arise, since actors 
have diverse interests and goals (Sabatier 2007, 3). Consequently, focusing events, as 
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well as actors around the formal political agenda are of importance when discussing 
the formal political agenda. Inside this equation lies a discussion about power – who 
has control over what information reaches the agenda, how are issues defined and who 
decides which solutions are discussed (ibid., 26)? According to the theory of 
“disjointed incrementalism” (Braybrook & Lindblom 1963, 83−98), only those policy 
suggestions following the prevailing values in a society are considered on the formal 
political agenda. Few alternative solutions that would reformulate a problem 
completely are discussed (Cobb & Elder 1972, 26). However, even though the political 
elite want to maintain the status quo, focusing events might provide an opportunity 
for change (Boin et al. 2005, 123). Firstly, this is because such events loosen the 
structural constraints, making policy change easier. Secondly, crises and disasters 
allow the discussion to deal with alternative solutions, to a higher extent than during 
normal politics. In addition, deeply rooted mind-sets might soften throughout the 
whole policy chain. Taking these three aspects into account, the politicization of 
focusing events on the parliamentary arena provides opportunities for change (ibid., 
125−126). Hence, to a certain degree it is an ideological struggle that determines 
whether focusing events are handled by a conservative or a reformist approach. A 
conservative approach implies a lower risk for the political elite, making it a popular 
way to go (Boin et al. 2005, 128). An example of how the political context affects the 
outcome of focusing events is found in the differences between Canada and the US 
when dealing with school shootings (Fleming 2012). The Canadian system provides 
the parliament with more influence, meaning that policy-making processes are faster 
and more efficient, in comparison to the US, which has a strong presidential influence. 
Hence, we find that momentous policy changes concerning gun legislation took place 
in Canada, whereas no real policy changes took place in the US (ibid.). Another aspect 
is that many societal problems are perceived as unsolvable to some degree; we cannot 
eliminate unemployment, or natural disasters for that matter (ibid., 29). Policy 
processes are thus often extended in time, and require that different levels of the 
political system have to cooperate (Sabatier 2007, 3–4). 
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3.4.1 Political processes  
There have been several academic attempts to define the policy process. Initially, many 
definitions emphasize different stages of the process; initiation of an issue on the 
political agenda could be followed by preparation if the issue is deemed important 
enough. A third stage could be decision making followed by implementation of the 
arrangements, and finally feedback or control (Lundquist 1992, 12−13). Then again, 
the world is usually not as simple as it may seem at first. The process is often described 
as a cycle, which refers to the notion that decision makers should learn from previous 
events and problems (Cairney 2012, 23). As such, previous knowledge should be 
incorporated when making future decisions. Early policy researchers emphasized that 
policy is conscious actions or inactions (Heclo 1972; Smith 1976); while later 
researchers point out that the policy process consists of decisions that can be 
understood according to networks (Easton 1965; Jenkins 1978). The policy process is 
a complex affair that includes many different actors, such as politicians, citizens and 
lobby groups.  Policy can be understood as a deliberately chosen course of action 
related to a societal problem (Smith 1976), referring to particular actions (Heclo 
1972), as well as a resource allocation between different groups in society (Easton 
1965). The simplest summarization would be “whatever government chooses to do or 
not to do” (Dye 1978, 3).   
However, many of the definitions used when discussing the policy process are 
difficult to apply to the real world (Danielsson 2010, 113). The critique brought 
forward highlights that broad definitions are virtually impossible to employ when 
studying a specific mechanism – especially if a single decision is understood as being 
interconnected to several other decisions over time. A better approach would be to 
adopt Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1984) foundation that policy is the idea of the 
relationship between means and ends (Danielsson 2010, 121). Policy cannot be both 
a means of intention, and actual behavior; instead, we should understand policy as 
theories and the idea that there are underlying problems that require action.  
To conclude, on one hand it is fair to express a critique against too broad concepts 
of policy processes, and that the processes do not necessarily play out in neat stages 
that follow each other. On the other hand, handling complex processes demands some 
form of simplification, as long as we are aware of the difficulties and challenges 
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(Sabatier 2007, 4). In this dissertation, the policy process, or the political process on 
the formal political agenda, is understood as the actions or inactions we choose in 
order to solve societal problems, as summarized by Cairney (2012, 4) below:  
 
The policy process is complex, messy, and often appears to be unpredictable. 
Further, the idea of a single process is a necessary but misleading simplification. 
When we scratch beneath the surface we find that there are multiple policy 
processes: the behaviour of policymakers, the problems they face, the actors they 
meet, and the results of their decisions often vary remarkably. They often vary by 
region, political system, over time and from policy issue to issue. 
 
3.4.2 How issues rise on the formal political agenda 
How are issues defined and redefined on the political agenda? “History tells us that 
political mobilization is fuelled as much by great events as by great men and great 
strategy”, writes Goss (2001, 3). In this way, focusing events often play an important 
role when mobilizing stakeholders. However, it is difficult to identify patterns and 
arrangements following focusing events because their circumstances are often 
random and impossible to predict. In contrast, this is one of the things that cause 
people to organize themselves. “Politically, focusing events do not happen so much as 
they ‘play out’” (ibid., 5), hence, we can identify the stages associated with how 
focusing events are contextualized. The first phase involves increased attention, which 
pushes the issue into the public agenda. In the second stage, the public perception of 
the causes and risks associated with the event is redefined, which can lead to a 
reformulation of the problem. In the third stage, new proposals can be brought 
forward, which leads to new groups getting involved in the issue. If the focusing event, 
and the actions decision makers choose to apply, are considered legitimate – there is 
an opportunity for policy change. This can be understood in terms of the focusing 
event creating an understanding of a problem, which in turn can result in concrete 
actions (Goss 2001, 5−6). Moreover, with an increased number of new ideas, a better 
breeding ground for new policies is created (Birkland 2006, 18). 
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Politics can be defined as three streams – a problem stream, a policy stream and a 
political stream (Kingdon 2003, 197). Inside the problem stream, events and problems 
related to them are identified. In the policy stream, solutions are presented by experts, 
interest groups and actors. However, there is not always a clear pathway between the 
problems perceived in the problem stream and the solutions presented in the policy 
stream (Rushefsky 1994, 98). Policy making is a complex concern, since the different 
actors must specialize and coordinate to achieve influence in the policy process 
(Sabatier & Weible 2007, 192). Furthermore, the different actors’ positions on policy 
issues are often very stable, making it relatively difficult to accomplish policy change. 
Still, the core of policy processes in democratic states is the occasional disturbance by 
“policy punctuations”, allowing change to happen (Baumgarner & Jones 1993). 
Politics consists of static and incremental periods with little or no change, followed by 
more dynamic periods where ideas are revised, allowing changes (Danielsson 2010, 
63). It is possible for states with a long history of stability, to experience rapid and 
destabilizing changes (Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen & Jones 2006, 63). Actors within 
a system often share an understanding of the problem formulation concerning a 
certain policy. The driving force behind major policy change is the mobilization of 
new actors, allowing problems to be reformulated. A disturbed balance in the political 
system can start from policy images – how issues are defined, or from the institutional 
context – where an instability on the political arena allows actors do advocate change 
(Parson 1995, 204). Political actors use attention to try to influence the formal political 
agenda, thus, the media plays an important role by drawing attention to various events 
(Danielsson 2010, 63; Parson 1995, 204). During static periods, the political elite 
dominate the policy process, but when for instance focusing events challenge existing 
notions and point out imperfections – policy change is possible (Walgrave & Varone 
2008, 367).  
When a society is aware of a problem, citizens can participate to demand changes, 
political groups can support or work against an issue, and academics can be involved 
in policy formulation. During normal political processes, the three streams work 
separately, however, during certain circumstances “a window of opportunity” 
(Kingdon 2003, 165) arises and the three streams are combined and new policies can 
come to light. Long periods of maturation and development precede policy change in 
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the process where new ideas are born and old ideas disappear on the political agenda 
(Kingdon 2003, 226). Even though the process is usually quite slow, there are examples 
of rapid change, when policy change does not happen gradually, but through great 
strides. Although legislative activities are usually a time consuming process, Wolfe 
(2012) finds that questions that are prominent on the political agenda are often 
followed by a faster policy-making process; if we are dealing with large-scale focusing 
events, the legislative process is up to two and a half times faster than usual. An 
explanation for this may be the positive feedback received from the media, when the 
coverage is extensive (ibid.). Hence, real and revolutionizing changes are possible. 
Nevertheless, there is still a need to have an existing understanding of the problem, 
since policy solutions are formed under longer periods of time, even though a change 
can happen quite quickly (ibid., 227).  
Furthermore, decision makers are expected to learn from disasters and crises. The 
learning process can be defined as “the process by which participants use information 
and knowledge to develop, test, and refine their beliefs” (Birkland 2006, 8). Learning 
in crisis and disaster situations can be about experience, if there is a lack of previous 
knowledge about rare events. Furthermore, learning can be based on explanations, to 
find rational and scientific causes and effects. Thirdly, learning in crisis situations can 
be about competencies and skills to adopt in similar situations (Boin et al. 2005, 118). 
A prevailing notion is that people and organizations act rationally; trying to make 
logical decisions based on information and analysis capabilities. So, when something 
goes wrong, we try to learn from our experiences and improve the system to avoid 
similar situations in the future (ibid., 9).  Hence, we can connect a specific event to 
policy learning, since participants in the policy process must try to solve the problems 
arising from the event; no legitimate politician wants school shootings or floods (ibid., 
18). Few events ever receive massive attention on the parliamentary arena. But once a 
particular event does come into the limelight, it will start to receive serious attention 
and consideration by policy makers, creating a better breeding ground for learning 
and policy change. There are two different approaches to the concept of learning in 
emergency situations. Firstly, learning aims to answer questions such as; what went 
wrong, why is this happening and how can we make sure this does not happen again? 
Moreover, learning can also refer to changes in policy (Boin et al. 2005, 116).  
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When formulating a problem, issues can be brought forward by groups. On one hand, 
the issues might be fabricated by the groups, according to their own political agendas. 
On the other hand, sometimes issues are brought forward for the good of the society, 
with no vested interest, for instance, the civil right movement in the US. Secondly, 
circumstantial reactors, or unpredictable events, might initiate an issue onto the 
formal political agenda, as an example, the murder of J. F. Kennedy made the issue of 
gun legislation an important political issue (Cobb & Elder 1972, 81–83). 
The triggering mechanisms of unpredictable events might be both external or 
internal, corresponding to domestic and foreign policy responsibilities (Cobb & Elder 
1972, 84):  
 
Internal triggering events: 
1. Natural catastrophe 
2. Unanticipated human event 
3. Technological change 
4. Imbalance in the distribution of resources leading to strikes or riots 
5. Ecological challenges 
 
External triggering events: 
1. Act of war or military violence 
2. Innovations in technology, for instance arms control 
3. International conflicts 
4. Changing world alignment patterns  
 
The internal triggering events are focusing events; natural disasters, and man-made 
disasters in the form of human accidents or technological change. Disasters and 
catastrophes provide an opportunity for change by being the triggering mechanism 
that changes our perception of a problem, or as Birkland (1997, 6) puts it: 
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That trigger can be a change in our understanding of the problem, a change in the 
political stream that is favourable to policy change, a change in our understanding 
of the tractability of the problem given current solutions, or a focusing event that 
draws attention to a problem and helps open a window of opportunity.  
 
However, to reach the political agenda the event needs attention; that is the 
surrounding society needs to be aware of this accident taking place. Secondly, a 
concerned public that approves of political action is needed in combination with the 
issue being considered a part of the government’s operating range. Hence, “action 
must be considered not only possible, but also necessary for the resolution of the issue” 
(ibid., 86). Reaching the system agenda is not always a given ticket to the institutional 
agenda.  
What makes an issue interesting once it has reached the formal political agenda? It 
is not the characteristics of the event per se, but the way “political actors deliberately 
portray them [problems] in ways calculated to gain support for their side” (Stone 
1989, 282). Political actors give us stories, telling us how to solve problems. As seen 
on the media arena and in the framing literature – our reality is a struggle over which 
ideas to use in the definition of the world. Although Stone calls this manipulation, one 
could ask whether there is another way to explain a complex world? Some kind of 
simplification and contextualization is always needed. The stories we tell can be about 
decisions or consequences which are accidental or deliberate in both dimensions 
(ibid., 284). An accidental cause, for example a natural disaster, is an event that is not 
the direct consequence of human actions. This makes it difficult to discuss on a 
political level. Since decision makers cannot control such events, it is more fruitful to 
discuss human actions in terms of responsibility or blame (ibid., 295–297). There are 
different ways to frame a crisis situation, depending both on the characteristics of the 
event and on the strategies by the leaders (Boin, t’ Hart & McConnell 2009). The first 
type of crisis covers events explained as an unfortunate happening, which therefore 
do not require any form of political action. The second type covers events portrayed 
as a critical threat to society, although no blame or accountability are placed on the 
political actors. Thirdly, there are crisis situations that are employed by bringing up 
criticism of current policies or the political parties in power (ibid., 85). Previously, the 
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first and second options were often discussed as “God’s work”, something you cannot 
influence through political actions. However, in today’s risk society there is a greater 
critical emphasis or framing of disasters in such a way as to affect the social and 
political arena (ibid.). 
 
3.4.3 Focusing events on the parliamentary arena – Opening a 
window of opportunity? 
Having discussed and defined political processes in the parliamentary arena, starting 
from the important question regarding which issues succeed in reaching the formal 
political agenda and staying there, I will conclude with some remarks about what this 
says about the influence of focusing events on the political agenda. The question is 
important, since the issues brought up for discussion affect which solutions are 
considered. An initial notion is that focusing events are not always a trigger for policy 
change, since other aspects such as the prevailing political ideology and the willingness 
to make changes might be important. Nevertheless, focusing events immediately bring 
attention to problems (Birkland 1997, 1).  Furthermore, the political processes 
following focusing events are usually faster than during normal politics (e.g. Wolfe 
2012).  
Sudden and rare events have a greater chance of reaching the political agenda, since 
these types of events are more efficient in terms of agenda building (e.g. Cobb & Elder 
1972). Furthermore, events that contain threats of violence, such as man-made 
focusing events like school shootings or terrorist attacks, reach the political agenda 
since they threaten core values (e.g. Mitchell 1962). Likewise, natural disasters as well 
as technological accidents can be seen as triggering devices (Cobb & Elder 1972). The 
political reality is a battle of competing ideas; why did this happen, how can we prevent 
similar things from happening in the future, and who is guilty? (e.g. Stone 1989). The 
vitality of an issue is strongly influenced by the media coverage (e.g. Birkland 1997; 
2006; Cobb & Elder 1972), “the larger public to which an issue has been expanded, the 
greater the likelihood of the conflict being placed on the docket” (Cobb & Elder 1972, 
151).  
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3.5 Who’ll stop the rain? – Summarizing the context 
 
Is the notion that politics is chaotic, messy, and unpredictable true? Or can politics be 
put into neat process steps, where rational choice and objective facts rise above the 
self-interest and shortsightedness? As anywhere in life, Aristotle’s thoughts of the 
golden mean – or the combination of elements from both domains, is probably closer 
to the truth than either side alone.  The same is true regarding the impact of focusing 
events on society; events raise emotions, thereby drawing attention – sometimes 
disproportionately so in comparison to other social problems. This is done by pushing 
issues onto social agendas, or getting them to serve as triggers and symbols for other 
issues bubbling under the surface. However, in a political context, the main question 
is that the event is labelled as a crisis or disaster, a problem that needs a solution. This 
conclusion lies close to Deborah Stone’s (2002, 378) thoughts on the political process: 
Reasoned analysis is necessarily political. It always involves choice to include some 
things and exclude others and to view the world in a particular way when other 
visions are possible. Policy analysis is political argument, and vice versa.  
In bringing the chapter to an end, I will try to shed some light onto how we can 
combine the context of three societal arenas with the general research questions of the 
dissertation. Looking at how focusing events with a varying degree of strength and 
origin affect political processes, we must start by including all three societal arenas. 
Hence, this chapter has tried to identify the arenas and the political processes 
connected to them, but also highlight the possible emotional and cognitive reactions 
that focusing events cause. The theoretical context has showed why focusing events 
are important in a society and that a political system must handle stress and 
disturbances for the legitimization of the system. Moreover, citizens must have trust 
in the political leaders in crisis and disaster situations. Physical destruction and 
negative consequences for large numbers of people force political leaders to “do 
something”. Focusing events have a high news values, which is a stepping stone to the 
media agenda and the political agenda. The processes following a focusing event are 
often faster than during routine politics, making a redefinition of a problem possible, 
as well as the mobilization of new actors.  
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The theoretical discussion set off with the notion that we are biologically biased to pay 
more attention to negative and fearful events. When looking back to the time when 
humans spent their days on savannas, fighting other animals for daily survival, the 
evolutionary discussion suggests that individuals who paid attention to negative 
stimuli had better chances of surviving. Hence, the negativity bias comes from a 
natural selection (e.g. Öhman & Dimberg 1984; Hunt & Campbell 1997). This bias is 
furthermore present also amongst other species, like rats, monkeys and chimpanzees 
(Brosnan et al. 2007; Miller 1961; Mahl 1952; Soroka 2014, 9). From a survival aspect, 
paying attention to negative stimuli is important – meaning that most people will, 
without even knowing it, pay more attention to focusing events. So what happens 
when we encounter negative events? How do we react? Often with a higher pulse rate, 
increased sweating, more brain activity and increased attention to the event. The 
definition of emotion as “specific sets of physiological and mental dispositions 
triggered by the brain in response to the perceived significance of a situation or object 
for an individual are goals (up to and including survival)” (Brader 2006, 51) means 
that focusing events by nature raise emotions and allocate our attention. Emotions are 
important in our information processing and political behavior (Huddy et al. 2005; 
Valentino et al. 2008), enthusiasm through uplifting stimuli motivate citizens, while 
fear and anxiety make voters more likely to change their beliefs and search for more 
information (Brader 2006, 182). Interestingly, emotional appeal also significantly 
affects highly educated and intelligent people (Brader 2006, 183), perhaps since 
emotions are triggered unconsciously. Contrary to the popular belief that the uses of 
emotion depreciate rational behavior, Brader (2006) found that emotion does not 
contradict logic. When studying political campaigns, the results show that fear ads 
were more likely to be based on facts and issues rather than personal characteristics 
(ibid., 184). To conclude, an emotional response is present when focusing events occur 
– and this is in our best interest and does not result in a deprived understanding and 
handling of the situation. The emotional response is a driver for information 
processing, behavior and policy formulation, which means that the emotional 
response can influence the attribution of responsibility, evaluation of leaders and 
which solutions are considered legitimate. Likewise, negative events and stories 
receive attention and are important when mobilizing actors. In conclusion, the 
emotional reactions are an important variable to study on all three arenas.  
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Secondly, citizens, the media, and politicians define the categories of an event through 
cognition, which in turn affect the political outcome. The mental construction of a 
problem, highlighting certain aspects while downplaying others, is necessary due to 
intellectual boundaries (Stone 2002, 378). However, this should not be understood as 
the existence of a true reality. Rather, in order for citizens and politicians to 
understand, know and live in a society, they must categorize events and objects and 
give them meaning (Berger & Luckmann 1966). We can probably agree over a few 
objective facts; such as chemical composition or the weight of an object, but “these 
kinds of facts are simply not the ones that matter in politics” (Stone 2002, 379). 
Instead, the important aspect of politics is defining events and problems with no given 
categories. The starting point for a problem can be for instance an accident or the 
intentional use of violence, which might result in a different kind of responsibility 
given to individuals or institutions. Nevertheless, politics is a struggle to define how 
we see the world, what problems exist and how to solve them. The meaning-making 
process of politics on the citizen, the media, and the formal political arena is an 
important point of departure for this thesis. Focusing events are agenda setters; 
extensive discussions on all three arenas make the problems salient – bringing 
together the problem stream, the political stream and the policy stream (Kingdon 
2003). The emotional and cognitive reactions on all three arenas are part of the 
politicization process: What happened? Who is responsible? What will we do now?  
 
3.6 Specific research questions 
 
The general aim of this thesis is to analyze how focusing events with a varying degree 
of strength and origin affect societal processes. The interaction on three societal 
arenas; the civic arena, the media arena and the parliamentary arena, are defined as 
the context for this dissertation. Following the theoretical discussion in this chapter, 
the important steps when a focusing event occurs are: 
 
1) emotional arousal → attention → the event reaches societal agendas 
2) defining the problem → framing, blame attribution → 
3) solutions presented 
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Thus, there are four main themes regarding how to study the effects of focusing events 
on political processes. Initially I defined the effects as consisting of both emotional 
and cognitive reactions. The specific research questions are therefore: 
 
1. Which emotional reactions are visible? 
 
2. How are the events framed? 
 
3. How is blame attributed? 
 
4. Which solutions are presented? 
 
However, not all themes may be of importance on all arenas. For instance, the citizens’ 
perception of how an event is framed is mostly affected by the media coverage or by 
political statements. Thus, the framing of the event will not be emphasized in the study 
of the citizen arena. Moreover, the externalization of emotions may vary across the 
different arenas. One example is how the emotional reactions in the media often 
consist of pictures and graphical elements, while the emotions on the parliamentary 
arena are transmitted through verbal attributes. Hence, the measurements of 
emotional reactions on the three societal arenas may vary to capture the unique 
attributes of the arenas.   
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4. Research design 
 
 
In this chapter I will discuss how to best investigate my research questions empirically. 
That means defining the context of the three societal arenas, and selecting cases for 
the studies, as well as discussing methodological considerations. In addition, the 
chapter encompasses the three studies. Each study will contain a short introduction 
and specific research questions. Furthermore, each study encompasses a more detailed 
theoretical discussion to operationalize the variables in the studies. 
As discussed in the introduction, this dissertation adopts a view of political processes 
as being closely intervened and combined on different arenas in the society (Easton 
1965; Lundquist 1971).  To understand the political decisions made, we must study 
the contextualization of the problem on different societal arenas. Are there demands 
from the citizens, do the public trust their leaders and view actions as necessary? And 
how did the media cover the event – what kind of framing was used and how was 
blame or responsibility attributed? These questions are important when looking at the 
discussion on the formal political arena. Moreover, this dissertation takes a somewhat 
new approach to studying disasters in politics – looking not at policy changes, but at 
the discourse surrounding the events, the debate preceding possible change. The 
politicization that is present when we answer questions such as: Why did this happen? 
and Who is to blame?, is an important determination for which solutions are seen as 
probable in the end.   
The context for such studies have to represent an open community where citizens 
are free to express their opinions, the media arena is not controlled by any specific 
actor and the parliamentary arena consists of different political options. Thus, there 
are many countries that fit this description. However, as will be discussed in the pilot 
analysis and case selection, it is necessary that the researcher has a substantial 
knowledge of the context in the questions, when making the index of strength. 
Likewise, the researcher has to comprehend the language spoken in the country. 
Notwithstanding, the cause that primarily affected the chosen context was the 
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method. Using an experimental laboratory approach sets some geographical 
restrictions. As a result, the context in these studies is placed in Finland.   
 
4.1 Case selection and pilot analysis 
 
The second chapter discussed focusing events theoretically, and ended with a proposal 
on how to define the magnitude of focusing events. To summarize, when discussing 
the magnitude of an event, I suggested that the event in question is discussed 
according to five characteristics: three necessary conditions and two further 
intensifying conditions. In the following discussion, I grade the necessary conditions 
on a two-point scale as either stronger or weaker, and the intensifying conditions as 
present or not (Figure 4.). The main point is to separate events with a weaker 
magnitude from events with a stronger magnitude, and thus, improve the definition 
of focusing events to four different parts; origin (man/nature) and magnitude 
(strong/weak).  
 
Figure 4. The magnitude of focusing events.  
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The grading of events is not always as black and white as a two-point scale might 
suggest, in the real world we could also include a third middle category of somewhat 
focusing event. Hence, I considered using a three-point scale, but found that the 
grading of strong/middle/weak was even more difficult since events differ on many 
aspects. This is why I suggest we apply a basic division of man-made versus natural 
disasters – and events with a stronger versus weaker magnitude. 
The combination of three necessary conditions; rarity, surprise and negative 
consequences for a large number of people, and two further intensifying conditions; 
cultural and geographical proximity, affect the magnitude of an event. In this section, 
I choose to test the empirical tool as part of the case selection for the studies in the 
dissertation. The main point is to identify events with a stronger versus weaker degree 
of focus. The research questions of the dissertation aim at identifying differences 
between focusing events concerning origin and magnitude. Hence, the case selection 
must start from a basic selection of man-made events and natural disasters. It should 
be emphasized that it is somewhat difficult to provide clear guidelines for how the 
necessary points are to be assigned, since the magnitude of events differs greatly 
between contexts. One example is how a country like the US has over 300 million 
inhabitants in comparison with Finland’s 5.5 million. Hence, the perception of the 
number of injured as a measure for severity can vary. Moreover, in some parts of the 
world, it is more common that various natural disasters with a strong degree of focus 
occur every year; one example is the occurrence of earthquakes, which take place 
where continental plates meet. In some concluding first remarks, I want to emphasize 
that the key to taking a first step in dissolving these issues is that the researcher 
presents a detailed and clear reasoning behind the scores. For this purpose, it is 
important that the researcher has a deep understanding of the culture and the society 
where the events take place. This makes it easier to provide scores and discuss the 
empirical tool. Another remark is that the tool is easier to use when adapted to one 
specific context. In this study, all events are analyzed in a Finnish context; moreover, 
all events took place in a Finnish context as well. The comparison between events is 
therefore not an issue. However, the generalization of the results is slightly more 
difficult. However, if we once again revisit the aim of the thesis, the main starting point 
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is to add to the theoretical discussion of focusing events by comparing different events 
and their political impact.  
 
The necessary conditions when determining the magnitude of a focusing event are 
bisectional; this means that an event meeting these three criteria can be defined as a 
focusing event. Regarding the first criteria, suddenness and surprise – the points 
awarded are either a 1 or a 2. A score of 1 implies that the event is expected to occur 
at regular intervals. Often one knows in advance when various natural phenomena 
such as storms and hurricanes are about to occur. Nevertheless, there is a difficulty in 
convincing citizens of a possible dangerous situation; people as well as governments 
tend to ignore disaster warnings (Merchant 1986, 1249). This means that a natural 
disaster can also be surprising to the people affected. It is also possible that the event 
can change character and become more extreme in such a short time that people do 
not have time to prepare for the change. To receive 2 points in this category, the event 
needs to strike like a bolt from the blue, such as the massacre of Utøya in Norway. 
This was an event that no-one saw coming, at least not in the preceding discussion. 
   The second necessary condition is rarity. Focusing events are always a breakup 
from the day-to-day routine politics. However, some events are rarer than other. 
Traffic accidents and natural disasters are two types of focusing events that are 
relatively common. If we can expect an area to get flooded at some point every year, 
the rarity of the event would score a 1 on the empirical tool. Other types of events 
occur more seldom, such as oil spills or extreme weather, and would score a 2 on the 
empirical tool.  
The last necessary criterion is that the event has negative consequences for a large 
number of people. A score of 2 should be given to an event that has national 
implications. Many extensive focusing events affecting whole countries also have a 
global influence, such as the Fukushima nuclear incident or 9/11. An event that scores 
a 1 is limited to a small area, such as a town or a municipality or a region. At this stage 
it is worth reiterating on the importance of taking the context into consideration. 
Using only the numbers of people affected by an event would not be a good 
measurement when comparing different countries. Hence, in a Finnish context, 
negative consequences for a large number of people can mean something else than in 
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an Indian context. A good example of this is the number of deceased in Finnish, or 
Nordic, accidents and natural disasters. The highest number of deceased in a Nordic 
accident during the 21st century was 24, in a traffic accident in Finland. For natural 
disasters such as storms and floods, the highest number of deceased is between four 
and seven in a Nordic comparison3. 
The characteristics of cultural and geographical proximity are awarded 1 point 
each, since a closer proximity results in a greater political impact (Nohrstedt & Weible 
2010, 20). Since all the events in this study take place in a Finnish context, and unfold 
on Finnish soil – the intensifying conditions are the same for all events. However, it is 
important to pay attention to these criteria when studying events occurring in other 
geographical locations. A focusing event taking place in another Nordic country 
would receive a point both for geographical proximity and for cultural proximity. As 
such, proximity, especially in the form of geographic proximity, results in  forms of 
cooperation in disaster preparedness (Brooks 1986). Moreover, events not taking 
place in the immediate geographical environment might also call for attention, even 
though the cultural proximity is further away. One example of this is Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic, two small countries in the Caribbean. Their culture and history, 
however, rely on different foundations, French versus Spanish heritage (Kelman 2012, 
84). Likewise, stronger focusing events happening in western societies, such as other 
European countries, also have a possible cultural influence over the Finnish political 
context. Nohrstedt & Weible (2010) have developed a typology that shows the 
relationship between geographic and policy (defined in this dissertation as “cultural”) 
proximity. A fourfold division between close and distant proximity levels yields the 
following dimensions of crisis; an immediate crisis has both a close policy and 
geographic proximity, for example the impact of Hurricane Katrina for the citizens of 
Louisiana. A policy-proximate crisis has close policy dependence, but a more distant 
geographic location, such as the impact of the 9/11terrorist attacks for European 
politics. The third dimension is a geographic-proximate crisis, such as the impact of 
Southern California wildfires on the public health subsystem in California. The fourth 
                                                            
3 The international disaster database http://www.emdat.be/  
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is a vicarious crisis which has neither geographical or policy proximity, such as the 
impact of the swine-flu crisis on the counterterrorism subsystem.  
 
After this first discussion of the scoring system, I now turn to the empirical analysis 
of four Finnish events. A first remark is that strong focusing events are quite rare in 
Finland. According to the international disaster database (www.emdata.be), only two 
disasters occurred in Finland during the 21st century, one flood and one technological 
disaster. In comparison, Germany experienced 43 natural disasters and 17 
technological disasters during the same time period. However, the database looks only 
at natural disasters and technological accidents, excluding, for example, school 
shootings and terrorist attacks. This means that when a focusing event does occur in 
Finland, the focal power is strong, since these events are very rare. It is also important 
to keep the cases close in time, to avoid a potentially different political climate during 
different time spans. Hence, a first limitation in this dissertation was to only include 
the last few years4, giving me a time span of about 2007 to 2012. During this time 
period, only one natural disaster with a stronger degree of focus appeared, hence this 
event will be included. Likewise, the first school shooting in Jokela is without a doubt 
one of the most focusing events occurring in Finland during the 21st century. The 
events with a weaker degree of focus were chosen since they are regional crises that 
still made it into the formal political arena.  
 
Focusing event created by man-made actions:  
The school shooting in Jokela 2007  
An 18-year-old student killed nine people, including himself, when he started 
shooting at Jokela High School. The school shooting in Jokela sparked a debate on gun 
legislation and the mental health service for the youth in Finland. Since this was the 
first ever large-scale school shooting in Finland the event can be characterized as very 
rare and sudden. The number of deceased was high in a Finnish context, and the event 
affected and spread concern throughout the Finnish educational system. Starting from 
the previous discussion on magnitude (see Figure 4), I will now grade each of the three 
                                                            
4 The first study was conducted in 2012. 
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necessary conditions (1−2 points) as well as the two further intensifying conditions (1 
point each if present). The points given will be explained further.  
 
Suddenness/surprise: 2 (the first large-scale school shooting in Finland came as a big 
surprise to the Finnish society) 
Rare: 2 (the first school shooting in nearly twenty years in Finland, the first school 
shooting took place in Rauma in 1989 and two people were killed) 
Negative for a large number of people: 2 (9 deaths, which is very high in a Finnish 
context, however, the school shooting threatened core values and affected the entire 
Finnish school system) 
Cultural proximity: 1 (occurred in Finland) 
Geographical proximity: 1 (occurred in Finland) 
Total: 8 = stronger degree of focus 
 
Focusing event created by man-made actions:  
Water crisis in Nokia 2007 
The drinking water in Nokia was contaminated in November 2007 when sewage water 
became mixed with drinking water due to human error. The water crisis affected 
12 000 inhabitants and caused diarrhea and stomach upsets for thousands of people, 
resulting in three deaths. The crisis highlighted the poorly-designed water treatment 
facility. The same design at that point in time was used in almost half of Finland’s 
water treatment plants. The event was quite rare and sudden. However, the numbers 
of people affected were limited to the inhabitants of Nokia. Hence, as this event does 
fulfil the suddenness and rarity criteria but is limited concerning the criterion of 
negativity for a large number of people, we deemed its degree of focus as being 
“weaker”. The three necessary conditions will be given 1−2 points each and the two 
further intensifying conditions one point each if present. The points given will be 
explained further below. 
 
Suddenness/surprise: 1 (the event was created due to human error, however it took 
three days before the residents in Nokia were informed of what had happened) 
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Rare: 1 (the event was quite rare, however, between four and ten water crises occur 
every year in Finland) 
Negative for a large number of people: 1 (the crisis involved the citizens of Nokia, 
about 32 000 inhabitants) 
Cultural proximity: 1 (occurred in Finland) 
Geographical proximity: 1 (occurred in Finland) 
Total: 5 = weaker degree of focus 
 
Focusing event created by a natural phenomenon:  
Boxing Day Storm 2011 
The storm that hit Finland as well as other Nordic countries (named Dagmar) during 
the Boxing Day of 2011 was one of the hardest storms in Finland during the twenty-
first century. The electricity supply for hundreds of thousands of people was cut off 
for up to two weeks. The damage to forests was later estimated to be approximately 
50−70 million Euros. One person was killed by a falling tree. The event was rare and 
affected large parts of Finland. Natural disasters are seldom very sudden in Finland 
and the authorities had issued warnings. The three necessary conditions will be given 
1−2 points each and the two further intensifying conditions 1 point each if present. 
The points given will be explained in detail below. 
 
Suddenness/surprise: 1 (the meteorological institute had come out with an official 
warning about storm winds) 
Rare: 2 (the storm was the strongest in Finland during the last ten years) 
Negative for a large number of people: 2 (large parts of Finland were left without 
electricity – 300 000 households) 
Cultural proximity: 1 (occurred in Finland) 
Geographical proximity: 1 (occurred in Finland) 
Total: 7 = stronger degree of focus 
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Focusing event created by a natural phenomenon:  
Floods in Ostrobothnia 2012 
During the late summer of 2012, many villages in the Finnish region of Ostrobothnia 
were flooded due to heavy rains. Roads were cut off and many homes and other 
properties were damaged. Many farmers had flooded fields and the harvest losses were 
estimated at 20 million Euros. Floods are not as rare as the Boxing Day storm, and 
flooding is expected to occur every year. However, the event was unusually severe and 
affected the region of Ostrobothnia. Hence, similarly to the Nokia water crisis, this 
event does fulfil the suddenness and rarity criteria but is limited concerning the 
criterion of negativity for a large number of people. The three necessary conditions 
will be given 1−2 points each and the two further intensifying conditions 1 point each 
if present. The points given will be explained further below. 
 
Suddenness/surprise: 1 (the meteorological institute sent out warnings about 
abundant rainfall) 
Rare: 1 (equal amount of rainfall during a short time period happen roughly every 
ten years, however, the same areas in Ostrobothnia get flooded almost every year) 
Negative for a large number of people: 1 (limited to the inhabitants of Southern 
Ostrobothnia)  
Cultural proximity: 1 (occurred in Finland) 
Geographical proximity: 1 (occurred in Finland) 
Total: 5 = weaker degree of focus 
 
This provides me with the following four cases, placed here in a fourfold showing 
origin and strength (Figure 5): 
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Figure 5. Case selection according to origin and magnitude. 
 
4.2 Methods and material  
 
The aim of the thesis is to study how focusing events affect society as a whole. Three 
separate studies are used in the research. Firstly, the effects of focusing events on the 
citizen arena will be analyzed. Revisiting the specific research questions, it is the 
emotional reactions and the attribution of blame that are most visible on the citizen 
arena. An emotional response is vital in mobilizing people, in information processing 
and when evaluating the leaders. The framing of the event is mostly done through the 
media coverage or by political statements. Likewise, citizens do not have a prominent 
role in solution formulation, as discussed in the theory.  One exception of this is letters 
to the editor, where citizens can suggest remedies or demand actions. However, these 
kinds of writings are present within the media arena and will be studied in the second 
study. When studying the civic arena an experimental approach will be used. 
Experimental methodology is often used to answer causal empirical questions 
(Morton & Williams 2012, 12). Thus, using experiments makes it possible to study the 
effects of explanatory factors on the dependent variable, while keeping other factors 
constant (Esaiasson et al. 2007, 371).  One reason for using laboratory experiments is 
that some situations of interest do not arise naturally (Morton & Williams 2012, 505), 
one example is the study of citizen’s immediate reactions to crises and disasters. Thus, 
if the focus is on affection and psychophysiological reactions, the only way to study 
these kinds of research questions is through controlled laboratory experiments.  
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This methodology provides researchers with a unique opportunity to study the 
unconscious psychophysiological reactions of citizens. A laboratory experiment 
provides interesting insights to the emotional reactions of humans; skin conductance, 
for instance, is an established method of evaluating a subject’s stress response (Stern 
et al. 2001). Furthermore, using a laboratory setting makes it easier for the researcher 
to measure behavioral differences between subjects who are randomly assigned 
different treatments in the same environment (Morton & Williams 2010, 305). The 
performance of the experiment is explained in detail in Chapter 5: Citizens’ emotional 
and cognitive reactions to focusing events.   
 
The media arena study will focus on the four main themes in the specific research 
questions; emotions, framing, blame attribution and solutions presented to the 
problem. The emotional appeal will be studied through the visual framing in the news 
coverage. Disaster coverage is often very visual, and emotions are expressed well 
through pictures (Pantti & Wahl-Jorgensen 2011, 118). Although this is rather logical, 
what is more surprising is the previous lack of research on visual framing. Needless to 
say, disaster coverage also consists of news texts in different forms. The framing, 
blame attribution and solutions will be studied through the media texts. To be able to 
make replicable and valid inferences from texts to the contexts of their use, a 
quantitative content analysis will be performed (Krippendorff 2004, 18). A 
quantitative approach is used since the amount of texts are quite large, and using a 
content analysis answers questions, such as how frequently a category occurs, and how 
much space it is given (Esaiasson et al. 2007, 223). Using enough analysis units of 
equableness makes it possible to compare variables expressed in numbers.  Hence, the 
research themes framing, blame attribution and solutions will be studied using a 
quantitative approach. When analyzing the coverage, there are two different 
approaches; an inductive and a deductive approach (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000, 94). 
An inductive approach means that although there are no clearly defined categories 
initially, the various news reports are analyzed to identify any patterns and 
frameworks (e.g. Gamson, 1992). As such, an inductive approach highlights many 
different frameworks used in the media coverage of focusing events. However, a 
problem that can occur is that the process becomes very time consuming. Moreover, 
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it can be difficult to repeat and generalize the results (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000, 
94−95).  
A deductive approach, on the other hand, uses a structure that previous research 
has identified to observe whether the same frameworks are present in the media 
reporting. However, the use of a priori identified frameworks poses a danger that a 
certain framework will be overlooked. Nevertheless, the advantage is that it is easier 
to discover differences between different types of reporting, such as between television 
and newspaper journalism, or, as in this case, between various crises and disasters. 
Another limitation when using already established framework categories is the fact 
that researchers may fail to identify newly emerging frames (Matthes & Kohring 2008, 
262−263). 
In Finland, there is one dominating newspaper: Helsingin Sanomat. The 
newspaper is an important effective channel used by power-holders to address peer 
groups and follow the elite debate in society (Kunelius, Noppari & Reunanen 2009, 
265−269); this newspaper also works as an agenda-setter for other Finnish newspapers 
(Lounasmeri 2013, 385). A detailed version of the coding scheme as well as the design 
of the study is presented in Chapter 6: Media framing and blame attribution of 
focusing events.  
 
The third study will analyze the formal political agenda by looking at the plenary 
debates in the Parliament. Appeal to emotions in the debates, as well as blame 
attribution, framing, and suggested solutions will be studied. When studying political 
communication, quantitative content analysis is a well-documented method 
(Esaiasson et al. 2007, 225). Similar to the second study, the discourse on the 
parliamentary arena will be investigated using quantitative content analysis. The 
coding scheme used for the framing and blame attribution variables is the same as in 
the previous study – making comparisons possible. The third study is presented in 
Chapter 7. 
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The overall aim of this thesis is to reach a deeper understanding of how focusing 
events influence societal processes. In the previous section, four focusing events with 
a varying degree of magnitude and origin have been selected. This fourth section 
contains three studies of how the cases were portrayed on three societal arenas. Each 
study will be presented in detail concerning theory, methods, research questions, 
results and conclusions. The following chapters are: 
 
Chapter 5 – Citizens’ emotional and cognitive responses to focusing events – An 
experimental study5 
 
Chapter 6 – Media framing and blame attribution of focusing events 
 
Chapter 7 – Threat or opportunity? The politicization of focusing events in the 
parliamentary arena 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
5 This chapter is based  on a previously published article: Lindholm et al. 2015. “Citizens’ 
Emotional and Cognitive Responses to Focusing Events”, International Journal of Mass 
Emergencies and Disaster 33(3), 407−427. 
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5. Citizens’ emotional and cognitive responses to 
focusing events – An experimental study 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
We live in a world that is constantly exposed to disasters and catastrophes, in a 
political context often considered as so-called focusing events (Birkland 1997; 2006; 
Kingdon 2003). The concept of focusing events provides an understanding of the 
political processes that follow a crisis or catastrophe. The twenty-first century has 
brought us new threats such as international terrorism, fears of a collapse of 
information and communication systems, and extreme weather events (OECD 2003). 
These new phenomena, as well as familiar problems in the form of crises and disasters 
created by humans and natural occurrences, show the vulnerability of societies (Boin 
et al. 2005, 1). Hence, disasters and catastrophes in the form of man-made and natural 
events, with both extensive, global degree of focus and more regional extent, provide 
an opportunity for political change, learning and evaluation of governmental 
performance, and are often studied in political science (Atkeson & Maestas 2012; 
Birkland 1997; 2006; Boin et al. 2008; Kingdon 2003).  
Previous research has mainly emphasized the “window of opportunity” (Kingdon 
2003) focusing events create on the political agenda by examining at reforms and 
policy change (Boin et al. 2005; Fleming 2012) or the framing of these events on the 
formal agenda (Boin et al. 2009; Goss 2001). Researchers have also accentuated the 
importance of media reporting, blame attribution and learning (Atkeson & Maestas 
2012; Birkland & Lawrence 2009; Boin et al. 2008). However, disasters and 
catastrophes are also important on the civic arena. Whenever a crisis or a disaster 
occurs, it is essential that citizens trust that their society can provide credence towards 
managing the situation. Society’s leaders are expected to avert threats – or at least to 
minimize the damage and devastation of a disaster. Likewise, an explanation is 
 105 
 
expected as to what went wrong and a declaration that it will not happen again (Boin 
et al. 2005, 1). Citizens’ reactions to focusing events are important because the more 
attention an event gets, the more likely it is to rise on the political arena. Previous 
research on citizens’ responses to crises and catastrophes are often case studies (e.g. 
Arceneaux & Stein 2006; Chamlee-Wright & Storr 2010). Citizens’ reactions to 
sudden crises or disasters, such as flooding, have been addressed in experiments (e.g. 
Kievik & Gutteling 2011; Terpstra, Zaalberg, de Boer and Botzen 2014; Zaalberg & 
Midden 2013). However, this field of research often focuses on citizens’ responses to 
natural disasters, and the overall reactions to different kinds of disasters, including 
man-made disasters, are a relatively unexplored part of a larger whole, namely the 
political implications generated from focusing events.  
This study addresses this area of research by examining how citizens respond to 
focusing events. This study emphasizes the following research question: in what 
manner do the origin and strength of focusing events affect the emotional and cognitive 
reactions of citizens, through devising an experiment of how citizens react to various 
crises and disasters. Hence, the study examines both the reactions as such and their 
potential political implications. The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. 
Firstly, I discuss affective intelligence and our understanding of the relationship 
between emotional responses and political demands. Secondly, I elaborate the concept 
of focusing events using a typology that emphasizes the strength of the event and the 
origin, concluding with our hypotheses. Thereafter, the method and design of the 
experiment is presented, followed by the results. I end with a concluding discussion 
as well as limitations of the study and directions for further research. 
 
5.2 Affective intelligence 
 
Since focusing events are rare phenomena containing some form of negative 
element(s), they can be expected to cause reactions among citizens. A situation that is 
perceived as threatening and fearful often produces negative emotions, such as 
anxiety, which can cause citizens to pay more attention to the event. The concept of 
emotion can be defined as “underlying responses to the perceived relevance of 
external stimuli” (Brader 2005, 390). The brain identifies different objects and their 
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significance, which triggers different emotions, often in such a way that the person is 
not even aware of this happening. Marcus et al. (2000) refer to this as affective 
intelligence (AI). The theory of AI develops from two emotional systems, the 
dispositional and the surveillance system, which people use to manage all tasks and 
information they are constantly confronted with. While the dispositional system 
handles everyday behavior, the surveillance system makes people pay attention to 
threats and novelties and is connected to feelings of anxiety and fear. Hence, Damasio 
(2003) maintains that threatening and dramatic situations produce an emotional 
arousal as a biological necessity, forcing individuals to become aware of dangerous 
situations. These reactions happen very fast and are often unconscious to the 
individual. Such mechanisms may also explain political behavior (Marcus et al. 2000, 
126−127; Renshon et al. 2015). According to Graber (2007, 265), different emotions 
may, for instance, influence citizens to learn more about a particular issue, demand 
policy change or perhaps distance themselves from the problem (e.g. Atkeson & 
Maestas 2012). Thus, emotional reactions, conscious as well as unconscious, in 
combination with cognitive responses, give rise to expectations and demands 
regarding policy changes. AI can thus be described as a theory about how “emotion 
and reason interact” according to Marcus et al. (2000, 1). We evaluate and think about 
political issues when our emotions are triggered by novel and threatening events. 
The framing of disasters is another factor that is linked to the cognitive and 
affective processes of citizens, especially the effects of risk information on information 
need (Terpstra et al. 2014). An interesting aspect is how both positive framing – in the 
form of a safety aspect – and negative framing – an increased risk of floods, resulted 
in a higher level of information need, correlated inversely with trust in the risk 
management by leaders. One explanation for this might be that the first message of a 
present disaster aroused a high level of fear that could not be reduced by positive 
frames (Terpstra et al. 2014, 1516). When studying citizens’ reactions to earthquake 
and tornado risks the perceived protection responsibility played an important role in 
the adaptive behavior. Trust and perceived protections responsibility have potentially 
political impact (Muilis & Duval 1997). Hence, it is important to understand how 
citizens perceive focusing events.  
Hence, in this study the causal chain of reaction depicted in the theory of affective 
intelligence is adopted as follows (Figure 6): 
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     X                                 Z                                      Y 
               Focusing event       Emotional response     Demand for political response 
                                                          
                                                        Cognitive response 
Figure 6. Affective intelligence theory. 
 
5.3 Focusing events  
 
The term focusing event suggests that the event increases attention to a specific 
problem. As have been discussed in chapter two, focusing events vary on two aspects. 
Firstly, the degree of focus, the more powerful the event is, the more attention it will 
receive on different societal arenas, for example, in the media (Birkland 2006). This 
also applies for citizen attention. For instance, in a study by Graber (2007), an 
interesting finding is that the television news feature that produced the highest 
emotional reactions from the audience depended on the magnitude of danger in the 
story. Moreover, involvement in violence abroad, terrorist attacks, natural disasters, 
and man-made disasters received more attention than elections and general issues 
such as childcare (Graber 2007,  267). In a study of specific news reports that people 
claimed to follow more closely, scholars found that what attracted the most attention 
from the audience was how widespread and dangerous the incident was perceived to 
be, and not for example, the audiovisual aspects of the stimuli (Graber 2007). This 
allows me to assume that focusing events generally evokes reactions and emotions 
from citizens on the basis of the characteristics that these events possess. This is 
primarily because the situation is rare, occurs without warning and affects a large 
number of people in a negative sense. This also results in the assumption that a higher 
degree of focus is associated with stronger reactions from citizens and the possibility 
of them taking measures to understand the problem and advance demands for policy 
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change. In chapter two, the strength of a focusing event was defined as consisting of 
different characteristics, which are either necessary or intensifying. Firstly, the three 
circumstances required for an event to be focusing are defined as: the suddenness, the 
rarity, and the negativity for a large number of people. Subsequently, two 
characteristics which further intensify the focus: geographic proximity and cultural 
proximity (see Birkland 1997; 2006; Worrall 1999). This is in line with Atkeson and 
Maesta’s (2012, 191) recommendation that the emotional intensity and breadth of 
personal relevance should be considered when evaluating the impact of events. The 
use of these criteria, regarding the treatment stimuli, will be further specified in the 
Methods section.  
 
5.4 Hypotheses 
 
The starting points for the hypotheses concern how focusing events of varying degrees 
of strength and different origins will influence citizens’ emotional and cognitive 
reactions. Taking earlier research into account (Atkeson & Maestas 2012; Birkland 
1997; 2006; Eriksson & Noreen 2004; Graber 2007), the expectations are that an event 
with a stronger degree of focus produces more emotional and cognitive reactions than 
an event with a weaker degree of focus. Concerning origin, although the scholarly 
evidence is somewhat inconclusive, I expect events originating from man to produce 
stronger reactions than events originating from nature if the degree of focus is similar. 
Due to limits of testing a low N, the hypotheses are split into two steps (H1a and H1b, 
H2a and H2b) instead of using two main hypotheses. When conducting multiple pair 
wise tests on four cases, the low N makes statistical significance hard to reach. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed:  
 
H1a: Among events originating from man, events with a stronger degree of focus will 
result in stronger emotional and cognitive reactions among citizens than events with 
a weaker degree of focus. 
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H1b: Among events originating from nature, events with a stronger degree of focus 
will result in stronger emotional and cognitive reactions among citizens than events 
with a weaker degree of focus. 
 
H2a: Among events with a strong degree of focus, events originating from man cause 
stronger emotional and cognitive reactions among citizens than events originating 
from nature.  
 
H2b: Among events with a weak degree of focus, events originating from man cause 
stronger emotional and cognitive reactions among citizens than events originating 
from nature. 
 
Thus, the two hypotheses concern the causal connection from an event occurring to 
emotional and cognitive responses as depicted in the theoretical model of affective 
intelligence. Besides these hypotheses, an interesting open question raises; does the 
strength or the origin of events produce stronger reactions? According to Fishman 
(1999) and Birkland (1997), focusing events deriving from natural disasters occur 
more often in society and the impact from “new” focusing events that are neither 
routine nor pre-planned are sometimes stronger. Thus, previous findings suggest that 
more rare events possibly create stronger reactions, which is something we shall 
tentatively explore here too. For instance, does a strongly focusing event originating 
from nature produce stronger reactions among citizens than a weakly focusing event 
originating from man, or vice versa? Additionally, I find it relevant to explore the 
interrelationship contained within the theory of affective intelligence – i.e. how 
emotional and cognitive responses interact – receives support in light of the findings 
of our study. According to the AI theory, these reactions produce thoughtful and 
attentive citizenry manifested in for example a demand for political change. In the 
empirical exploration the following hypothesis is used: 
H3: Stronger emotional reactions are positively correlated to a higher extent of 
cognitive reactions. 
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5.5 Method 
 
In this study, the aim is to compare citizens’ affective and cognitive reactions to 
focusing events varying in degree of focus and origin (see typology in Figure 1). To 
this aim, four news broadcasts depicting four different real-life focusing events from 
Finland were used as treatment stimuli in a lab experiment (Morton & Williams 2010); 
two concerning events that are natural disasters – with strong and weaker degrees of 
focus respectively – and two regarding events that are created by human action – also 
with variation in the strength of the degree of focus. The participants (N=30) were 
randomly assigned to one of these four different treatment groups6. While viewing the 
stimulus material, participants’ pulse and skin conductance level were observed in 
order to measure their objective, socially uncontrolled, affective reactions to the events 
(Gruszczynski et al. 2013; Renshon et al. 2015). Immediately after viewing the stimuli, 
participants filled out a questionnaire containing self-reported measures of affective 
reactions (SAM and Likert scales), potentially adjusted according to social control, as 
well as scales measuring cognitive reactions to the event.  Psychophysiological 
reactions can be related to arousal and emotions and are incidental to the decisions 
process, for example fear and anxiety have been linked to a negative selective retrieval 
bias (Renshon et al. 2015,  20). Thus, the study applies a post-test only experimental 
design (Campbell & Stanley 1963). Due to the small number of respondents, each 
treatment group had either N=7 or N=8, nonparametric tests are applied in analyzing 
differences between treatment groups. Additionally, since a low-N requires very high 
effect sizes in order to be statistically significant while maintaining sufficient statistical 
power (see Kraemer &Thiemann 1987; VanVoorhis & Morgan 2007), we apply a 
significance level of .10 in our statistical tests. This yields an approximate a priori effect 
size, Cohen’s d, of 0.6 with a statistical power of roughly 0.817 (see Kraemer & 
Thiemann 1987).  
 
                                                            
6 Chi-square tests and Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric H-tests, which were carried out after 
the random allocation to groups, showed no differences between the groups for background 
variables such as; gender, age, education, occupation, media consumption, and trust in 
societal institutions and actors. 
7 Calculated on-line at http://stat.ubc.ca/~rollin/stats/ssize/b2.html 
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5.5.1 Design 
The design of the study is a 2 (strength of focus) x 2 (origin of event) basic factorial 
design. Each factor has two levels; strong degree of focus or weaker degree (strength 
of focus factor); originating from man or originating from nature (origin of event 
factor). The experiment uses a between-subjects analytical design. However, regarding 
the objective psychophysiological measures of each participant’s reactions, within-
subject measures are firstly used in order to standardize each individual’s 
psychophysiological values against their individual level. These values are thereafter, 
in the analytical stage, compared between subjects.  
 
5.5.2 Participants 
Thirty adults participated in the study. Participants were recruited from a local adult 
learning center. The participants were aged between 17 and 74 (mean 42 years), 53 % 
were women and 47 % men. Prior to the actual experiment, a pilot study was 
conducted to test the stimuli, the questionnaire and the interview questions. A group 
of graduate students (N=8) participated in this successful pilot study.  
 
5.5.3 Stimulus materials 
The four Finnish crises and disasters which we used as stimuli in the treatment groups 
were the School shooting in Jokela (man-made/stronger), the water crisis in Nokia 
(man-made/weaker), the Boxing Day storm (nature/stronger) and the floods in 
Ostrobothnia (nature/weaker).  
Obviously, since all of these events have actually occurred, the time lapse since they 
had taken place varied when the experiment was conducted in 2013. Thus, it is 
plausible that the test subjects might remember one event more vividly than the other 
which could blur the results of the experiment. However, we maintain that all of these 
events are all well-known to Finnish citizens and that such a memory-effect ought not 
to have been a de facto problem8. Additionally, it should be pointed out that the 
                                                            
8 This assessment also appeared valid in light of what the test subjects indicated in the 
debriefing interviews at the end of the experiment. 
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variation in time lapse is only present in comparisons across origins, not within the 
same origin.  
The stimuli used consisted of television news broadcast of approximately three 
minutes length. Each focusing event had its own stimulus, so, there were four different 
broadcasts. The members of each treatment group saw only one stimulus. The video 
news broadcasts originated from the newscast belonging to the Finnish public 
broadcasting service, Yleisradio (YLE). In order to ensure that the format itself would 
not affect the test subject’s reactions, the four different stimuli broadcasts were edited 
to resemble each other as far as possible. This allowed us to compare the reactions 
between the four different groups. Each stimulus started with the newsreader briefly 
introducing the audience to what had happened. Subsequently, there were different 
reports ranging from eyewitnesses accounts of the event to stories of people who were 
on the scene describing what they saw. Thereafter, a clip was shown of either a 
government official or an expert discussing the incident and attempting to explain 
what had happened. Finally, a clip was shown about the impact the event had had on 
society and various proposals for action were discussed. 
 
5.5.4 Emotional reactions 
Self-reported measurements  
Emotional reactions were measured after exposure to the stimuli using the Self-
Assessment Manikin (SAM) form (Bradley & Lang 1994). The SAM consists of 
graphic symbols on a nine-point scale to represent three different dimensions of 
emotion: pleasure/happiness, arousal, and dominance. In this study, two of the 
dimensions were used; whether the stimulus gave rise to positive and pleasant feelings 
or negative emotions, and whether the test subject felt excited or calm during the 
exposure to stimulus. Previous research shows that the two dimensions of 
pleasure/happiness and arousal together account for a large part of the emotion 
variance which a person experiences (Bradley & Lang 1994, 55). SAM is an established 
measuring instrument and an effective method that has been widely used in previous 
research, including studies on the emotions associated with pictures, sounds, or 
advertising (for a review see e.g. Bradley & Lang 1994,  51). Many studies involving 
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television or film clips in combination with SAM have already been implemented, 
such as Lombard et al. (2000), Palomba et al. (2000) and Zhou (2005).  
Emotional reactions were also measured in a questionnaire that the subject completed 
immediately after seeing the stimulus material. In the questionnaire, the subject filled 
out an evaluation of six basic emotions (anger, fear, anxiety, sadness, happiness and 
hope) on a seven-point scale. The emotions chosen were such which are often used in 
research on media, news and political consequences (e.g. Brader and Valentino 2007; 
Huddy et al. 2007; Neuman et al. 2007). The self-reported negative emotions of anger, 
fear, anxiety and sadness together with the two SAM measurements were combined 
to one variable measuring the test subjects’ combined extent of negative emotions 
(Cronbach’s alpha 0.78). The SAM measurements were standardized to a seven-point 
scale to be comparable to the other negative emotions; all measurements were then 
summarized and divided by six, representing the test subject’s self-reported emotional 
reactions. 
 
Psychophysiological measurements 
Since there are arguably elements of social control involved in completing self-
report questionnaires describing emotions – i.e. the test subject can alter their 
response as he or she feels is expected and socially acceptable – we opted for also 
using psychophysiological measures of emotional reaction. This provides us with 
objective measures of the citizens’ emotional reactions of the kind described in the 
theory of affective intelligence. The psychophysiological measurements used in this 
study were pulse and skin conductance (SCL). In order to achieve comparability 
between subjects, SCL was standardized using each test subject’s own maximum and 
minimum values. Sensors were attached to the test subject’s hand to measure heart 
rate and skin conductance. Skin conductance reflects both the subject’s emotional 
and cognitive activity and electro-dermal activity may be seen as “the state of the 
organism’s interaction with its environment” (Stern et al. 2001, p. 206). Moreover, 
skin conductance can be described as either skin conductance level or skin 
conductance response (SCR). The difference, however, is that SCL refers to basal 
activity (tonic), while SCR refers to the response to a stimulus. In this study we use 
SCL since it provides a tonic, slowly habituating measure of arousal (Alexander et 
al. 2005, p. 116). Skin conductance data was collected ten times per second with a 
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collection range of 0.01 to 40.95 μMho. Skin conductance and heart rate were 
collected using two Ag-AgCl standard electrodes attached to the participant’s non-
dominant hand, and data was collected using an UFI MSDCS system. Heart rate or 
pulse plethysmograph (PPG) measures blood flow changes in the skin with values 
from 30 to 240 beats per minute and is used as a measure of attention (Stern et al. 
2001; Grabe et al. 2003).  
 
5.5.5 Cognitive reactions 
Citizens’ cognitive reactions were all measured in the post-test questionnaire using 
seven-point Likert scales. These covered two aspects: what institutions have social 
responsibility and what societal institutions should do more when similar events 
occur?  
 
Social responsibility  
The respondents answered a 9-item question, each item being on a seven-point Likert 
scale where 1=no responsibility and 7=full responsibility, concerning which societal 
institutions have responsibility in similar events contained in the stimulus material. 
In line with Rothstein’s (2003) three dimensions of institutional trust – the 
representative, the implementing and the reviewing – the societal institution included 
in the items were the government, the parliament, political parties, the police, the 
military, rescue services, newspapers, radio and television, as well as citizens. The nine 
items were combined into a summarized scale ranging between values 1 and 7 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80). 
 
Do more  
Respondents were asked how these institutions or actors should act in a similar 
situation, if they should do more. On the Likert scale, 7 represented that they should 
do more while 1 represented that they do enough as it is today. The measures for each 
institution were summarized into one scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91).  
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5.5.6 Procedure 
Data collection took place in a user experience laboratory at Åbo Akademi University 
in Finland during two weeks in April 2013. Each test session was scheduled to take 
approximately one hour. Initially, each subject received information about the test 
session’s procedure and a reminder that data is treated confidentially. Next, the 
subject filled out a short questionnaire with demographic variables and information 
about media consumption and confidence in government agencies and social 
institutions. Also questions about the subject’s trauma history were included. The 
trauma questions used in the study were from the Traumatic Life Events 
Questionnaire (TLEQ) (Kubany et al. 2000). Test subjects were asked to answer 
questions about different types of traumatic events such as experience of a traffic 
accident or a natural disaster, since such trauma history might have affected the 
person’s emotions when watching the stimuli material (Weathers et al. 2009). 
Thankfully, no test subject had any relevant trauma history.  
Thereafter, each subject sat down in an armchair and the collection of 
psychophysiological measurements started. As an introduction a quiet and restful 
image was shown on the television screen, while the test subject was instructed to 
relax. The picture was taken from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS), 
with a valence of 6.36 and arousal of 2.51 on a nine-point scale. The measurements 
are based on SAM and indicate that the picture is seen as neutral and not very arousing 
by most people. A baseline consisting of the individual’s normal values was obtained 
during this phase. Thereafter, the test subject saw a short and neutral video material 
in order make the person feel more comfortable in the laboratory setting. Also, we 
deemed it likely that the first stimulus would receive higher responses because of the 
test situation itself. Moreover, it is also necessary to have a comparison of how test 
subjects normally react to a television report, as psychophysiological reactions can 
vary greatly between individuals. 
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5.6 Results 
 
We present the findings by firstly, in Table 1, showing the descriptive findings (group 
median values) for each dependent measure according to stimuli groups. Thereafter, 
we demonstrate in Tables 2, how the findings relate to hypothesis H1a, H1b and 
hypothesis H2a and H2b respectively. 
 
 
Table 1. Findings of study 1.  
      Emotional reactions      Cognitive reactions 
 
Self‐
reported 
emotions  Pulse  SCL 
   
Social 
responsibility  Do more 
                 
Man‐made/strong 
(N=8)    5.07  83.5  41.2 
   
5.33  3.89 
Man‐made/weak 
(N=7)    3.19  74.9  41.2 
   
4.44  3.11 
Nature/strong (N=8)    3.31  74.4  31.5      5.61  2.78 
Nature/weak(N=7)    3.30  65.0  37.7      5.33  4.00 
                  
Note: Figures for self‐reported emotions, social responsibility and do more are median values 
on scales ranging between 1 and 7. Figures for pulse and SCL are the median values per group. 
Man‐made/strong  =  Jokela  School  Shooting,  Man‐made/weak  =  Nokia  water  crisis, 
Nature/strong = The Boxing Day Storm, Nature/weak = The floods. 
 
Observing the findings in Table 1, the median values for the Jokela stimuli group 
(classified as a strongly focusing event originating from man) generally are among the 
highest among all dependent variables. The findings are much more mixed for the 
remaining three stimuli groups making it hard to discern any clear patterns.  
 117 
 
I now proceed by judging our hypotheses in light of the descriptive findings 
presented thus far. This is done in Table 2, where we present the findings for each 
hypothesis and according to each dependent variable. Since non-parametric tests are 
applied, all tests of between-group differences are carried out on mean ranks using 
Mann-Whitney independent sample test. 
 
 
Table 2. Findings in light of the hypotheses 1 and 2. 
      Emotional reactions      Cognitive reactions 
 
Self‐reported 
emotions  Pulse      SCL
    Social     
responsibility 
Do  
more 
                 
H1a  
(Jokela vs. Nokia) 
    11.38 > 4.14**  10.38>5.29*  n.s. 
   
10.00 > 5.71†  n.s. 
H1b  
(Storm vs. Floods) 
    n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
   
n.s.  n.s. 
H2a  
(Jokela vs. Storm) 
    12.38 > 4.63***  10.63>6.38†  n.s. 
   
n.s.  n.s. 
H2b  
(Nokia vs. Floods)    n.s.  10.43>4.57**  n.s. 
   
5.36 < 9.64  n.s. 
                       
† = Mann‐Whitney significant at p<.010; *=p<.05 ** = p<.01; *** = p<.001 
Note: Figures in strikethrough font are in the opposite direction of what is predicted in the 
corresponding hypothesis.  
 
Concerning H1a, the findings for the relevant pair wise comparison, between the Jokela 
and Nokia stimuli groups, show that there were three significant differences, among the 
five possible, which all supported the hypothesis. These were concerning self-reported 
emotions with a non-parametric effect size Cliff’s delta of 0.95 (see Macbeth et al. 2009), 
pulse (Cliff’s d=0.70) and social responsibility (Cliff’s d=0.54). Thus, the null-hypothesis 
can, on balance, be rejected for H1a. Concerning hypothesis H1b, no significant 
between-group differences were found in the relevant pair wise comparison of the 
Storm and Floods stimuli groups. Concerning this hypothesis, consequently, the null-
hypothesis is not rejected. For hypothesis H2a, two significant between-group 
differences (Jokela stimuli compared to Storm stimuli), which both supported the 
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hypothesis, where found. These were regarding self-reported emotions (Cliff’s d=0.95) 
and pulse (Cliff’s d=0.52). Tentatively, in light of these two significant findings at least, 
the null-hypothesis can be rejected. Finally, regarding hypothesis H2b, the null-
hypothesis is not rejected. Although there were two statistically significant between-
group differences (Nokia compared to Floods) – concerning pulse (Cliff’s d=0.84) and 
social responsibility (Cliff’s d=-0.37) – these were in contradicting directions. Thus, the 
findings concerning pulse supported H2b whilst the findings for social responsibility 
did not support H2b. In summary, it is noteworthy that the non-parametric effect sizes 
were generally medium or large as was also to be expected in light of the a priori 
approximation of statistical power of the experiment. 
Finally, I turn to the research questions concerning the relative importance of 
strength and/or origin in affecting citizens’ reactions, and to the exploration of the 
degree to which our findings shed light on the relationships between emotional and 
cognitive reactions contained within the theory of affective intelligence, respectively. 
Regarding the former of these, the findings of the experiment (see Table 1) show that 
in light of statistically significant between-group differences when comparing 
reactions crosswise in the analytical typology (origin/strength), strength of a focusing 
event seems to cause somewhat stronger reaction regardless of origin. First and 
foremost, though, it is noteworthy that most between-group comparisons did not find 
any statistically significant differences. Nonetheless, three statistically significant 
differences were found: firstly, a strongly focusing event originating from nature 
(Storm) causes significantly stronger reactions than a weakly focusing event 
originating from man (Nokia) for social responsibility (Cliff’s delta = 0.57). Likewise, 
in the other relevant crosswise comparison – between a strongly focusing event 
originating from man (Jokela) and a weakly focusing event originating from nature 
(Floods) – the former causes statistically stronger reactions concerning self-reported 
emotions (non-parametric effect size, Cliff’s delta = 0.77) and pulse (non-parametric 
effect size, Cliff’s delta = 0.84).  
Secondly, I examine the findings concerning the third hypothesis, i.e. the 
correlation between emotional and cognitive reactions, suggested in the theory of 
affective intelligence. Thus far, the findings show that events did cause some 
emotional and cognitive reactions among the test subjects. Nonetheless, we have not 
yet addressed the potential connection between emotional reactions and cognitive 
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reactions. Did emotional reactions among our test subjects also correlate to cognitive 
reactions? Thus far, the analyses have not provided any clear indications of any 
particular event producing strong correlations between both types of reactions. Often, 
either one type of reaction occurred but not so much the other. Initially, in the 
empirical tests of this correlation, I also tested the same correlations for each stimuli 
group separately but found no significant correlations on the group level. Therefore, 
I additionally test this with two Spearman’s rank-correlations; one in which self-
reported affective reactions for all individual subjects (N=30) are compared to a 
summarized scale of all cognitive reactions9, and one in which the combined 
psychophysiological measures – e.g. the value of pulse and SCL added together and 
divided by two – for all subjects (N=30) of affective reactions are compared to the 
same sum of cognitive reactions10. Regarding the former of these tests, the findings 
support the assumptions of the AI theory; stronger emotional reactions were 
significantly positively correlated to stronger cognitive reactions (Spearman’s 
Rho=.42 sig.=.02). However, when using the psychophysiological measures of 
emotional reactions, there is no significant correlation between emotional and 
cognitive reactions (Spearman’s Rho=.21 sig.=.27). This raises some interesting 
questions since it challenges the AI theory’s assumption. According to the theory, to 
reiterate, an event triggers emotional arousal unconsciously as a biological necessity 
(e.g. Damasio 2003) which, according to Graber for instance (2007, 265), could 
interact with cognitive reactions. However, as indicated above, when measuring such 
“unconscious” reactions with the appropriate measures of biological 
psychophysiological emotional reactions, there was no correlation between emotional 
reactions and cognitive reactions.  Thus, interestingly, the theory fits focusing events 
better when emotional reactions are subject to social control in answering a post-test 
questionnaire than when they are approximated with measures of objective, 
unconscious, reactions during the exposure to the stimuli. I will discuss the 
implications and limitations of this further in the conclusions. 
                                                            
9 The scale was constructed by summarizing the values for the variables “social 
responsibility” and “do more” and dividing that figure by two. 
10 Additionally, I tested the correlations between pulse and cognitive reactions, and between 
SCL and cognitive reactions separately. Neither of these resulted in any statistically 
significant findings. 
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5.7 Discussion and conclusions 
 
As McDermott (2007, 393) desiderates, more work needs to be done beyond the 
American context to achieve a wider acceptance and information concerning the 
ability to generalize from the AI theory. The political implications of emotions might 
vary within the context of divergent social, political and cultural structures. Thus, even 
if citizens in different societies share an emotional experience, the cultural and 
cognitive expressions may differ (ibid.). Consequently, the current study contributes 
to existing knowledge of AI in its’ focus on a European context where citizens’ 
emotional and cognitive reactions to crises and catastrophes beyond the U.S. context 
are examined. To summarize, in this section, the main findings emanating from this 
examination are discussed and directions for future research are explained.  
The findings of this study might be deemed as both unsurprising on the one hand, 
and surprising on the other. Thus, as was to be expected in light of previous research 
(e.g. Atkeson & Maestas 2012; Birkland 1997; 2006; Eriksson & Noreen 2004; Graber 
2007), the findings showed that an event with a stronger degree of focus brings about 
more emotional and cognitive reactions than an event with a weaker degree of focus, 
albeit only among events originating from man. This was evident in the quite strong 
support for hypothesis 1a, which tested the impact of strength for events originating 
from man.  Likewise, the crosswise comparison of events of varying degree of focusing 
strength and origin, i.e. the first open research question, tentatively indicated that a 
stronger degree of focus was predominant in producing more reactions among our 
test subjects.  
Turning to the more surprising findings, two aspects of the experiment merit 
further attention. Firstly, as this study is to my knowledge the first studies testing an 
event’s strength of focus and its origin in the same experiment, the findings shed some 
further light on how these might relate to each other and how they cause reactions 
among citizens. In hypotheses H2a and H2b, I tested the effects of origin when 
focusing strength was kept constant in turn. The findings showed that an event 
originating from man tended to cause stronger emotional and cognitive reactions 
among our test subjects, but only if the event had a strong degree of focus. For events 
with a weaker degree of focus, the origin of the event made no difference for the 
reactions. Hence, if an event has a strong enough degree of focus, the findings lend 
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some support to Eriksson’s and Noreen’s suggestion (2004) that threats and crises 
where we are able to identify the actor responsible – i.e. those originating from man – 
clearly becomes easier to combat and discuss. More novel are the findings concerning 
the relative impact of focusing strength and origin on citizens’ reactions where we saw 
that in the two significant between-group differences, strength “triumphed” over 
origin. So mainly, albeit my findings are only tentative here due to many between-
group differences not being significant, this is in line with Graber’s findings (2007, 
267) that both emotional and cognitive reactions seem to mostly be contingent on the 
magnitude of danger in the event and not on who or what caused it. Bearing in mind 
how focusing events occur in reality – usually, if not always, one at a time – these 
findings are rather logical.  
The second aspect which can be deemed surprising in the experiment concerns the 
findings regarding the relationship between emotional and cognitive reactions 
illustrated in the theory of affective intelligence. Even though this was not one of the 
main points of interest a priori, it emanates as perhaps one of the most important 
findings of the study. Especially intriguing is the finding that emotional reactions 
measured by psychophysiological measures did not correlate with cognitive reaction 
whereas emotional reactions gauged in the self-completion questionnaire did 
correlate significantly to cognitive reactions. Of course, one could argue that the self-
reported and psychophysiological measures used here gauge different types of 
emotions which would explain the discrepancy in their connections to cognitive 
reactions. As McDermott (2007, 378) points out, one of the differences between self-
reported emotions and skin conductance and heart rate is the difference in timing. 
Psychophysiological reactions during a stimulus might measure different 
psychological processes than self-reported emotions, which include elements of 
memory processing and semantics. Hence, there seems to be more work to be done in 
integrating psychophysiological measurements with self-reported scales of emotions. 
Also, one should bear in mind that the AI theory seeks to explain actual reactions – 
i.e. how people react to sudden and real danger and how that spills over to cognitive 
reactions which may have real policy implications – whereas an experiment always 
suffers in terms of external validity. Thus, even though we preempted this by using 
real life events as the basis for our stimuli, the connection from the unconscious 
emotional reactions to the self-reported cognitive reactions might have been broken 
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due to the fact that these events nonetheless had already occurred and the test subjects 
did not consciously perceive any real current danger in them. Arguably, in hindsight, 
manipulation checks of the stimuli would have been helpful. However, although this 
method has its restrains and could be further refined, I still think that experimental 
research has an important contribution to the discussion concerning political 
processes following focusing events. It should also be stressed that using stimuli 
depicting fabricated disasters and catastrophes have obvious problems with external 
validity too. Nonetheless, even though there are clear limitations regarding our 
findings concerning the AI theory, these initial and tentative findings suggest that 
future studies ought to further explore the mechanisms contained within the theory. 
Furthermore, it is also feasible that other factors besides strength and origin influence 
the emotional and cognitive reactions of citizens, for example the level of external 
efficacy of the test subjects. Nevertheless, I deem it highly unlikely that this factor 
would influence the results due to the randomization of the test subjects. Finally, on 
the note of limitations, the ability to generalize from the findings is limited by the low 
N in this study. Nevertheless, many laboratory studies have a limited number of 
participants because of the time and recourse consuming methods used. In specific, 
measuring and analyzing psychophysiological reactions is extremely time-consuming. 
The context of focusing events may condition their effects (McDermott 2007, 393). 
Hence, possibly the Finnish cultural and cognitive expressions may manifest 
themselves quite reservedly and cautiously due to certain intangible aspects of Finnish 
political culture. Examples of these aspects were seen in the aftermath of the Boxing 
Day Tsunami in 2004 and how it caused societal reaction in the Nordic countries. In 
Finland, the criticism from citizens concerning the governmental response was short-
lived and the event had no political implication, in contrast to a deafening disapproval 
in Sweden resulting in a prolonged political crisis (Kivikuru and Nord 2009, 11). 
Hence, the political culture in Finland has traditionally given the state a strong 
position and policy making operates more hierarchically, making cognitive demands 
from citizens more infrequent. Therefore, the topic concerning the context of 
divergent social, political and cultural structures – and their influence on cultural and 
cognitive expressions – need further investigation and elaboration.  
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6. Media framing and blame attribution  
of focusing events 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Occasionally, in every society, ordinary life is interrupted by extraordinary events that 
are considered to be threatening enough to arouse feelings of sudden uncertainty 
(Boin et al. 2008, 3). One Monday morning, in December 2004, an earthquake 
occurred west of Sumatra. This resulted in two giant tidal waves, or tsunamis, 
smashing over towns and villages all along the Indian Ocean coastline, in what can be 
described as one of the worst natural disasters of our time. Although the event 
occurred thousands of kilometers from the Nordic countries, the incident nonetheless 
generated political implications in Finland and Sweden, since many northerners were 
affected by the event. When unexpected and dramatic events occur, the 
communication between policy makers, the media and citizens influences the 
democratic foundations of trust, accountability and legitimacy (Kivikuru & Nord 
2009, 9). During times of crisis, citizens rely on the media for information – thus 
providing the media with great potential influence over the framing and blame 
attribution of an event. This is illustrated in the fact that disaster news affects public 
perceptions and concerns in times of crisis. However, another aspect is the 
competition between actors to frame the media coverage according to their individual 
self-interests (Salwen 1995, 827).  
Media coverage of crises and disasters creates a framework for the comprehension 
of focusing events – what has happened, who is responsible, and how the problem 
should be solved (Atkeson & Maestas 2012, 30). Initially, the media act as a channel 
for information to the public, by supplying reports from eyewitnesses and victims. As 
the event develops, other sources, such as organizations, experts, officials and 
decision-makers are included in the coverage. Concerning the sources used in disaster 
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reporting, actors tend to accentuate themselves and blame others (Salwén 1995, 835). 
Moreover, the same study showed that state officials were cautious in their accusations 
and chose to present themselves as defenders of the public and the victims. Yet, as 
soon as the first articles and the first pictures are published, the coverage contributes 
to the explanation, understanding and framing of an event (Entman 2003). Framing 
can be explained in terms of the media highlighting certain aspects of an event – 
through pictures, quotes and comments – while downplaying others. However, the 
framing of focusing events changes and develops over time (Atkeson & Maestas 2012; 
Li 2007; Muschert 2009). Different frameworks are used to describe and explain the 
incident, e.g. an initial focus on how humans are affected by the incident might over 
time emphasize economic consequences. Thus, focusing events become politicized 
rather quickly. As such, political, economic or societal actors do not want to concede 
their interests simply because a crisis happened, rather “they engage in a struggle to 
produce a dominant interpretation of the implications of the crisis” (Boin et al. 2008, 
9).    
The tsunami catastrophe received extensive coverage, e.g. it was the event that 
received the most media attention in Sweden during a two-week time span since the 
1990s (Odén, Ghersetti & Wallin 2009, 189). Moreover, the news media are often the 
only source of information about what has happened and how the authorities 
managed the situation, resulting in citizens having to rely on the news in order to 
understand and evaluate the incident (Jääsaari 2009, 59). Natural disasters are 
interesting because there is no clear enemy or responsible actor to blame and the 
framing of the event is therefore open to debate. This was visible in the media coverage 
of the tsunami in Finland and Sweden (Jääsaari 2009). The blame game that occurred 
in  the Finnish media emanated from a temporary confusion and distrust of the 
decision-makers, while the Swedish responsibility attribution developed into a 
prolonged political crisis, resulting in a weak election result for the Social Democrats 
in 2006 (Henderson & Sitter 2007, 207; Jääsaari 2009, 57). The tsunami catastrophe 
had an impact on the Finnish political arena too. However, this was more in terms of 
learning rather than causing changes in the political situation, e.g. Jääsaari (2009) 
mentions improvements in crisis communications following natural disasters. In light 
of the above, it can be seen that crises and catastrophes tend to cast long shadows on 
society, resulting in blame attribution and discussions on how to anticipate similar 
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events in the future. Moreover, crises and catastrophes can also shatter or damage 
political careers.  
The purpose of this study is to compare the media coverage following four different 
focusing events of varying degrees of strength (weaker versus stronger) and origin 
(man-made versus natural disasters). Since the media message helps shape broader 
political outcomes, Atkeson and Maestas (2012, 191) call for studies that compare 
different types of disasters. The framing and blame attribution of these events are 
important because the media is likely to be an agenda setter and shape the outcome of 
the incidents. Moreover, as Boin et al. (2009) demonstrate, crisis outcome is affected 
by historical, cultural and political variables. Therefore, it is fruitful to study events in 
the same context. The main research question in this study concerns whether different 
types of disasters result in different types of media coverage. It has already been proved 
that media reports about focusing events play a particularly important role in society, 
since a comprehensive coverage is often linked to increased attention both in the 
parliamentary arena and among citizens (e.g. Smith 1996).  
 
6.2 Theoretical background 
 
Theories of agenda setting and framing show that the media has a key role to play in 
how a focusing event is perceived. As such, the media arena is not only a stage where 
various actors perform, but an important arena where those in power and opposition 
have to work hard for an event to be understood based on certain explanations (Boin, 
t’ Hart & McConnell 2009). In some situations, the political actors in power manage 
to emphasize their explanation of the incident well, while in other situations, those in 
power are pinpointed as the culprits. There are several explanations for this variation, 
such as how skilled the different actors are in their crisis communications (Ulmer, 
Sellnow & Seeker 2007), or that everything is dependent on the media climate and the 
willingness of the media to blame actors (Brändström & Kuipers 2003). However, it is 
less likely that those in power will suffer negative political consequences when the 
coverage highlights exogenous explanations (Boin et al., 2009). As such, there is a 
difference in the responsibilities highlighted in the coverage, i.e. whether a causal 
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responsibility or treatment responsibility is used. A causal responsibility indicates that 
there is a causal link to the source of the problem, while a treatment responsibility 
looks into the possibility of mitigating circumstances (Iyengar 1991, 8). When 
discussing the framing of crises, three different types can be detected (Boin et al. 2008, 
19). Incomprehensible crises provide considerable room for a framing contest, 
illustrated by strong focusing events, such as 9/11 or the Asian tsunami. A great deal 
of confusion and incomprehension leaves room for actors to put forward many 
different explanations. Mismanaged crises represent a failure within governmental 
institutions and offer an opportunity to emphasize weakness in the legitimacy of 
decision makers and politicians. The third type of crises are agenda-setting crises that 
demonstrate social vulnerabilities and fears, e.g. nuclear accidents or riots. Such events 
may affect entire policy domains and open up a wider debate on societal issues (Boin 
et al. 2008, 19). 
 
The media coverage of focusing events can be divided into three distinct phases 
(Graber 2009). The initial phase follows immediately after a focusing event has 
occurred or when the event is developing. During this phase, it is crucial to spread the 
information about what occurred, especially during perilous situations where the 
public needs to take action and get to safety (Graber 2009). Moreover, the coverage is 
often extensive and largely based on reports by eyewitnesses. The characteristic of the 
first phase is speed and volume, where television, radio, the internet and social media 
focus society’s attention to an extraordinary event. As such, other issues might get 
disregarded for the moment. The media’s role during the first phase is significant 
because the media coverage is often the only source of information about what 
happened, both for the average citizen, as well as for politicians. The first phase is 
followed by an active phase, where the reporting is mainly a matter of sorting out 
causes and correcting any factual inaccuracies in the initial speculations. Hence, the 
second phase can be partially represented by the stage in which policy-makers and 
other actors are trying to influence how the event is perceived and portrayed on the 
political arena (Graber 2009). When journalists try to place the event in a broader 
societal and political perspective, the coverage transcends into a third phase that 
overlaps the previous two phases (ibid.). One characteristic of the third phase is that 
the media evaluate various governmental interventions, often by attributions of blame 
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and responsibility (Atkeson & Maestas 2012). As Boin et al. (2008, 21) demonstrate, it 
is clear that the media is an important part of a crisis’ aftermath, since without the 
media arena there would be no venue for exploitation and blame gaming. However, 
the media coverage of crises and catastrophes is often extensive and can amplify or 
cast doubt on the political response to an event. A widespread coverage focuses the 
public’s attention and sometimes works as a catalyst, affecting the politicization of the 
crisis (Boin et al. 2008).  
Previous research has emphasized that natural disasters receive attention for 
shorter periods of time when compared to other issues (Houston et al. 2012). Another 
characteristic feature of natural disaster coverage is an emphasis on the current event 
itself, e.g. writing about how many people were injured, physical destruction, or 
economic aspects. As such, the discussion about the present situation and what is 
happening at that particular moment is often conducted on a regional level. From an 
information perspective, the media are successful in conveying information about 
what happened to the public. Nevertheless, one thing lacking in this type of disaster 
coverage is a more comprehensive picture of natural disasters, e.g. a discussion about 
how society has responded to previous disasters, and how these incidents might affect 
society in the future (Houston et al. 2012, 619).  
During the time that a focusing event is featured in the news reports, the 
frameworks used to describe and explain the incident might change. Frame-changing 
is used both unconsciously and consciously, e.g. to keep the reporting interesting for 
the audience (Chyi & McCombs 2004). Usually, two different dimensions vary in the 
coverage; temporal and spatial aspects. The temporal dimension can either focus on 
what is happening at the moment, by giving historical explanations to the event, or by 
evaluating the possible future effects of the event. The second dimension is based on 
whether the event is presented at a micro or a macro level. This spatial dimension has 
five levels: an individual level, a community level, a regional level, a societal level, or a 
level showing the event from an international perspective (ibid., 25). Previous research 
shows that the use of frames discussing the incident at an individual or a group level 
decreased significantly after the first three weeks, in favor of a more general 
perspective (Chyi & McCombs 2004, 29). Moreover, the use of different frames in the 
media coverage can be understood based on Downs’ (1972) issue-attention cycle. This 
theory discussed how awareness about a particular issue evolves through five stages, 
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from 1) a pre-problem stage, 2) alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm, 3) 
realizing the cost of significant progress, 4) gradual decline of intense public interest 
to 5) a post-problem stage. 
 
6.3 Framing 
 
Theories of political communication and agenda setting have been used to explain 
how the media inform audiences about which issues are important (McCombs et al. 
1997; Wanta 1997). The theory of framing emphasizes how the media construct 
different societal problems in the communication process, since the media chooses to 
highlight particular aspects of reality. Hence, framing includes a definition of the 
problem, diagnosis of the causes, making moral judgments, and lastly, some form of 
suggested remedies (Birkland & Lawrence 2009; Entman 1993; Gamson 1992; Iyengar 
& Kinder 1987; Pan & Kosicki 1993; Reese 2007). In the past decades, the theory of 
framing has gained popularity in many different academic disciplines, resulting in a 
slight confusion of the concept. Nevertheless, instead of recognizing the lack of a clear 
definition as a problem, Reese (2007, 148) emphasizes that therein lies the strength of 
the theory. Namely, that framing can be seen as “a provocative model that bridges 
parts of the field that need to be in touch with each other”, such as quantitative and 
qualitative methodology. However, one problem occurs when researchers choose to 
highlight only the descriptions of the various frameworks that the media uses, without 
putting them in relation to a larger whole or discussing how these frameworks can 
change over time (Entman 1993, 52; Reese 2007, 149).  
In the description of reality, certain information is left out, while other information 
is highlighted. This kind of construction is needed if we are to understand a complex 
world. Likewise, framing is about "organizing principles that are socially shared and 
persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully construct the social 
world" (Reese 2001, 11). Hence, framing involves something beyond the text, the 
creation of wider social explanations and patterns. As such, framing within policy-
making is used to highlight a particular issue. Furthermore, the construction is often 
more visible if it concerns a controversial issue (Birkland & Lawrence 2009, 1406). 
 129 
 
However, the media can distort the public’s perception of an event and prevent a 
deeper understanding of various societal problems (Muschert 2007, 65). One 
problem, in this respect, is that news reports focus largely on dramatic events, which 
undermines a more long-term and holistic analysis of various phenomena. During 
emergencies and disasters, the media use exceptional pictures, which act as a social 
construction of an event (Birkland 1997, 11).  By comparison, many societal crises and 
disasters are complex problems that are difficult to comprehend. Hence, the social 
construction of a problem affects the extent to which an issue is expanded, and 
influences which starting points are used to find solutions to a problem. For example, 
a school shooting can be described as a massacre, an execution or a school shooting 
(Norris et al. 2003, 7). In addition to the framing of the issue, other factors also affect 
how the issue is perceived by the general public, such as real world indicators, personal 
experiences and discussion amongst citizens. However, there are strong implications 
that the current media context plays a major role in shaping public opinion, especially 
if decision-makers and leaders are united on an issue (Hewitt 1992).  
Previous research has identified different types of frameworks found in media 
coverage (e.g. Neuman, Just & Crigler 1992; Semetko & Valkenburg 2000). 
Furthermore, some of this research has had a specific focus on crisis and disaster 
communications (An & Gower 2009; Iyengar 1991; Houston et al. 2012; Li, 2007). 
Based on the above, the following five recurring frameworks are identified; attribution 
of responsibility, conflict, economic, human interest, and morality; these will be 
discussed in turn below. The attribution of responsibility framework describes a 
problem in such a way that responsibility can be attributed to decision makers, groups 
or individuals. The responsibility can be portrayed as the occurrence of a problem, or 
as responsibility for resolving the issue (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000, 96). In Semetko 
and Valkenburg’s (2000) study of how European politics was framed by national 
newspapers, attribution of responsibility was the most common framework. The 
description of responsibility may occur either through an episodic framework, where 
the focus lies on a specific event or an individual, or as a thematic responsibility 
(Iyengar 1991, 14). Using a thematic framework places the event in a broader societal 
perspective by providing background explanations or discussing the issue more 
generally. One problem with the use of episodic explanations is that citizens could 
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perceive social problems based on an individual perspective, rather than as a political 
issue (ibid.).  
When applying a conflict framework, the media coverage underscores a conflict 
between individuals, groups or institutions. Describing a problem as a conflict can be 
understood according to media logic, such as an attempt to capture the audience's 
attention (Johansson 2004; Nord & Strömbäck 2002). Neuman et al. (1992) studied 
the media coverage in the US regarding different issues and problems and found that 
the use of conflict frames were one of the most common approaches. Through a 
human interest framework, the news is presented through an emotional angle or a 
personal story (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000). Similar to the conflict frame, a human 
interest frame aims at catching the audience by enabling identification and 
dramatizing the news (Nord & Strömbäck, 2002). The use of a human interest frame 
increases emotional reactions, which correlates with responsibility attribution (Cho & 
Gower 2006, 422). The fourth framework is an economic angle, which presents an 
issue, an event or a problem based on the economic consequences for individuals, 
groups, institutions or countries (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000, 96). When reporting 
on natural disasters, the second most common framework is addressing the disaster 
costs or business issues (Houston et al. 2012, 614). The fifth framework, i.e. morality 
framework, places an issue or an event in a moral context by referring to religious 
principles or moral rules (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000, 96). However, since 
journalists are expected to remain objective, a moral framework is often used by 
allowing other sources to raise such issues (Neuman et al.  1992). 
 
Focusing events are embedded with emotion, both by those affected by an event and 
by a collective sorrow in a society (Pantti & Wahl-Jorgensen 2011, 108). Hence, the 
visual framing of focusing events is of great importance, since pictures transmit 
emotions. However, the visual framing is often unexamined in disaster coverage 
(Rodriquez et al. 2011, 49). Nevertheless, emotions are significant in political life, e.g. 
as motivators to incite participation in political processes. As such, the mediated 
picture of focusing events provides an expression of emotions through images, 
editorials and letters to the editors (Pantti & Wahl-Jorgensen 2011, 118).  
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6.4 Blame attribution  
 
During times of extraordinary events, such as crises and catastrophes, the media and 
the public often attribute blame as a way to understand the event or infer 
responsibility (Atkeson & Maestas 2012, 160; Mutz 1994). Focusing events motivate a 
need for journalists and the media to make sense of the situation. At the same time, 
attributions affect particular avenues for policy-making. As such, discussions about 
causal responsibility or assignment of blame are a natural part of how the media 
coverage evolves during times of crisis (Graber 2009). Moreover, criticism of 
governmental officials occurs more often during a crisis or a catastrophe than under 
normal circumstances (Salwen 1995). However, the blame attributions following 
focusing events differ from the normal flow because of the intensity, as well as the 
extensive attention given to the issue. Hence, journalists rather than elites may 
influence the framing of such events (Atkeson & Maestas 2012, 9). The politicization 
of crises and catastrophes tend to evolve around the processes of accountability and 
learning (Boin et al. 2008, 9). Accountability refers to actors rendering account, often 
in public forums, of their and other’s actions prior to, and following a focusing event. 
Learning can be defined as the evaluation and redesign of policies and practices (ibid.). 
It has never been easy for political leaders or decision makers to avoid the blame game 
following a crisis; however, the transformation of the media industry has made things 
even more difficult (Boin et al. 2008). Aggravating aspects include the growing 
number of media representatives, the speed of reporting, and increased competition 
between different media actors, which have resulted in a more aggressive approach 
toward politicians (Sabato et al. 2000; Nylund 2003). A difference in the attribution of 
blame may also derive from the characteristics of the event in question. Exogenous 
factors sometimes play an essential part in this respect. For example, when dealing 
with natural disasters like floods or tsunamis, it is easier for governmental actors to 
present an underlying cause for the event, and thus avoid blame. However, when 
endogenous factors, such as mistakes or negligence, are part of a crisis, it is more 
difficult to alleviate doubt.  
There are different strategies for decision-makers to adopt in times of crisis (e.g. 
Brändström et al. 2008). Should actors choose to construct severity, they can frame the 
event as a violation of specific core values in society. The more severe an issue is 
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perceived to be, the more likely actors are to get involved (Rochefort & Cobb 1994). 
Another strategy is to construct agency, and describe an event as an incident or a 
common problem. A third strategy is to construct responsibility and depict the crisis 
as being caused by an actor (Brändström et al. 2008, 116). In the aftermath of the 
tsunami catastrophe, governments in the Nordic countries tried to frame the event as 
“an act of god”, to avoid blame; nevertheless, this attempt failed. In Finland and in 
Norway the public apologies by the governments seemed to relieve the blame when 
constructing severity. The Swedish government continued to deny responsibility, 
turning the event into high politics (Brändström et al. 2008, 142−143). In summary, 
when events are severe enough, and receive an extensive coverage in the media, they 
arouse a collective stress where “some sort of catharsis is required” (Brändström & 
Kuipers 2003, 279).  
As a summary, the coverage of focusing events can be discussed in terms of 
temporal and spatial aspects, Phase I, II and III, and on a micro or macro level, since 
coverage varies over time (Figure 7). It is difficult to separate Phase I and II, especially 
in today’s media environment where the internet speeds up the information flow and 
descriptions concerning what has occurred are immediately followed by possible 
explanations. Hence, Phase I and II are merged in the figure, representing the first two 
weeks of the media coverage. The blame game and attribution of responsibility, visible 
in Phase III, are most likely to overlap during the initial two weeks.  
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    Temporal 
    Phase I  Phase II  Phase III 
 
 
Spatial 
 
Micro level 
 
 
Human interest, Morality 
 
Attribution of 
responsibility 
(preventable 
crisis) 
 
Macro level 
 
Economic, Conflict 
 
Attribution of 
responsibility  
Figure 7. Media coverage of focusing events over time. 
 
The use of frames on a micro level will probably decrease after the first weeks (Chyi & 
McCombs 2004). Moreover, the use of frames varies depending, for example, on the 
characteristics of the event – some frames are more relevant in the case of a natural 
disaster and others when discussing a school shooting. Previous research shows that 
human interest frames and morality frames are used when discussing preventable 
crises, and when attributing blame on an individual level, while a macro perspective 
focuses on economic and conflict frames (An & Gower 2009). The attribution of 
blame might also be present in the second phase, when looking for explanations 
(Graber 2009).  
 
The aim of this study is to compare how events with a varying degree of focus and 
origin are covered in the media, proceeding from four main research questions: 
 
RQ1: How much coverage did the focusing events receive?  
RQ2: Which different themes were used in the coverage? 
RQ3: How did the media frame the events? 
RQ4: How was blame attributed in the coverage? 
BLAME GAME 
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The first research question is descriptive, looking at the quantity of media texts and 
pictures. The question also considers the characteristics of the texts and images, such 
as the type of text and distribution over time. The following three questions analyze 
different aspects of the coverage on a more detailed level. This study contributes to 
previous research since it focuses on two previously limited research areas, a 
comparison of different focusing events and the study of visual framing. 
 
6.5 Methods 
 
This study uses quantitative content analysis to examine the media reporting 
following four focusing events: the school shooting in Jokela 2007, the water crisis in 
Nokia in 2007, the Boxing Day storm in 2011 and the floods in Ostrobothnia in 2012. 
Content analysis can be defined as “a research technique for making replicable and 
valid inferences from texts to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff 2004, 18). The 
data consists of 521 items of texts and pictures that appeared in the leading Finnish 
newspaper Helsingin Sanomat (HS). All media coverage – such as news texts, 
editorials and letters to the editors, as well as pictures and graphics – that was present 
during the first two weeks following the events was analyzed (n = 498). Letters to the 
editor were included in the analysis to provide a comprehensive picture of the media 
coverage following the focusing events. When citizens and politicians read the news, 
the journalistic coverage represented by news texts and editorials is not the only news 
of importance, since the voices of citizens act as an interplay between the media 
agenda and the public agenda. Letters to the editor and stories where ordinary people 
are used as sources provide a direct channel for blame attribution and criticism toward 
power holders. Pantti and Wahl-Jorgensen (2011, 118) call this “disaster citizenship”, 
which is a democratized systematic critique of power holders.  
Moreover, the number of texts and the spatial distribution during the following six 
months were charted and a randomized sample of texts published during this time 
period was analyzed (n = 23), in order to take the temporal aspects into account. 
However, the small n gives only an indication of the Phase III media coverage and the 
results will not be used to compare the two time spans, but merely to illustrate what 
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frames were used later on in the coverage. A six-month limitation corresponds with 
the findings of Houston et al. (2012) that the average time span of disaster media 
coverage is 178 days (5.93 months)11.  
 
The material was compiled from Helsingin Sanomat’s printed versions. All HS printed 
newspapers since 2003 are available online (www.hs.fi/paivanlehti/). HS has a 
dominant position in Finnish society with 849,000 readers daily (2012−2013)12, 
compared to the second largest newspaper Aamulehti, which has 281,000 readers 
daily. HS’s influence is noticeable since the newspaper is important to power-holders 
as an effective channel for addressing peer groups and for following the elite debate in 
society (Kunelius, Noppari & Reunanen 2009, 265−269). Furthermore, HS is a 
significant agenda-setter and source of information for other Finnish newspapers, 
influencing which issues are regarded as important. Given the strong position HS 
holds on the media arena, HS might be regarded as a watchdog in society (Lounasmeri 
2013, 385).  
The focus of the analysis is divided into two time periods, because of the different 
phases of media reporting on crises (see e.g. Graber 2009). As such, the first two weeks 
are more likely to deal with descriptions of what has happened, along with a discussion 
of possible explanations (Phase I and II). During the first two weeks following the 
focusing events, all printed newspapers were analyzed. All articles and paragraphs 
referring to the event on the first page and inside the paper were coded, as well as 
letters to the editor, editorials, editorial columns, expert comments (vieräskynä), 
pictures and graphics concerning the event. During the second period of reporting 
(Phase III), when the media might try to place the event into a larger societal 
perspective (Graber 2009), texts concerning the event, present during the following 
six months period, were analyzed. The texts selected from the second time period were 
                                                            
11 That is when hurricane Katrina was excluded from the sample. Katrina received a massive, 
1,920 days coverage.  
12 Kansallinen Mediatutkimus, KMT. 2013. 
http://www.levikintarkastus.fi/mediatutkimus/Kokonaistavoittavuus%20S12-K13.pdf 
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found through the HS digital search archive using keywords related to the event13. A 
randomized sample of material was selected for analysis. If the texts during the second 
phase were distributed evenly throughout the time span, a randomized sample was 
selected. However, if the material was packed together in larger clusters throughout 
the six months period, articles were selected from all the larger clusters.  
 
6.5.1 Coding measurements 
The coding scheme used in the quantitative analysis was developed from previous 
research (Atkeson & Maestas 2012; Birkland 2006; Bytzek 2008; Chyi & McCombs 
2004; Houston et al. 2012; Lawrence 2001; Li 2007; Semetko & Valkenburg 2000).  
 
Descriptive data 
Initially, basic data was compiled (see Appendix A for details). Each text was first 
identified by the focusing event it dealt with. The information collected was the 
headline, the date, placement in the newspaper and centimeters of column space 
together with the number of words. The producer of the text and the type of text was 
also noted. The text’s theme was then described in a few words. A text’s theme refers 
to the general meaning of the text or a recurring typical thesis in the text (Altheide 
1996, 30). In the second stage of analysis, the themes were recoded into more general 
variables to enable a comparison between the four events. An illustration of this is the 
theme “problems that the event created”, which was characterized by phrases such as 
‘troubles with the supply of electricity’ (Boxing Day Storm), ‘stomach disease 
epidemic’ (Nokia Water Crisis) or ‘evacuation of citizens’ (The Floods).  
The character of the text is connected to the nature of the frame, which is either 
descriptive, attributive, or affective (Li 2007, 674). Interestingly, this character may 
vary depending on which phase of the reporting the text occurs in. Moreover, Graber 
(2009) found that the different stages of media reporting in times of crisis are flexible 
and overlapping, which illustrates why it is necessary to code the main character of 
the item correctly. In this way, the descriptive character parallels to the media’s role 
                                                            
13 For example the key words for the Jokela school shooting was “Jokela*”, “koulusurma* 
[school shoot*]” and “Auvinen”. A review of the result identified articles referring to the 
school shooting in question. 
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as an informant in the first stage of a crisis. In other words, if the text is mainly relating 
to what has happened, it is coded as descriptive. On the other hand, if the characters 
of a text correspond to the media’s function of explaining and making sense of an 
event during the second phase, it is coded as attributive. Hence, an example of an 
attributive text is the discussion about SSRI-medicines prescribed to the Jokela school 
shooter, and their possible connection to his destructive and aggressive behavior. 
Media texts that are coded as affective are linked to the third phase, where the news 
media try to explain the issue in a more long-term perspective (Li 2007, 674). An 
example of a text coded as affective is the discussion on how emergency messages in a 
crisis situation will appear on television in the future, and not only on the radio, 
following the Nokia water crisis. 
 
Dominant actors  
The actors and sources used to comment and contextualize the focusing event in texts 
are key components to how the event is defined and what issues are brought to 
discussion (Lawrence 2001, 101). Journalists have a central role in choosing which 
views to amplify, especially in the case of a disagreement of the cause of the problem. 
One important distinction is the proportion of non-official actors, such as citizens and 
interest groups, and their participation in the debates. When observing the sources 
used in the national reporting in the US after the Columbine School shooting, 38 % of 
the actors were public officials and 33 % experts, compared to representatives from 
interest groups (8 %) and citizens (24 %) (Lawrence 2001, 104). However, gaining 
access to the debate does not guarantee success in the struggle over problem 
definition, since actors such as experts seldom represents a unified opinion (Lawrence 
2001, 105). The actors interviewed in the texts were coded according to group type, 
such as academic, interest group, journalist, public official or victim (e.g. Birkland 
2006, 77; Lawrence 2001, 104). 
 
Blame attribution 
The texts analyzed were coded for attribution of blame. The measurements used for 
this analysis were drawn from previous work by Atkeson and Maestas (2012), who 
analyzed the media message environment following Hurricane Katrina with a focus 
 138 
 
on blame attribution. Attributions of blame may be implicit, such as the tone of the 
report or leading statements, or explicit in the form of direct statements. In this 
study, explicit attributions of blame, defined as an expression of some kind of 
responsibility for what has happened, were coded. When an attribution occurred in 
the text, the coder noted the speaker making the attribution and the target of the 
attribution. Moreover, the time frame to which the attribution was referring was 
coded as either a preparation failure or a response failure. Moreover, the reason for 
the attribution of blame was registered (Atkeson & Maestas 2012, 204−207). An 
example of this is the statement from the Minister for the Interior, Päivi Räsänen, 
regarding how the criticism of the power producing companies after the Boxing Day 
storm is justified, since the companies had serious shortcomings concerning the 
supply of electricity. This statement was coded as a public official making the 
attribution, while a corporation was the target and the time frame was a response 
failure14.  
 
Framing 
Previous research has emphasized that visual framing is less studied than the framing 
of texts (Matthes 2009). However, when studying focusing events like natural disasters 
or school shootings, the events are often given extensive visual coverage in the media. 
In the same way that textual material accentuates some aspects of reality, so does visual 
material (Kruif 2009). Therefore, both visual and textual framing is analyzed in this 
study. However, since the aim of the study is to compare the framing of four different 
events, and not to deduct contingently emerging frames, this study will use a 
previously developed measurement of media framing. 
To analyze which frames were used in the textual reporting, a previous framing 
measurement developed by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) was used. The 
measurement is used by other researchers concerning a wide range of topics (e.g. An 
                                                            
14 Sähköyhtiöt ovat saaneet myrskyn hoidosta rankkaa kritiikkiä. Moni on arvostellut ennen 
kaikkea suurimman yhtiön, Fortumin, tiedottamista. Eilen kritiikkiin yhtyi sisäministeri 
Päivi Räsänen (kd). "Myrskyn hoidossa on ollut todella suuria ongelmia ja pahoja puutteita 
nimenomaan sähköyhtiöiden kohdalla. Sähkönsaannin keskeytyminen on ollut kaikkien 
ongelmien keskeinen syy", hän sanoi. 
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& Gower 2009; de Vreese et al. 2001; Dimitrova et al. 2005; Igartua et al. 2005). The 
coding scheme included 20 questions to which the coder had to answer yes (1) or no 
(0). Each question represents one of five frames: attribution of responsibility, human 
interest, conflict, morality and economic dimensions. The questions used were such 
as “Does the story suggest that some level of government has the ability to alleviate the 
problem?” (attribution of responsibility) and “Is there a mention of the cost/degree of 
expense involved” (economic). The attribution of responsibility frame presents 
accountability to either some level of government or an individual/group. The human 
interest frame illustrates how individuals are affected by the issue, or present an 
emotional angle to capture the audience’s interest. The conflict frame emphasizes a 
disagreement between actors, often used when a political discussion is reduced to 
simplistic conflicts (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000). The morality frame discusses the 
issue in terms of religious tenets or moral prescriptions, while the economic frame is 
used to cover a problem concerning economic consequences or the degree of expenses 
involved (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000).  Previous research (e.g. d’Haenens & De 
Lange 2001; Holt & Major 2010; Semetko & Valkenburg 2000) has investigated how 
the questions cluster together and the five previously discussed frames were 
distinguishable. To measure the occurrence of frames a yes-no category was used in 
the analysis15.  
 
Images and graphics 
In the analysis of images and graphics used in the media reporting of focusing events, 
the measurements of the item’s height and length were registered to calculate square 
centimeters. This was done as a comparison between the proportions of text 
percentage and image percentage of the coverage. Moreover, actors visible in the 
images and the framing of the images were coded. The variable “actors” visible in the 
images were the same as used in the measurement of dominant news source.  
Concerning the framing of images, previous studies have analyzed which frames 
are present in the media environment (e.g. Borah 2009; Fahmy 2004; Messaris & 
                                                            
15 A principal component analysis with varimax rotation on the 20 framing questions was 
conducted and the analysis yielded a factor solution in which the framing questions clustered 
into five frames, explaining 54.7 % of the variance.  
 140 
 
Abraham 2001). A specific focus on the images present in crisis and catastrophe media 
reporting found five categories of visible frames: loss versus gain, pragmatic, human 
interest, political and other (Ali & Mahmood 2013; Borah 2009, 51). The loss versus 
gain frame, for example, emphasizes lives saved or lives lost. The coding of “lives lost” 
included the images of deceased people, compared to “lives saved” images that focus 
on survivors and the relief and rescue work being done. Not many “lives lost” images 
were found in this study, but one illustration is a portrait image of the headmaster of 
the Jokela High School, who was killed in the school shooting. Images coded as “lives 
saved”, for example, represented police officers and fire fighters cleaning up after the 
Boxing Day storm and the Floods. The pragmatic frame was represented by physical 
destruction – often illustrated by flooded homes, shattered buildings or general 
destruction following the events. The human interest frame was divided into three 
subcategories. The first subcategory was emotional framing, represented by images of 
grieving and suffering citizens and victims showing strong emotions. The second 
subcategory was human interest framing, portraying victims and people affected by 
the event, albeit with the absence of strong emotions in the image. The third 
subcategory was ordinary citizen framing, showing regular people as spectators and 
not as victims. The political frame was represented by images of politicians, sometimes 
they were seen visiting the disaster area but many were portrait images. The framing 
category “other” was represented by images of weapons or medicines in the school 
shooting case. A separate category was included concerning images of school shooters 
- dominated by images of Auvinen, the Jokela school shooter, although images of 
American school shooters were also included.  
Concerning graphical features, the height and length of the graphics was noted, 
along with a comment of what the graphic represented.  
An inter-coder reliability test was conducted on a randomized sample of 30 stories 
for the variables character, blame attribution and framing using simple agreement 
(Holsti’s formula)16, with the lowest score of .93 for the framing variables and .80 for 
character and blame attribution. 
                                                            
16 Holsti’s intercoder reliability (IR) formula was used as follows: IR = 2M/(N1 + N2), where M equals 
the number of agreements between the coders, N1 is the total number of coding decisions made by 
Coder 1 and N2 is the total number of coding decisions made by Coder 2. 
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6.6 Findings 
 
Following the coding processes outlined in the preceding section, a total of 350 texts 
and 171 images and graphics from HS were included in a content analysis to identify 
differences between different types of disaster coverage. Since a low-N requires very 
high effect sizes in order to show statistic significances while maintaining sufficient 
statistical power (see Kraemer & Thiemann, 1987; VanVoorhis & Morgan, 2007), I 
apply a significance level of .10 in the statistical tests. The agreements between events 
are measured by Kendall's coefficient of concordance, W. The coefficient illustrates 
differences in the values of Kendall's W from unity, which represents full agreement. 
The initial two weeks of media coverage represents a total population, hence, statistical 
tests are redundant. However, the tests conducted are used to indicate small or large 
differences between the events. The findings will be reported as four different events 
in this section, and discussed according to strength and origin in the concluding 
discussion section. 
The first research question asked how much coverage the focusing events received. As 
Table 3 shows, during the first two weeks of reporting, the Jokela School shooting 
received the highest number of texts and images.  
Table 3. Media coverage of focusing events during the first two weeks. (N = 498). 
First two weeks 
Man‐made 
stronger focus 
Man‐made 
weaker focus 
Nature 
stronger focus 
Nature 
weaker focus 
Texts (n)  187  34  87  19 
Images (n)  92  12  42  12 
Graphics (n)  4    6  3 
Centimeters of 
column, mean   11  7  10  7 
Total centimeters 
of column  2,090  252  873  126 
Average number of 
words (n)  255  160  195  143 
Total number of 
words (n)  47,363  5,423  16,930  2,574 
Percentage of 
images (%)  42  56  48   70 
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Moreover, the texts about the school shooting were more extensive with a mean of 11 
column cm and 255 words. The Boxing Day storm received the second highest 
quantity of coverage, with an almost equal column height mean (10 cm) as the school 
shooting. In comparison, the water crisis and the floods derived an equal number of 
images (12) and fewer texts than the other two events. The distribution of texts and 
images (in column cm) were calculated into a percentage of the entire coverage. As 
shown in the table, the coverage of the water crisis and the floods attained a large 
percentage of visual coverage – 56 % versus 70 %, while a majority of the school 
shooting and the storm coverage consisted of texts. 
Figure 8 presents the distribution of texts during the first two weeks. The Jokela School 
shooting coverage peaks at Day 2, with almost 35 texts. The storm and the Floods have 
their highest number of texts during Day 3 or 4. The Nokia water crisis maintained a 
more even distribution of texts throughout the two-week time period, since the crisis 
developed due to new facts emerging over time.  
 
Figure 8. Distribution of texts during the first two weeks. Total number of texts,(N 
= 327). 
Figure 9 shows the total centimeters of column for the texts during the first phase of 
reporting. The texts concerning the school shooting were the longest during the 
second day, with another peak during the last days of the second week. The floods and 
the water crisis received a similar proportion of centimeters of column during the two 
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weeks, however, slightly higher concerning the water crisis. The storm showed a 
similar pattern as Jokela, with the highest quantity of centimeters of column during 
the second and third days. 
 
Figure 9. Total centimeters of column for texts published during the first two 
weeks. 
The following six months included 191 texts about the four events, distributed as 
shown in Figure 10. Noticeably, the school shooting in Jokela received extensive 
coverage during the first month, with an additional peak after five months.  
 
Figure 10. News texts during a six month phase. Total number of texts, N = 191. 
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The water crisis was featured in the news with a few texts each month during the 
following half year. However, both natural disasters disappeared from the media 
agenda after three or four months. To analyze the third phase, a randomized sample 
of ten texts from Jokela (N = 129), five from the water crisis (N = 32), five from the 
Storm (N = 27) and three from the Floods (N = 3) were analyzed to provide a 
transitory picture of the coverage. 
The basic characteristics of the texts during the first two weeks are presented in 
Table 4. Articles accounted for the most common type of texts concerning three of the 
events; between 32−38 % of the texts about the school shooting, the water crisis, and 
the storm. In comparison, the most common textual feature concerning the floods 
was a paragraph (37 %), followed by articles (31 %). Moreover, the two events 
receiving a large number of letters to the editor were the school shooting and the 
storm. Additionally, there are some similarities concerning the producer of the texts. 
HS is the main contributor to all the events’ texts, followed by citizens in the form of 
letters to the editor. However, one difference between the events is that the flood’s 
second most common producer is a news agency, while the school shooting is 
discussed through expert comments.   
Concerning the character of the texts, the school shooting and the storm show a 
similar structure, with a high number of affective stories, followed by attributive and 
descriptive stories. The water crisis and the floods are presented through a high 
number of attributive texts. Interestingly, citizens are the most dominant actor in texts 
about the school shooting and the storm, in comparison to the water crisis and the 
floods, where public officials are cited. Furthermore, when reporting on Nokia and 
the two natural disasters, victims and eyewitness were a commonly used source (22 
and 23 % respectively). However, not many eyewitnesses were interviewed when 
covering the school shooting; rather, academics and experts were used instead of 
citizens.  
Moving on to the second research question, concerning the different themes used 
in the reporting, Table 5 illustrates the distribution and as Kendall’s W (.244) shows, 
there are differences between the events. In the reporting of the school shooting, 
among the topics covered were explanations, such as the one explaining that in 
Finland it is too easy to acquire a license to own a fire arm, and solutions referring to 
bullying or how the school should intervene and prevent harassment. 
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Table 4. Basic characteristics of media coverage of focusing events during the first 
two weeks. 
     
Man‐
made 
stronger 
focus 
n 
(%) 
Man‐made 
weaker 
focus 
n 
(%) 
Nature  
stronger 
focus 
n 
(%) 
Nature 
weaker  
focus 
n 
(%) 
Type of 
text1                      
I    article 
60 
(32)  article 
12 
(35)  article 
33  
(38)  paragraph 
7 
(37) 
II   
letter to 
the editor 
46 
(25)  paragraph 
7 
(21) 
letter to 
the editor 
30  
(35)  article 
6 
(31) 
III    paragraph 
38 
(20)  1st page 
5 
(15)  paragraph 
11  
(13)  1st page 
3 
(16) 
Prod‐
ucer2                       
I    HS 
125 
(67)  HS 
29 
(85)  HS 
49  
(56)  HS 
12 
(67) 
II    citizen 
46 
(25)  citizen 
3 
(9)  citizen 
30  
(35)  news agency 
5 
(28) 
III   
expert 
comment  7 (4) 
news 
agency 
2 
(6) 
news 
agency  
4  
(5)  HS + news agency 
1 
(6) 
Chara‐
chter3                        
I    affective 
108 
(58)  attributive 
19 
(56)  affective 
41  
(47)  attributive 
9 
(50) 
II    attributive 
70 
(38)  affective 
13 
(38)  attributive 
34  
(39)  descriptive 
5 
(28) 
III    descriptive  8 (4)  descriptive 
2 
(6)  descriptive 
12 
(14)  affective 
4 
(22) 
Dominant 
actor4                     
I    citizen 
47 
(26) 
public 
official 
9 
(30)  citizen 
20  
(24)  public official 
7 
(54) 
II   
academic/
expert 
31 
(17) 
victim/eye
witness 
7 
(23) 
victim/eye
witness 
19  
(22)  victim/eyewitness 
3 
(23) 
III    
public 
official 
25 
(14) 
journalist 
& citizens 
4 
(13) 
public 
official 
15  
(17) 
expert & political 
party & corporation 
1 
(8) 
1 Kendall’s W = .575 
2 Kendall’s W = .622 
3 Kendall’s W = .438 
4 Kendall’s W = .188  
 
Another common issue concerned stories about the school shooter Auvinen, in the 
form of interviews with classmates, discussions about philosophers he had read, or 
references to previous school shootings in the US. The themes most common in the 
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Nokia water crisis coverage were distributed evenly between five different types of 
themes.  
Table 5. Primary themes used in the media coverage during the first two weeks.  
Man‐made, stronger focus 
 
n (%) 
 
Explanation  51 (27) 
Solutions  47 (25) 
Auvinen/school shootings  25 (13) 
Narrative  23 (12) 
Compensation/responsibility  14 (8) 
Other  14 (8) 
Critique  13 (7) 
 
Man‐made weaker focus  n (%) 
   
Compensation/responsibility  8 (23) 
Critique  7 (20) 
Problems  6 (17) 
Narrative  6 (17) 
Solutions  5 (14) 
Other  2 (6) 
   
 
 
Nature, stronger focus 
 
n (%) 
 
Problems  31 (36) 
Solutions  20 (23) 
Compensation/responsibility  12 (14) 
Narrative  11 (13) 
Critique  11 (13) 
Other  2 (2) 
 
 
Nature, weaker focus 
 
n (%) 
 
Problems  9 (47) 
Compensation/responsibility  5 (26) 
Narrative  4 (21) 
Other  1 (5) 
 
Kendall’s W = .244 
Compensation and responsibility illustrated questions such as the city being 
responsible for the accident, while critique dealt with questions of the late and 
insufficient information following the situation. Problems in connection to the water 
crisis were e.g. the water supply and businesses affected by the lack of clean water. 
Moreover, another common theme was descriptions about what had happened, as 
well as solutions to the problem, e.g. in the form of crisis communication in 
emergency situations. The two natural disasters were similar in that the most common 
theme was problems that the events created. The Boxing Day storm resulted in days 
of interruption in the electricity power supply, and the floods caused evacuations 
when houses were filled with water. Other frequently appearing discussions following 
the natural disasters concerned compensation and responsibility, such as whether the 
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electric companies (concerning storm damage) and the insurance companies 
(concerning flood damage) have to pay compensation to the customers. Furthermore, 
the storm was discussed in terms of solutions concerning how to avoid similar 
problems in the future by burying the power lines underground. Looking at the most 
prevalent theme during the six-month period following the initial reporting, the storm 
was discussed in terms of compensation and responsibility, e.g. how the damage 
following the event affected many forest owners. In comparison, the coverage in the 
second phase following the floods dealt with questions of solutions, how information 
and warnings may be used to prevent similar situations. In the aftermath of the water 
crisis, the media reported on how the economic costs of the crisis were over 1.5 million 
Euros, as well as the investigation of several deaths and their possible connection to 
the contaminated water. The school shooting coverage focused on solutions and 
explanations, dealing with questions on how aggression is linked to violence, and the 
media’s power when reporting about similar events.  
The third research question concerns the variation of frames used in the reporting of 
the four focusing events. Table 6 presents the percentage distribution for the five 
frameworks of attribution of responsibility, human interest, morality, conflict and 
economic.   
Table 6. Use of frames in the reporting of focusing events during the first two 
weeks (%).  
  Attribution 
of resp. 
Human 
interest 
Conflict  Morality  Economic  N 
Man/strong  54  61  22  34  9  186 
Man/weak  82  39  21  12  24  33 
Nature/strong  71  43  37  11  37  84 
Nature/weak  61  29  6    29  17 
Note:  Cronbach’s  alpha  was  used  to  measure  the  internal  consistencies  for  the  five 
dimensions. Alpha values for the frames were: .701 for the attribution of responsibility, .850 
for human interest, .709 for the conflict frame, .818 for the morality frame and .734 for the 
economic frame. 
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When reporting on the Jokela School shooting, the most dominant frame was human 
interest, followed by attribution of responsibility and morality frames. The school 
shooting is indeed the event that differs most from the other events, e.g. concerning 
the morality frame, with a more frequent use, and the economic frame, with a low 
appearance. However, this is somewhat understandable since the school shooting 
dealt with questions of ethics and morals, a debate not employed in the reporting on 
natural disasters. 
 
The dominant frame used in the coverage of the water crisis and the two natural 
disasters was attribution of responsibility. Another similarity was the use of the 
human interest frame, the second most common frame for these three events. 
Moreover, the economic and conflict frames were used quite often when reporting on 
the water crisis and the storm. Using a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
with type of frame (attribution of responsibility, human interest, conflict, morality 
and economic) as a within-story factor and the event (Jokela, Nokia, the Storm and 
the Floods) as a between-story factor, the MANOVA generated differences between 
the use of type of frame, F (15, 862) = 5.86, p < .000, Wilk’s Λ = 0.765, partial η2 = .086. 
The discussions of frames used during the six-month period following the events 
are only indicative, because of the small number of texts. Hence, the discussion will 
focus on the frame-changing of the same event in comparison to the first two weeks 
of coverage (see e.g. Chyi & McCombs, 2004). The framing of the school shooting was 
quite similar throughout the two phases. The six months period (n = 10) was 
dominated by stories with a human interest framing (80 %), followed by attribution 
of responsibility (50 %), morality (30 %) and conflict (20 %).  However, the frame-
changing of the other three events is more visible. The water crisis (n = 5) was later on 
in the reporting framed in terms of attribution of responsibility (80 %), together with 
economic (40 %) and human interest (20 %) aspects. Regarding the two natural 
disasters (the Storm, n = 5 and the Floods, n = 3) the most common frame during the 
six-month period was an economic frame, 80 % and 67 % respectively. Furthermore, 
both events were portrayed in terms of attribution of responsibility and human 
interest frames, approximately 30 % of the texts.  
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When analyzing the images in the reporting, Table 7 illustrates that the most common 
visual framing was the human interest frame concerning all four events. The images 
from the school shooting differed from the other events with a high quantity of images 
coded as “other”, showing e.g. weapons and medicines.  
Table 7. Most dominant framing in images during the first two weeks (N = 158). 
   
 
Man‐made 
stronger focus (n) 
Man‐made 
weaker focus (n) 
Nature 
stronger focus (n) 
Nature 
weaker focus (n) 
       
1    Human interest (17)  Human interest (7) 
Human interest 
(15)  Lives saved (4) 
2    Other (17)  Lives saved (3) 
Physical 
destruction (10)  Human interest (4) 
3    Emotional (13)  Other (2)  Lives saved (7)  Phys.destruct. (3) 
Kendall’s W = .406 
 
Most dominant actors in images. 
     
1   
Victim/eyewitness 
(23) 
Victim/eyewitness 
(9) 
Victim/eyewitness  
(16) 
Victim/eyewitness 
(4) 
2   
Citizen  
(11) 
Police/rescue 
services (2) 
Police/rescue  
services (6) 
Police/rescue 
services (2) 
3   
Police/rescue 
service (9)  Citizen (1)  Citizen (5)  Citizen (2) 
   
Accountable 
person (9)  Corporation (1)     
Kendall’s W = .853 
Furthermore, the third most common frame was an emotional frame showing people 
in grief. The two natural disasters’ images showed physical destruction and lives saved, 
images of lives saved were also used in the coverage of the water crisis, illustrated by 
the military service handing out clean water.  
The actors displayed in the images show a high conformity for all four events 
(Kendall’s W = .853). Furthermore, the images of all the events were dominated by 
victims and eyewitnesses, and three of the events were also portrayed with images of 
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police officers or rescue services. However, in the case of the school shooting, the 
police/rescue service group was the third most common. Moreover, citizens were a 
common actor in the visual catastrophe coverage.  
All the graphics (N=13) consisted of maps, e.g. geographical maps of where the 
storm and the floods had hit, and maps of the Jokela High School showing how the 
school shooter moved inside the building.  
 
The fourth and final research question concerns how blame was attributed in the 
media coverage following the events (Table 8). In the coverage of the water crisis, 
blame attribution was present in 50 % of the texts (n = 17). In comparison, following 
the storm, blame was attributed in 34.5 % of the texts (n = 30), in 18.5 % (n = 34) of 
the texts concerning the school shooting, and in 5 % (n = 1) following the floods. The 
low number of blame attributions concerning the floods may originate from the fact 
that most texts were short paragraphs.  
When attributing blame for the school shooting and the water crisis, the speaker 
making the attribution was usually a citizen, while the storm received the highest 
amount of blame from victims and eyewitnesses. However, blame attributions in 
response to the school shooting were also made by academics and experts, journalists, 
and public officials. The blame game following the water crisis consisted of journalistic 
initiatives, and the speakers making the attributions following the storm were public 
officials or citizens.  
The target of the attribution was often a public official in all the four events. 
However, in the aftermath of the school shooting, society was attributed 
responsibility, illustrated by problems in the Finnish culture, such as alienation and 
violence. Concerning the storm, corporations were the target of the attribution in 50 
percent of the texts, as the electricity power supply companies were blamed for their 
slow response. 
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Concerning the time frame, the school shooting stands out as the event that received 
the most preparation failure blames, e.g. that it is too easy to acquire a weapon license, 
or that neoliberal values and downsizing in the 1990s have resulted in social problems. 
The blame attribution for the other three events proceeded from a response failure, 
such as little and slow information about what happened in Nokia, or difficulties to 
get in contact with the electricity companies after the storm. 
When looking at the six-month period following the initial response, blame 
attribution was only present in three of the items analyzed: two attributions 
concerning the water crisis, and one concerning the school shooting. In Nokia, the 
head of the waterworks was fired, presenting a concrete solution to the blame 
attribution, while the blame for the school shooting was attributed to the shooter.  
 
6.7 Discussion and conclusions 
 
Media attention to focusing events explain the event, propose solutions, and promote 
learning (Birkland 2006) in the form of framing – when highlighting certain aspects 
of the incident, or attributing blame. Intense media coverage of an event may make 
certain issues salient, which provides important clues to the public and to 
policymakers. Attention from the media can produce political change, as the pressure 
to “do something” rises (Birkland 2006; Smith 1996). The aim of this study was to 
compare the media coverage regarding four focusing events with a varying degree of 
strength and origin, using content analysis of texts and images. The differences 
between the events will be discussed starting from the distinction between natural 
disasters and man-made disasters, as well as a weaker versus stronger degree of focus. 
The media coverage in terms of framing, theme, blame attribution and descriptive 
characteristics were empirically assessed through a quantitative content analysis of 
Helsingin Sanomat’s coverage. The coverage was studied during a two-week period 
immediately after the incident (total sample) and a six-month period (randomized 
sample). The analysis showed differences between the four events and will be 
discussed in more general terms here.  
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Concerning the initial two-week coverage of the events, the events with a stronger 
degree of focus (namely the school shooting and the storm)  cluster together in 
contrast to the events with a weaker degree of focus. The quantity of texts, the number 
of images, the mean column height, and the number of words are higher for the events 
with a stronger degree of focus – not surprisingly since the stronger the focus, the 
more newsworthy the event. However, the school shooting clearly stands out as the 
event that receives the most attention since it was such an exceptional event in a 
Finnish context. When looking at the visual coverage, one aspect clearly emerges, a 
difference in the percentage of images. As such, 70 % of the flood coverage during the 
first two weeks consisted of images, compared to 42 % of the school shooting 
reporting. Moreover, when examining the six-month period, the second phase, the 
man-made catastrophes continue to receive attention, while the discussion about 
natural disasters has faded away. The Boxing Day storm did acquire around 30 texts 
during the second phase, but 89 % of these were published during the first six weeks 
following the crisis. The pattern for the school shooting (N = 129) and the water crisis 
(N = 32) is much more evenly distributed throughout the six-month period, with texts 
published five to six months after the event. The patterns for the natural disaster 
coverage are similar to Bytzek’s (2008, 95) findings from a flooding in Germany, 
where the core of the reporting represented a three-week intense peak, followed by 
only a few texts later on. Therefore, the two natural disasters are more of a “fast-
burning crisis” type (‘t Hart & Boin 2001; Boin et al. 2008) – i.e. critical events followed 
by intense media coverage. However, as soon as the operational action is over, the 
significance on the political agenda fades away. On the other hand, the two man-made 
disasters can be discussed in terms of being “long-shadow crises” (Boin et al. 2005; 
Boin et al. 2008), since there was no immediate closure of political actions, and the 
intensity lasted longer.  
The basic characteristics of the four events have similarities concerning the type of 
text and the producer of the text (Kendall’s W .575 and .622, Table 3). The two events 
with the stronger degree of focus received more coverage as noted, illustrated by a 
higher number of articles and letters to the editor. However, the water crisis and the 
floods had a higher quantity of paragraphs and front page stories. When looking at 
the character, the two events with a higher degree of focus cluster together with a 
similar structure. Firstly, an affective character, trying to explain the issue in a more 
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long-term context, followed by attributive texts corresponding to making sense of the 
present situation. The use of affective texts in the coverage of Jokela and the storm 
may relate to a more comprehensive reporting. A higher number of texts provide 
more room for analysis. The coverage of the floods and the water crisis focused on a 
micro level analysis at an individual level, in comparison to the events with a stronger 
degree of focus where an affective reporting on a macro level with more focus on 
regional and societal levels (cf. Chyi & McCombs 2004). Natural disasters are often 
covered in terms of physical destruction and economic aspects, and a more 
comprehensive picture is missing in the reporting (Houston et al. 2012). 
The actors and sources used to comment and contextualize the focusing events in 
texts are key components to how the event is defined, and what issues are brought to 
discussion. The use of sources in the reporting varied between the events, and no clear 
resemblance was found between either events with a similar degree of focus or origin. 
The school shooting was discussed by citizens, experts and public officials when trying 
to make sense of an incomprehensible event. The coverage of the storm leaned on a 
high number of citizens and eyewitnesses together with public officials. Some 
similarities are distinguishable between the Nokia reporting and the floods, where 
public officials were the most common source, followed by victims and eyewitnesses. 
The proportion of non-official sources in the reporting is similar to Lawrence’s (2001) 
study, around 25 %, the exception being the storm where the combination of citizens 
and victims account for 46 % of the sources used in the reporting.  
 
The school shooting can be classified as an “incomprehensible crisis”, since it was 
extremely unexpected and caused a collective disruption in society (Boin et al 2008, 
289), whereas the water crisis and the storm developed into “mismanaged crises” 
(Boin et al. 2008, 290) due to official response failures. The themes used in the 
reporting are connected to the characteristics of the event. An incomprehensible event 
generates questions of explanations and solutions, and a focus on the person behind 
the incident – in the case of the school shooting, the shooter Auvinen. The two natural 
disasters dealt with themes such as problems, solutions, compensation and 
responsibility to clear up the situation. In Nokia, the mismanaged water crisis resulted 
in texts about the compensation and responsibility alongside a critique of the 
management of the situation.  
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The framing of the events differ mostly between Jokela and the three other events. 
The school shooting was mainly framed in terms of human interest stories, together 
with attribution of responsibility and morality. When a focusing event involves 
human casualties, it is likely that human interest is a central issue in the framing (Li 
2007, 684). In comparison, the framing of the other three events emphasized 
attribution of responsibility in 60−80 percent of the cases, together with a human 
interest frame and an economic frame. The absence of the economic discussion in the 
debate following the school shooting is, on the one hand, understandable, since the 
visible economic consequences concerned only the school of Jokela, while the other 
three events affected society economically in a more direct manner. The result is in 
line with Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000) findings that attribution of responsibility 
is the most frequently occurring frame. The explanation for this might be found in the 
potential influence of political culture and context, where a strong welfare state is 
connected to citizen’s expectations that the government should provide answers to 
societal problems (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000, 106). The frame-changing of the 
events, although only implied due to a small sample of texts, reveals that the school 
shooting coverage remained quite similar throughout the whole period, while the 
natural disasters transcended into a more economic centered reporting. The water 
crisis moved towards an attribution of responsibility framing.  
 
The fourth research question in this study compared the blame attributions following 
the four focusing events. During times of extraordinary events, such as crises and 
catastrophes, the media and the public often attribute blame as a way to understand 
the event or infer responsibility. Blame attributed in the media coverage was most 
dominant in the water crisis reporting, probably because the incident occurred 
because of a mistake, presenting clear scapegoats in combination with inadequate 
response management from the public officials. The storm coverage had the second 
highest percentage of blame attribution, 34.5 %, and about a fifth of the texts covering 
the school shooting contained blame attribution. The coverage of the floods only 
contained one blame attribution, making it difficult to discuss the differences 
according to origin and degree of focus. Thus, a more general discussion concerning 
the blame game following the school shooting, the water crisis and the storm will be 
carried out. There are situations where the political actors in power manage to market 
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their explanation of the incident well, and other situations where people in power are 
pinpointed as culprits. The framing of the school shooting as an incomprehensible 
event made it easier for policy-makers to avoid blame. This can be seen as a sharp 
contrast to the blame game that followed after the second school shooting in 
Kauhajoki, less than a year later (Raittila et al. 2009). The analysis of blame attribution 
made by Atkeson and Maestas (2012) following hurricane Katrina showed that almost 
half of the segments contained blame attribution, such as a slow response of 
government and the devastation to property and livelihoods – similar to the natural 
disaster coverage in Finland. It is common that governments receive blame in times 
of crisis (Atkeson & Maestas 2012; Salwen 1995), and the most common target of the 
attribution is public officials. The debate after the storm placed blame on the 
companies responsible for electricity supply, and the discussion about possible 
explanations to the school shooting emphasized society as one factor to blame. 
Exogenous factors sometimes play an essential part, e.g. it is easier for governmental 
actors to present an underlying cause for the event and thus avoid blame when dealing 
with natural disasters. However, when endogenous factors such as mistakes or 
negligence are part of the crisis, it is more difficult to alleviate doubt – as seen in the 
aftermath of the water crisis.  
The distribution of speakers making the attribution is extensive and concerns 
different actors. As Atkeson and Maestas (2012, 68) demonstrate, journalists, victims 
and local politicians expressed blame following hurricane Katrina. In the Jokela case, 
the combination of citizens, victims and journalists represent about 60 % of the 
speakers making the attribution, compared to 70 % in the case of Nokia and 56 % in 
the aftermath of the storm. This illustrates the fact that journalists and ordinary people 
attribute blame and, to some extent, influence the framing of the media coverage in 
crisis situations (Atkeson & Maestas 2012). Since the second phase of reporting – the 
six-month period – was only briefly studied, it is difficult to say as to whether blame 
attribution is more common in the second phase of the reporting, as stated by Graber 
(2009). However, blame attribution in the more long-term phase was only present 
concerning man-made disasters. 
Visual framing is an important part of disaster coverage, although it is less studied 
than textual framing. This study analyzed the images and graphics present during the 
first two weeks. The human interest framing was used in the visualization of all four 
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events. The two natural disasters have a similar image framing with images framed as 
lives saved or images showing physical destruction. The absence of lives lost frames 
might be explained by the more serious image of HS, since displaying dead bodies is 
more often a feature of sensationalism employed by the tabloid newspapers (Ali & 
Mahmood 2013). The dominant actors in the images were very similar between the 
four crises, mostly victims and eyewitnesses, although policemen and rescue services 
were also portrayed. 
A summary of the most dominant frames used in textual and visual coverage of the 
focusing events, along with blame attribution for the events, is presented in Table 9. 
Table 9. Summary of the media coverage following four focusing events. 
  First two weeks 
Most dominant text frame (%) 
Most dominant image frame (%) 
Blame attribution (%),Who is blaming 
who?  
Six months 
Most dominant text frame (%) 
Man‐made, 
stronger 
Human interest (61 %) 
Human interest/other (18 %) 
18.5 %, citizens blaming public officials 
and society 
Human interest (80 %) 
Man‐made, 
weaker 
Attribution of responsibility (82 %) 
Human interest (58 %) 
50 %,  citizens and journalists blaming 
public officials 
Attribution of responsibility (80%) 
Nature, 
stronger 
Attribution of responsibility (71 %) 
Human interest (36 %) 
34.5 %, victims and public officials blaming 
corporations and public officials 
Economic (80 %) 
Nature, 
weaker 
Attribution of responsibility (61 %) 
Lives saved/human interest (33 %) 
5 %, political party blaming public officials 
Economic (67 %) 
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As discussed by Boin et al. (2008, 9), focusing events become politicized rather quickly 
when political, economic or societal actors engage in a struggle to produce a dominant 
interpretation of the implications of a crisis. Thus, we can anticipate a difference in 
the framing, as well as frame-changing over time, of focusing events. Therefore, the 
current study contributes to disaster research by comparing different types of disasters 
and the apprehension of how these events and the media message helps shape broader 
political outcomes. Overall, the findings of the study show that some characteristics 
of the reporting are affected by the event, while other features might be explained by 
origin and strength. The volume of initial coverage given to an event regarding space 
and time is connected to the strength of the focus. As expected, the more focusing an 
event is, the more texts are written about the event, since focusing events are 
interesting according to media logic (Birkland 2006; Downs 1972; Nord & Strömbäck 
2002). However, the percentage of images used in the reporting seems to be higher 
when the strength of an event is weaker. Furthermore, man-made disasters tend to 
receive a more extensive coverage during the third phase; this might provide a better 
understanding of the event and possible effects, while natural disasters are discussed 
in terms of the immediate actions (Houston et al. 2012).  
Looking back at the initial theoretical figure we can conclude that the school 
shooting had the highest percentage of human interest and morality frames, while the 
other three events were dominate by attribution of responsibility. Especially the water 
crisis, which indeed was a preventable crisis, had a high amount of blame gaming. The 
natural disaster with a stronger degree of focus did show a high usage of economic 
and conflict frames in combination with the attribution of responsibility and human 
interest. Hence, natural disasters are discussed more frequently on a macro level, while 
man-made disasters are explained on a micro level concerning how ordinary people 
are affected by the events (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11. Media coverage of focusing events over time according to origin. 
 
Moreover, discussing how the visual frames correspond with the textual frames, the 
physical destruction frame resembles the economic frame, while the human interest 
is used in both framing measurements. The emotional image frame often displays 
cemetery candles or grieving and suffering people – related to both the human interest 
frame and the morality frame. The lives saved image frame could be linked to the 
attribution of responsibility, together with the politician frame – showing actors who 
are handling the situation. The combination of visual and textual framing of the 
school shooting shows a clear focus on the human interest angle. The water crisis uses 
both textual and visual frames of attribution of responsibility and human interest, 
while the two natural disasters combine an economic angle with human interest and 
attribution of responsibility. To conclude, the visual and textual framing of focusing 
events reinforce each other, making the coverage a powerful contributor to the 
understanding of focusing events.  
Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate the combination of visual and 
textual framing more closely. In previous research, the textual and visual elements are 
often studied separately.  Another fruitful research strategy would be to analyze the 
visual and textual elements using the same coding scheme for a better comparison of 
how the two elements support each other. 
BLAME GAME 
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7. Threat or opportunity? The politicization of 
focusing events in the parliamentary arena 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In today’s world, there is a constant punctuation of everyday life by crises and 
disasters, followed by a sense of threat and uncertainty. Focusing events cast doubt on 
institutions and policies, raise salient issues, shape agendas and might even alter 
power distribution (Baumgartner & Jones 2009; Boin et al. 2009, 3). “In the wake of 
devastation and sorrow, we expect more from government than restoring a sense of 
order. We expect government to study the causes and initiate actions that ensure this 
crisis will never happen again” (Boin et al. 2008, 309). Focusing events receive a lot of 
attention, both on the formal political agenda and on the media agenda (Atkeson & 
Maestas 2012; Henderson & Sitter 2007; Jääsaari et al. 2009; Odén, Ghersetti & Wallin 
2009). In both these arenas, actors define which problems need our attention, and how 
we should understand them (Roggeband & Vliegenthart 2007). Nevertheless, when 
discussing political actions, the debate in the parliamentary arena has a legislative role, 
in comparison to the media arena where ideas can be brought forward without a clear 
connection to actual policy making (Birkland & Lawrence 2004). Hence, the 
interesting aspect in this study is the process regarding how an event is perceived in 
the formal political arena, e.g. through the discussion of problems and solutions in the 
wake of an event (Birkland 2006, 1). A causal mechanism between a focusing event 
and specific policy change is sometimes hard to establish (Birkland 2006). Hence, the 
debate of the event in the parliamentary arena is a more direct technique to distinguish 
how the event is perceived by those in power, which is influenced by values, interests 
of the actors, as well as the framing of the debate. Furthermore, disasters are 
influenced by political factors; the prevention, preparedness and response to a disaster 
are parts of a political game, where the reconstruction of the event in the media or in 
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the parliament is a political event with political outcomes in terms of framing the 
problem, agenda-setting or governmental interventions (de Waal 2006; Fuentes 2009; 
Hannigan 2012).  
Atkeson and Maestas (2012, 1) argue that crises and disasters create a different 
surrounding than routine political conflicts – a space where political change is 
permitted, because of the emotional impact of these events and the high motivation 
for attributions of blame. Moreover, focusing events highlight existing problems, thus 
providing an opportunity for change. Hence, the debate following a focusing event 
may contain new ideas concerning what the problem is and what should be done, 
bringing about a competition amongst political actors regarding the framing and 
definition of the event (Birkland, Camileeri & Warnement 2014, 2). Nevertheless, 
what is lacking in previous research is a careful textual analysis of the discourse 
surrounding focusing events (e.g. Birkland & Warnement 2013, 21). This study 
examines the following research question: are there different kinds of meaning-
making processes following different types of focusing events in the formal political 
arena? The aim of this study is to compare different types of disasters through a 
quantitative content analysis of the debate in the parliamentary arena. The main focus 
is to compare natural disasters to man-made disasters, as well as events with a weaker 
degree of focus to events with a stronger degree of focus. The outline of the chapter is 
as follows. Firstly, I present a theoretical discussion about the politicization process 
following a focusing event, i.e. how crises are portrayed as either a threat or as an 
opportunity, and potential political implications concerning framing and blame 
attribution. Hereafter, the method, design and data of the study is presented followed 
by the empirical findings and a concluding discussion. 
 
7.2 Theoretical background – The politics of crises 
 
“Crises have a way of becoming politicized rather quickly”, state Boin et al. (2008, 9). 
The concept of politicization can be defined as an “increase in polarization of 
opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced 
towards the process of policy formulation” (de Wilde 2011, 560). While some actors 
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might fear a critique of existing policies and a threat to the legitimacy of the 
dominating way of work, others enjoy a window of opportunity for a possible political 
change. We cannot expect actors with a political, economic or other interest to give 
up their self-interest when a disaster or catastrophe occurs – instead different actors 
participate in a struggle to define the event and the political outcome. Two important 
aspects of a crisis aftermath are therefore accountability and learning; policy makers 
discuss actions prior to the event and evaluate and redesign practices (Boin et al. 
2008).  
When a focusing event occurs, the media coverage of the event is essential because 
an extensive media reporting can be linked to an increase in institutional attention 
(Smith 1996). Furthermore, a more profound discussion mobilizes groups and actors 
who may otherwise find it difficult to be heard in the political arena (Birkland 2006).  
There are various ways for policy makers to deal with emergencies, as different events 
can be framed in very different ways (Boin et al. 2009, 84). This notion derives from 
the supposition that it is not the event per se, but the public perception and 
interpretation that affects whether a focusing event has a political impact and leads to 
policy change. The first type of crises are events that are explained as unfortunate 
incidents and therefore do not require any kind of political actions. The second type 
constitutes crisis situations portrayed as the existence of a critical threat to society. 
However, the situation nonetheless defends prevailing norms and values and does not 
put blame on the political actors. The third type of emergencies are events that raise 
criticism of current policies or the political parties in power, defined here as a critical 
opportunity. Earlier, the first two types of crises were often seen as ‘An act of God’, 
something you could not influence at a political level (Rosenthal 1998), and a similar 
argumentation is often applied following natural disasters – the weather is something 
we cannot influence. These situations are seen as incomprehensible events, and 
feelings of confusion and sorrow produce a necessity to move on and restore order. 
However, in today’s risk society, there is a greater chance of crises and disasters 
affecting the societal agenda, as well as the political agenda. If a disaster situation 
repeats itself, critical voices may be raised asking how this could happen again. Have 
there been warning signals showing the vulnerabilities of a society – and why have no 
actions been taken? The third type of emergency, crises as opportunities, are therefore 
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becoming more common today, when a more critical interpretation of the questions 
are emphasized (Boin et al. 2009, 85−86). 
 
 
7.3 Blame games and meaning-making  
 
Politicians and decision makers undergo five critical tasks in the wake of a crisis; sense 
making, decision making, meaning-making, terminating, and learning (Boin et al. 
2005, 10). Political leaders have a special responsibility to safeguard societies from 
crises, and handle the consequences of these situations. This study focuses on the 
meaning-making aspect of a crisis situation, where a society demands to know what 
is happening and how citizens can feel safe and protected. In a situation where the 
government does not succeed in dominating the meaning-making of a crisis, the 
ability to take action and manoeuver the situation is constrained. In this situation, 
leaders are, as stated by Boin et al. (2005, 13) “challenged to present a compelling story 
that describes what the crisis is about: what is at stake, what are its causes, what can be 
done”. Framing is part of the meaning-making following a focusing event, and an 
interesting aspect of framing is how it is not just about following existing plans or 
implementing pre-crisis decisions. Instead, framing brings about an intuitive and 
sometimes improvised communication by leaders “to influence public perceptions 
and emotions” (Boin et al. 2005, 82). The meaning-making of an event is important 
to the legitimacy of societal institutions and core values. Hence, did those in power 
present a clear interpretation of the focusing events and explain how the society is 
supposed to get through the crisis (Boin, Kuipers & Overdijk 2013, 85)? To 
successfully attribute meaning to a focusing event through defining the problems and 
diagnosing causes also gives the power to suggest remedies. 
In the description of reality, some information is withheld, while other material is 
highlighted. This construction is needed if we are to understand a complex world. 
Framing is about “organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over 
time, that work symbolically to meaningfully construct the social world” (Reese 2001, 
11). Hence, framing involves something beyond the text, the creation of wider social 
explanations and patterns. Within policy-making, framing is used to highlight a 
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particular issue, as such, the construction is often more visible if it concerns a 
controversial issue (Birkland & Lawrence 2009, 1406). In the parliamentary arena, 
actors may use a juridical language to de-politicize a crisis (Boin et al. 2005, 83). 
Moreover, another effective strategy is to downplay a crisis by using a scientific 
discourse (Snider 2004). Framing in times of crisis is a balancing act between 
dramatizing the seriousness of the event including, for example, emphasizing villains 
and threats, followed by the opportunity to propose bold actions that under normal 
political processes would not stand a chance (Birkland 2006; Boin et al. 2005). 
Previous research has identified different types of framework that are found in media 
coverage (e.g. Neuman, Just & Crigler 1992; Semetko & Valkenburg 2000), and 
furthermore with a specific focus on crisis and disaster communications (An & Gower 
2009; Iyengar 1991; Houston et al. 2012; Li 2007). In a broad sense, the concept of 
framing includes the use of emotions and blame gaming. However, in this study the 
concept of framing is first operationalized through previous research to represent five 
frameworks dominating political discussion; attribution of responsibility, conflict, 
economic, human interest, and morality. Then I apply an additional more specific 
focus to post-disaster framing in the form of blaming, emotional appeal, and solutions 
presented. 
The values, interests and positions of political actors can be seen as the “why” 
aspect of the politicization of crises. Explanations as to why an event becomes a crisis 
can be found in temporal aspects, such as in the media environment or in the political 
context with leaders versus opposition. However, the aim of this study is to discuss 
the “how” process, where frames, blame and emotions are used in the meaning-
making process to either portray the event as an opportunity or as a threat, affecting 
which solutions are discussed as feasible.  
Temporary factors affect how actors participate in the politicization process in the 
parliamentary arena, such as the proximity in time when a crisis occurs in relation to 
elections (Boin et al., 2009). One example is how the bombings in Madrid in 2004, 
which occurred only a few days before the national elections, became a major election 
issue. The opposition leader, José Luis Zapatero, beat the incumbent Prime Minister, 
José María Aznar, despite the fact that the former was in the lead in the polls before 
the bombings occurred (ibid.). Thus, the timing may result in different motivations 
for actors to pursue questions regarding responsibility and liability. The closer in time 
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to an election a focusing event occurs, the more likely it is that the crisis is exploited 
to achieve policy changes or creates negative repercussions toward the actors in power 
(Boin et al. 2009). Furthermore, the length of the political career can affect how hard 
political leaders are punished. Leaders who have been in power for a long time are 
more likely to have to defend themselves, while newly elected leaders can come off 
more easily (ibid.).  
Furthermore, another temporary factor is whether the media coverage about the 
incident emphasizes exogenous explanations. As such, policy makers can more easily 
avoid blame attribution, and instead, negative political consequences are linked to 
endogenous explanations. However, the media’s influence on the political agenda is 
often tied to political contingency, which means that opposition parties, for example, 
react to media coverage only if an issue is important in the politicization process 
(Green-Pedersen & Stubager 2010). However, there are differences in the framing of 
political issues in the parliament and in the media (Roggeband & Vliegenthart 2007). 
Institutional structures might explain these differences, whereby the media have 
stronger incentives to define a problem in a new way, while the parliament favors 
preexisting solutions. This derives from the fact that the parliamentary debate is 
concerned with policy making – discourse and action, while the media handles ideas 
that are not necessarily convertible into legislation (Birkland & Lawrence 2004; Elder 
& Cobb 1983). Moreover, situational factors may influence the crisis outcome. Some 
events are so compelling that the meaning-making process is limited, as for example 
when there is a clear actor to blame for an event. At other times, the magnitude of the 
event can impose a national solidarity rather than blame gaming (Boin et al. 2008, 98). 
A study of post-crisis political processes involves an accountability or responsibility 
discussion. In times of crisis, there are different strategies for decision-makers to 
adopt (e.g. Brändström et al. 2008). When actors choose to construct severity they can 
frame the event as a violation of specific core values in society. The more severe an 
issue is perceived to be, the more actors are likely to get involved (Rochefort & Cobb 
1994). Another strategy is to construct agency and describe an event as an incident or 
a common problem. A third strategy is to construct responsibility and depict the crisis 
as caused by an actor (Brändström et al. 2008, 116). In the aftermath of the tsunami 
catastrophe, governments in the Nordic countries tried to frame the event as “an act 
of God” to avoid blame. Nevertheless, this attempt failed. Subsequent public apologies 
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by the governments in Finland and Norway did, however, appear to mitigate the crisis 
somewhat in those countries, although the Swedish government, by comparison, 
continued to deny responsibility, thus turning the event into high politics 
(Brändström et al. 2008, 142−143).  
The media and the public often use catastrophes to attribute responsibility to 
leaders and not to parties (Bucy 2003; Merolla & Zeichmeister 2009). As such, disaster 
leadership is connected to legislation and the executive branch. The question of 
accountability in the event of crises and disasters can be about a political, legal, moral 
or financial responsibility. Therefore, a focusing event raises a collective stress in 
society, often requiring some form of catharsis for mitigating circumstances 
(Brändström & Kuipers 2003). Accountability and guilt will affect the political arena 
if the incident has been explained and contextualized as a result of policy failures 
(ibid., 280−281); and when different actors choose to view the incident as a failure and 
pinpoint scapegoats we can speak of a “politicization process” (ibid.). Although this 
process is neither automatic nor the predominant way of addressing focusing events, 
such events can become politicized if influential actors “succeed in framing them as 
blameworthy violations of crucial public values” (ibid., 280).  
It is important to study attributions of blame and responsibility because they are 
the basis for how we evaluate political leaders and policy-making (Iyengar 1989). An 
especially central role can be recognized concerning attributions formed in crisis and 
disaster situations, as these events attract massive attention and often create a 
common way of perceiving the events. This means that focusing events have “the 
potential to become long-standing political symbols that are used in framing a range 
of policy debates” (Maestas et al. 2008, 610). The description of attribution of 
responsibility may occur either through an episodic frame, where the focus lies on a 
specific event or an individual, or as a thematic responsibility (Iyengar 1991, 14). A 
thematic framework puts the event in a broader societal perspective by providing 
background explanations or discussing the issue more generally. Episodic 
explanations may result in citizens perceiving social problems based on an individual 
perspective rather than as a political issue (ibid.). Therefore, the attribution of 
responsibility may be individual or organizational, e.g. in the case of a crisis 
originating from a mistake or an accident, organizational responsibility attribution is 
often used (An & Gower 2009, 110). 
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The meaning-making process eventually boils down to presenting a solution to the 
problem. Is the event in question treated as a possibility for new policies or is the status 
quo maintained? As such, the solution discussion is closely related to defining the 
problem. By presenting what is wrong, the politicians are automatically assigning a set 
of solutions to the problem (Birkland & Warnement 2013).  
 
7.4 Political discourse and emotional rhetoric 
 
Emotions are a central part of how citizens and societies make sense of focusing 
events. On the one hand, emotions can foster solidarity and arouse a collective shared 
meaning (Hutchison 2010, 81), while on the other hand, disasters arouse feelings of 
anger and fear (Bleiker & Hutchison 2008). Emotional responses are important since 
“the raising of emotions in politics is essential to the prioritization of problems, 
because emotion governs the allocation of attention” (Jones & Baumgartner 2005, 16). 
Crisis and disaster situations are, by definition, rhetorical situations since they call for 
a discursive action (Mral, Hansson Nylund & Vigsø 2010, 53). Hence, the meaning-
making process of framing, blame attribution and emotional arguments in the 
parliament is undertaken through rhetoric, “achieved through an unprejudiced and 
systematic inventory of every possible angle on a question (invention), and through 
dialogic debate” (Mral et al. 2010, 54). When a disaster strikes, the rhetorical reactions 
should be quick and distinct, as well as prepared – political leaders should be prepared 
for unexpected events, handle the situation and learn for the future.  
One challenge when studying political discourse is how speeches are both 
theoretically and empirically relevant in relation to political structures and processes 
on a macro level. However, the study of discourse often takes place at a micro level, 
where we find individual political actors with various sets of beliefs, discourse and 
interactions. At an intermediate level, we can discuss political groups and institutions, 
followed by the top level represented by political systems and socio-political and 
cultural processes (van Dijk 2002, 204). Nevertheless, an MP giving a speech in the 
parliament speaks both as an individual, with personal beliefs, and as a member of a 
party, with a specific position, e.g. as part of the opposition. At the same time, the 
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person is participating in a system of parliamentary democracy, using a discourse 
order of democracy with presupposed cultural norms and knowledge. The context of 
political discourse is indeed crucial, since many forms of political discourses, like 
parliamentary debates or laws, are defined more by contextual rather than by textual 
terms – “who speaks to whom, as what, on what occasion and with what goals” (van 
Dijk 2002, 225). As a consequence, political discourse is politicized because of its role 
in the political process.  
Communication in times of crisis is about deciding on rational arguments based 
on facts (logos). However, pathos, which are the emotions aroused, are an important 
factor in determining the outcome (Mral 2013). The brain is not a machine, 
objectively calculating and searching for facts and figures in order to make rational 
decisions. Instead, “the political brain is an emotional brain” (Westen 2008, xv), 
insofar as both politicians and citizens are guided by emotions. This view opposes the 
view of emotions as contradictory to rationality; instead emotions are understood as 
an important part of political processes (Hutchison 2010, 82). A demand for change 
may not merely be a result of new information, but of new emotions, such as anger or 
fear, advocating a new way of looking at issues. However, there are problems with 
using emotional appeal in discussion. Emotional appeals are sometimes viewed as 
weak arguments on a logical basis, since they are based on presumptions and not 
evidence. Despite its shortcomings, an emotional appeal may play an important role 
in the wake of a crisis, especially when collective values are threatened or societal 
norms are questioned. A ceremonial rhetoric might be needed when the identity of a 
group or a nation is disturbed, an example being the rhetoric used after 9/11 (Mral 
2013, 50). Moreover, strong rhetoric is full of examples, metaphors and emotive 
concepts to either reduce or increase collective anxieties. “The very act of labelling a 
particular set of societal conditions a ‘crisis’ is itself a major communicative act with 
potentially far-reaching political consequences” (Boin et al. 2005, 83). Whether an 
event is labelled as a “disaster” or an “accident” is important, especially when it comes 
to the allocation of responsibility (Millar & Heath 2004).  
Political reasoning is different from other forms of reasoning since it is part of a 
struggle over the dominant interpretation of the world, e.g. problems, solutions and 
decisions made. This means that a political discourse is strategic in the sense that it is 
intended to build alliances, to spur action or to maintain the status quo.  Hence,  
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political discourse “seeks to evoke values and emotions by presenting something as 
good or evil, innocent or guilty, responsible or not, possible or impossible, strong or 
weak, right or wrong” (Stone 2002, 382). As such, attributions of responsibility are 
linked to emotions and trust in government. The aftermath of a disaster is highly 
emotional, as well as a fertile environment for blame gaming, often connected to 
feelings of anger or anxiety. While anger, on the one hand, is linked to a desire to 
punish those responsible or those in powers, anxiety, on the other hand, might reduce 
the likeliness to blame others, and instead favor information-seeking policies 
(Atkeson & Maestas 2010, 181−182; 188; Kühne & Schemer 2015, 401). When feelings 
of sadness are elicited, the participants are more willing to help victims and emphasize 
remedial measures (Kühne & Schemer 2015, 402).  
 
As a summary, I draw together the main theoretical points concerning the discussion 
of the politicization of focusing events in the parliamentary arena in Figure 12. The 
research questions of the study analyze framing, blame attributions and emotional 
appeal when discussing different focusing events and possible solutions to the 
problems. Boin et al.'s (2009) distinction between whether a crisis is portrayed as a 
threat or an opportunity can be seen as the outcome of a discursive environment. 
Hence, the first dimension in the politicization process is that the event is portrayed 
as a crisis, threatening the core values in society. In addition, whenever such a crisis 
situation is identified, some political actors may decide to use the event as an 
opportunity for change. Others, however, may simply prefer to maintain the status 
quo and existing policies. Therefore, the politicization of the event in the 
parliamentary arena is generally a struggle over the meaning-making process. 
Furthermore, the meaning-making of an event is important for the legitimacy of 
societal institutions and core values. In this light, the framing offers an interpretation 
of the focusing event and explains how a society is supposed to get through a crisis. 
The expectations concerning the five reoccurring frameworks are that the attribution 
of responsibility framing variable involves recognizing the problem as a threat to core 
values, as well as emphasizing a responsibility for dealing with the situation. However, 
the attribution variable can be discussed in terms of blame or merely as recognition. 
A conflict frame is likely to portray an event as an opportunity by attributing some 
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form of blame, or attacking the status quo. In this study, an exploratory analysis is also 
made of the three other frames; economic, human interest and morality.   
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Figure 12. The politicization of focusing events in the parliamentary arena. 
 
An important question to consider here concerns how these frames are used in 
promoting a threat or an opportunity discourse. Regarding the blame game, blame 
attribution is present when a focusing event is seen as an opportunity for change and 
actors want to pinpoint the disarray on governmental actions. However, only modest 
or diffused blame is visible when the event is portrayed as a threat to core values and 
the collective good in society, ensuring the defense of existing policies and incumbent 
office-holders. Concerning the emotions used in the argumentation, anger and 
anxiety have been linked to blame attribution. However, whereas anger promotes a 
desire to punish those in power, anxiety stimulates a more reductive attitude. 
Furthermore, positive feelings of joy, hope and pride, together with sadness and 
compassion are researched using an exploratory analysis in this study. For example, 
consideration is given as to whether feelings of sadness make MPs more willing to 
want to help the victims and emphasize a threat discourse. In conclusion, the 
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perception of an event as more of a threat or more of an opportunity affects the 
solutions that are deemed necessary. 
 
7.5 Aim of the study 
 
The aim of the study is to analyze the Finnish parliamentary debate following four 
focusing events, and distinguish variances in the discourse. This is done by analyzing 
the discussions that took place in the plenary sessions in the wake of each event. The 
overall research question examines whether any differences can be found in the 
discussions following these four events in terms of their strength (stronger versus 
weaker) and origin (man-made versus natural disasters). The debates are studied 
using four main themes (e.g. Atkeson & Maestas 2012; Birkland 1996; 2006,) and the 
notion is that there is a lack of research available on the discourse surrounding the 
political debate on focusing events. Hence, the two main research questions, as well as 
the four themes, are as follows: 
R1: Does the origin of a focusing event (natural versus man-made) affect the political 
discourse? 
R2: Does the strength of a focusing event (weaker versus stronger) affect the political 
discourse?  
 
The questions pertaining to the four political discourse themes are as follows: 
 
a) Which different frames were used in the debate? 
b) How was blame attributed in the debate? 
c) Which emotions were used in the debate? 
d) Which solutions were presented to the problem(s)? 
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7.6 Method and material  
 
 A quantitative content analysis is used in this study to examine the debates that took 
place during the plenary sessions following four focusing events in Finland; the school 
shooting in Jokela 2007, the water crisis in Nokia in 2007, the Boxing Day Storm in 
2011, and the floods in Ostrobothnia in 2012. The use of a content analysis is a 
research strategy defined as “the systematic assignment of communication content to 
categories according to rules” (Riff et al. 2014, 3), often involving statistical methods 
to analyze relationships. To obtain as similar coding objects as possible, only the 
plenary debates are analyzed. The data includes all debates mentioning the events 
during a nine-month period following each crisis. A nine-month period represents 
the initial phase of the discussion. Moreover, another school shooting happened less 
than a year after Jokela, and that debate needed to be excluded from the present 
analysis. Depending on the success of the political actions, and feedback from other 
societal arenas, the framing of the debate might emphasize other aspects during the 
third phase. The plenary sessions in written form were found through the search 
engine www.riksdagen.fi, which provides access to all documents discussed in the 
Finnish parliament and the government. Through the use of key words, the following 
numbers of plenary sessions dealing with each of the four focusing events were 
identified; the Jokela School shooting (16);  the Boxing Day storm (11); the Nokia 
water crisis (9); the floods in Ostrobothnia (9). The combined numbers of debate 
contributions during these sessions are 132 and each contribution is seen as a coding 
unit. The search was limited to a nine-month period following the events.  
7.6.1 The Finnish political context 
A great deal of seminal disaster research has been carried out in an American setting 
(Atkeson & Maestas 2012; Birkland 1996; 2006, Baumgartner & Jones 2005). However, 
Jensen (2011) argues that a major difference between the US and the European context 
is the European parliamentary systems, where political parties have a central role as 
executives. Deriving from this notion, it is essential to discuss the veto power of pivotal 
parties. As Boin et al. (2009) demonstrate, the political context and an event’s 
occurrence in relation to ongoing elections matter greatly. All the four Finnish cases 
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appear at a similar point in the political process, during the first or second year of a 
political term. Hence, the events did not influence the election campaigns or the 
formation of government. Previous research shows that the closer in time to a 
forthcoming election a focusing event occurs, the higher the likelihood of policy 
reform or elite damage (Boin et al. 2009, 99). The expectations of the debates in the 
Finnish parliaments are therefore more balanced. During 2007, the Centre Party 
(KESK) and the Conservatives (KOK) formed a coalition with the Swedish People’s 
Party (RKP) and the Greens (VIHR). Four years later, the Left Alliance (VAS) and the 
Christian Democrats (KD) formed a coalition with KOK, the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP), the Greens and the RKP, forming a so-called rainbow coalition. 
7.6.2 Coding measurements 
To analyze the blame attribution, framing, emotional appeal and discussion about 
problems and solutions, I draw upon previous research (e.g. Atkeson & Maestas 2012; 
Birkland 2006; Birkland & Warnement 2013; Birkland et al. 2014; Bytzek 2008; Chyi 
& McCombs 2004; Houston et al. 2012; Lawrence 2001; Li 2007; Semetko & 
Valkenburg 2000). The coding scheme is included as Appendix B.  
Initially, basic data were collected. Each text was identified by the focusing event it 
dealt with and the information collected was from the plenary discussion where the 
comment was placed and who placed it; i.e. the speakers’ role in the parliament, party 
membership, as well as opposition or governmental position. The proportion of a 
comment discussing the focusing event in questions was noted as ranging from 
complete to very small on a four-point scale, followed by a brief description of the 
theme of the text.  
Blame attribution 
The comments analyzed were coded for attribution of blame. The measurements draw 
upon previous work by Atkeson and Maestas (2012) who have analyzed the blame 
attribution environment following Hurricane Katrina. Attributions of blame may be 
implicit, such as in the tone of the report or leading statements, or explicit in the form 
of direct statements. In this study, explicit attributions of blame – defined as an 
expression of some kind of responsibility for what has happened – were coded. When 
an attribution occurred in the comment, the coder noted the speaker making the 
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attribution, and the target of the attribution. Additionally, the time frame to which the 
attribution was referring was coded as either a preparation failure or a response 
failure. Moreover, the reason for the attribution of blame was registered (Atkeson & 
Maestas 2012, 204−207). An example is the statement from Eero Lehti (KOK)17 
pointing out how Jokela was an unexpected event, while Nokia to some extent was a 
product of gross negligence. Hence, the two events should be treated differently.  
Framing 
To analyze which frames were used in the parliamentary debate, a previous framing 
measurement developed by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) was used. This 
measurement is used by other researchers concerning a wide range of topics (e.g. An 
& Gower 2009; de Vreese et al. 2001; Dimitrova et al. 2005; Igartua et al. 2005). The 
coding scheme included 20 questions to which the coder had to answer yes (1) or no 
(0). Each question represented one of five frames; attribution of responsibility, human 
interest, conflict, morality and economic dimensions. Examples of the questions used 
were “Does the story suggest that some level of government has the ability to alleviate 
the problem?” (attribution of responsibility) and “Is there a mention of the cost/degree 
of expense involved?” (economic). The attribution of responsibility frame describes a 
problem in a way that responsibility can be attributed to decision makers, groups or 
individuals, either as a responsibility for the occurrence of a problem or as 
responsibility for resolving the issue (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000, 96). When 
applying a conflict frame, the debate underscores a conflict between individuals, 
groups or institutions. Through a human interest frame, the news presents an 
emotional angle or a personal story (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000). Furthermore, the 
use of the human interest frames can increase emotional reactions, which correlate 
with responsibility attribution (Cho & Gower 2006, 422). The economic frame 
presents an issue, an event or a problem based on the economic consequences for 
individuals, groups, institutions or countries (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000, 96). 
Fifthly, the morality frame places an issue or an event in a moral context by referring 
to religious principles or moral rules (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000, 96). Previous 
                                                            
17 ”Nokia ja Jokela ovat erilaisia luonteeltaan. Jokelassa on täysin ennalta arvaamaton tapaus. 
Nokian kohdalla voidaan sanoa, että on törkeästä huolimattomuudesta ainakin osittain kyse, 
jolloin siinä mielessä näitä kohteita pitäisi myös käsitellä omavastuuosuudeltaan erilaisina.” 
PTK 58/2008 vp 
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research (e.g. d’Haenens & De Lange 2001; Holt & Major 2010; Semetko & 
Valkenburg 2000) has investigated how the questions cluster together and the five 
previously discussed frames were distinguishable.  
Emotional argumentation 
The argumentation was coded for use of emotions. A division of six basic emotions 
(anger, anxiety, enthusiasm, pride, compassion, sadness and hope) are often used in 
political communication research (e.g. Brader & Valentino, 2007; Huddy et al., 2007; 
Neuman et al., 2007). This is in line with Brader’s (2006) study of emotional appeal in 
political ads. During the coding process in this study, some of the original categories 
were merged into a broader division of emotions – negative versus positive. An 
example of enthusiasm, hope and joy appeal is the statement made by Markku Eestilä 
(KOK) 18; “Finnish electricity companies did an outstanding job during last year’s 
storms, a formal thank you to them.”  
Problems and solutions 
In the parliamentary arena, different representations of the problems are presented. 
These representations can be analyzed by looking at a diagnosis – what is presented 
as the problem, how is it presented and who caused the problem, followed by a 
prognosis of how the problem should be solved (Birkland & Warnement 2014; 
Roggeband & Vliegenthart 2007, 529). The questions included in the coding scheme 
are “What is represented as the problem?” and “Which action is deemed necessary 
and why?” After the initial coding, the problems and solutions variables were recoded 
into new, more general categories, in order to enable a comparison between the four 
events. An illustration of this is the economy category that contained different 
statements, for example the quest for more resources to pay compensation to farmers, 
or a demand for more money to be allocated to school health services. 
 
An inter-coder reliability test was conducted on a randomized sample of 15 
contributions for the blame attribution, framing and emotional appeal variables, using 
                                                            
18 ”Suomalaiset sähköyhtiöt selvisivät erinomaisesti viime vuoden myrskyistä, siitä heille 
julkinen kiitos.” PTK 23/2012 vp. 
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simple agreement (Holsti’s formula)19, with the lowest score of .85 for the framing 
variables and .90 for emotional appeal. The blame attribution showed total agreement 
between the two coding occasions.  
 
7.7 Results 
 
The findings of the study show some differences between the four focusing events 
concerning the parliamentary debate. A quantitative content analysis, following the 
coding scheme presented in the previous section, was conducted on 132 plenary 
session contributions. The nine months of parliamentary debate represent a total 
population, hence, statistical tests are redundant. However, the tests conducted are 
used to indicate small or large differences between the events.  
The findings will be reported as four different events in this section, and discussed 
more profoundly according to strength and origin in the concluding section. The 
debate will be exemplified through translated plenary session contributions and the 
original texts in Finnish and Swedish are included in Appendix C. Initially, I present 
the basic characteristics of the parliamentary debate (Table 10). The three most 
dominant parties in the debate are different during the two time periods (the 2007 
parliament and the 2011/2012 parliament). Throughout the school shooting and the 
water crisis, the two governmental parties, i.e. the Centre Party (KESK) and the 
Conservatives (KOK), as well as the third largest party in opposition, the Social 
Democrats (SDP), dominated the debate.  
                                                            
19 Holsti’s intercoder reliability (IR) formula was used as follows: IR = 2M/(N1 + N2), where 
M equals the number of agreements between the two coding opportunities, N1 is the total 
number of coding decisions made during the first coding and N2 is the total number of 
coding decisions made during the second session.	
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Concerning the debates following the natural disasters, although the governing KOK 
prevailed, the two other most vocal parties in the debate were opposition parties; 
KESK and the True Finns Party (PS).Thus, the majority of the flood debate 
contributions were made by the opposition parties.  
As described above, the debates following the two man-made disasters often 
emphasized other aspects than the focusing event in question, while the majority of 
the comments discussing the natural disasters focused completely on the subject of 
the crisis. Moreover, the number of debate contributions varies between the events; 
both the man-made disasters receive far more entries than the natural disasters, 55 for 
the school shooting and 35 for the water crisis – versus 14 for the storm and 28 for the 
floods. One explanation for the low number of entries for the storm is explained by 
the timing. The storm occurred during the Christmas holiday period, which is 
followed by a month-long break in the plenary sessions. As such, an extensive debate 
had already taken place in the media arena during the days immediately following the 
focusing event. Nevertheless, the floods also receive less space on the political agenda 
than the two man-made disasters.  
 
Framing  
The use of frames provides meaning to a crisis context that can otherwise be very 
complex. The results (Table 11) concerning the first research question show that the 
school shooting in Jokela stands out as the event that differs the most from the three 
other events, with a lower proportion of economy and attributions of responsibility 
frames. 
 
Table 11. Use of frames in the parliamentary debate (%).  
  Man‐made 
stronger  
n = 55 
Man‐made 
weaker 
n = 35 
Natural dis. 
stronger 
n = 14 
Natural dis. 
weaker 
n = 28 
Attribution of resp.  66  89  89  89 
Human interest  42  9  43  21 
Conflict  13  3  29  11 
Morality  15       
Economic  29  57  64  82 
Note: a debate contribution may contain several different frameworks. 
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Instead, the school shooting is the only event discussed in terms of morality. The other 
man-made event, the water crisis, had a very high number of responsibility comments, 
as well as economic references, whereas the human interest and the conflict angles 
were less prominent, as seen in MP Katainen’s statement:  
As a part of the budget discussion that is handled right now we suggest that the 
city of Nokia, following the accident with the water pipe, and the municipality of 
Tuusula, following the tragic events in the Jokela School, both are granted a 
maximum amount of 1 million Euros each. […] Both events are disasters, and 
the handling of these events definitely belongs to state activity. (Elsi Katainen, 
KESK, ptk 58/2008 vp) 
The two natural disasters are framed alike, with a domination of responsibility and 
economic frames. It is noticeable that the frames are more evenly distributed when 
comparing natural disasters to man-made events.  
 
Blame attribution 
The blame attribution in the parliamentary debate regarding explicit attributions of 
blame was, in general, quite low. Only one blame attribution was present in the 
discussion of the school shooting, placing responsibility on the internet by saying that 
playing computer games may worsen problems of marginalization and loneliness. As 
seen in Heinäluoma’s statement, the debate following the school shooting explicitly 
pointed out that no one was to blame.  
 
Why does this happen? Can we learn something from this? At the same time it 
is clear that we do not want to blame anyone. We know the high standard of our 
schools, we are aware of the good work that the teachers do. But one always stops 
to wonder – is there anything we can learn? (Eero Heinäluoma, SDP, ptk 
75/2007 vp) 
 
Concerning the water crisis, three attributions placed blame on the city of Nokia, 
pointing out that it was a mistake or a self-inflicted problem caused by the civil 
servants in Nokia. The two natural disasters, however, were portrayed as preparation 
failures, collecting five blame attributions in total. In these disasters, the blame was 
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placed on the large electricity companies for their poor preparation and focus on 
executive bonuses instead of developing the technology – as well as on insufficient 
dredging:  
 
It should not be unclear to anyone that the flooding in Ostrobothnia is not 
caused by the people who live there. The flooding is caused by the upstream flow 
of water. (Lars-Erik Gästgivars, RKP, ptk 45/2013 vp) 
 
However, attributions of blame may be implicit, such as the tone of the text or leading 
statements (Atkeson & Maestas, 2012: 204−207). In this study, even if no explicit 
blame was present, the blame attribution is connected to the fourth research question 
of solutions presented to the problem. Even though no explicit attribution is stated, 
an underlying connection between blame and the problems and solutions presented 
may be present.  
 
Emotional appeals 
Although the use of emotions is considered to be important when evaluating a 
situation, interestingly, as shown in Table 12, only a small number of debate 
contributions focused on conveying fear and only about a fifth of the natural disaster 
discussions appealed to anger.  
 
Table 12. Use of emotions in the parliamentary debate (%).  
  Fear  Positive 
feelings 
Anger  Compassion 
Sadness 
n   
Man/strong   7  13  2  31  55   
Man/weak  3  14    9  35   
Nature/strong  14  21  21  21  14   
Nature/weak  7  4  18  29  28 
Note:  Positive  feelings  consist  of  the  categories  hope/joy  +  enthusiasm.  Subsequently, 
compassion and sadness are combined to one category.  
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Instead, positive feelings of being proud of what has been done, or an optimistic 
outlook for the future, are present in all the discussions.  
Minister Häkämies has acted exceptionally well in dealing with this storm. (Timo 
Heinonen, KOK, ptk 23/2012 vp) 
However, the feelings appealed to the most in the parliamentary debate are 
compassion and sadness.  
The situation in Nokia is still truly challenging. There are people who have 
contracted stomach illness for the second or third time and people who suffer 
from secondary disease such as articulation inflammation. The local businesses 
have also suffered disproportionate losses of income. The question of whether 
the government will come to assist has been raised. (Erkki Pulliainen, VIHR, ptk 
97/2007 vp) 
An interesting aspect worth consideration here is the association between the frames 
to the emotions used in the debate (Table 13). 
 
Table 13. Cross tabulations between frames and emotional arguments (%).  
  Fear  Positive 
feelings 
Anger  Compassion 
Sadness 
   
Att. of resp.  6.7  11.5  8.7  24     
Human int.  10.5  23.7*  13.2  68.4***     
Conflict    13.3  40.0***  26.7     
Morality    25    75**   
Economic  2.9*  10.3  11.8**  23.5   
Note: Fisher’s Exact Test, significant at *** p<.001, **p<.05, *p<.10 
The use of positive feelings and compassion and sadness, here in terms of human 
interest, is probably an explanation for the low amount of blame attributions. The 
decision makers focused more on sending out a positive image or expressing 
sympathy than impeaching each other. However, the use of anger was present when 
portraying the issue as a conflict, which could point to implicit blame. Subsequently, 
I tested the differences between governmental and opposition parties regarding their 
use of emotional appeal and found that the only statistically significant difference was 
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the use of compassion and sadness (Table 14.). What is noteworthy here is a higher 
use of anger by opposition parties; the parties belonging to the government were more 
inclined to express positive feelings of hope and pride.  
 
Table 14. Emotions used by governmental and opposition parties (%).  
  Governmental party  Opposition party 
Fear  6.5  7.3 
Positive feelings  13.0  10.9 
Anger  3.9  10.9 
Compassion/sadness  16.9  32.7** 
Note: Fisher’s Exact Test, significant at *** p<.001, **p<.05, *p<.10 
 
Problems and solutions 
Even if the problems and solutions presented in the parliamentary debate of the 
focusing events are event-specific, some general categories can be found. Since the 
debates during the plenary sessions are restricted in time, many comments emphasize 
only the solution aspect. Hence, the problems are exemplified very briefly, and instead 
the main focus here lies on the solutions presented. The school shooting was often 
mentioned in reference to a high amount of anxiety, depression or loneliness among 
adolescence in combination with few psychologists available as MP Alanko-Kahiluoto 
points out below. Subsequently, MP Heinonen emphasizes the need of changes in the 
school organization:  
 
The events in Jokela last week have finally alerted all of us to the fact that 
something needs to be done about preventing malaise of the youth. It is 
important to strengthen the distribution of income, but that action alone is not 
enough. The decay of the preventing measures provided to families, children and 
the youth must be stopped. (Outi Alanko-Kahiluoto, VAS, ptk 81/2007 vp) 
Our government has taken action concerning additional funding for special 
education, supportive education and the size of the student groups, all of which 
have a clear link to the malaise mentioned. (Timo Heinonen, KOK, ptk 39/2008 
vp) 
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Moreover, this malaise was discussed in terms of it being a problem permeating all of 
Finnish society: 
But we must also continue supporting our families. The killings in Jokela, which 
have affected all of us, shed new light on the importance of this matter. The 
wellbeing of children or families cannot be reduced since the problems families 
face reflect how we are doing in general. (Katri Komi, KESK, ptk 101/2007 vp) 
Problems following the water crisis were presented as a physical and mental 
indisposition amongst the citizens of Nokia, in combination with economic 
compensation. The inadequate crisis communication from the city of Nokia was 
mentioned as a problem:  
The accident in the water system in Nokia and the communication concerning 
the accident has been a matter of discussion among the Finns during the last 
weeks. The health of thousands of people in Nokia has been affected by the event. 
The event proves how vulnerable a system can be at its worst in Finland. The 
event also proves that effective, fast and objective informing is crucial after a 
disaster. Furthermore the event proves that the resources of a single municipality 
are insufficient when an accident of this measure occurs in a certain place. (Harri 
Jaskari, KOK, ptk 97/2007 vp) 
Difficulties following the two natural disasters were portrayed as a physical damage, 
i.e. harvest losses or interruption in the electricity supply, and how to organize the 
economic compensations:  
The need for change in certain parts of the electricity market legislation were 
brought to light by the power failure following the storms of last summer and 
this New Year. In many places people were left without electricity for several 
weeks. The power failure also causes large financial losses to both companies and 
people. Many people have been subjected to health threats due to the lack of 
heating and water. (Lea Mäkipää, PS, ptk 23/2012 vp) 
The main solutions put forward are presented in Table 15, ranked according to how 
frequently they are used. The economy category refers to the debate on economic 
resources, how to compensate both individuals and the affected region, and how to 
reallocate resources.  
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Table 15. Solutions advocated during the plenary sessions. 
   
Man‐made 
stronger (%) 
Man‐made  
weaker (%) 
Nature 
stronger (%) 
Nature 
weaker (%) 
       
I    Economy (25)  Economy (34)  Research (43)  Economy (57) 
II    Policy change (13) 
Crisis communication 
(26)  Policy change (21)  Research (36) 
III    Society (11)  Research (11) 
Crisis communication 
(21) 
Policy change 
(4) 
IV    Research (9)  Policy change (6)     
V   
Crisis 
communication (5)       
Kendall’s W = .315 
 
Following the tragedy at the educational center of Jokela, a million euros of 
governmental grants will be granted to the municipality of Tuusula to cover 
various expenses concerning the tragedy. 100.000 Euros will also be granted for 
the investigation of the events. (Minister of Finance Jyrki Katainen, KOK, ptk 
87/2007 vp) 
Ostrobothnia is flooded again and the government withdraws itself from paying 
compensations. Instead, the insurance companies step forward, but the question 
is: Who is going to pay the premium to the companies? (Lars-Erik Gästgivars, 
RKP, ptk 45/2013 vp) 
 
The policy change category advocates that a law change or some kind of policy change 
is needed to solve the problem. When debating the school shooting, MP Peltonen 
points out that the education act needs updating. The discussion following the storm 
emphasizes a need for policy change: 
 
In my opinion it is thoroughly motivated to add a supplement about the duty to 
guarantee the welfare of the students in the education act. (Tuula Peltonen, SDP, 
ptk 4/2008 vp) 
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The companies and associations which have been granted access according to 
the electricity market legislation have not done thorough enough preparations 
concerning the prevention and reparation of power failures. The legislation of 
today does not provide the customers of power companies’ compensation for 
losses. With certain changes the legislation will be better adjusted to the need for 
power companies to be responsible for covering losses. (Lea Mäkipää, PS, ptk 
23/2012 vp) 
 
A focus on research and evaluation refers to learning from the event and developing 
new methods to avoid similar situations in the future, as seen in the debate 
contributions concerning the floods and the school shooting: 
 
Concerning the situation, and also surely concerning future floods, in the fall of 
2011 the Ministry of agriculture and forestry pointed out 21 areas that are 
subjected to the greatest risks of floods. At this present plans are being made for 
these areas in order to prepare for possible future floods. These plans will of 
course be ready in some time, and then they will be actualized. The government 
has its responsibility, and the municipalities have theirs, and in some cases the 
land owners have to take care of their properties. (Minister of Agriculture and 
Forestry Jari Koskinen, KOK, ptk 45/2013 vp) 
The justice department has started a process of investigation on the disaster, and 
in that investigation the legislation and needs of changes concerning it will be 
evaluated through ground rules of investigation. It stands clear that the 
discussions that have been held and the statements from experts point to the fact 
that a change in the legislation concerning firearms will be evaluated seriously as 
a part of the investigation. (Minister of Justice, Tuija Brax, VIHR, ptk 97/2007 
vp) 
The crisis communication category calls attention to the development of better 
communication tools and strategies between leaders and citizens:  
As the informing from the government has been so weak and as the method of 
mass text messages was discussed after the tsunami disaster, what is the status of 
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this right now? Could this be the method by which we, in the future, will be able 
to communicate rapidly in challenging situations? I will end this on a positive 
note. It concerns the water accident in Nokia. The fast and reliable courses of 
action are precisely the right way to deal with these things, and society as a whole 
will surely come to aid to if there is a need for it financially. But this kind of 
preparedness without fuss will surely be expected by the National defence also in 
the future. (Erkki Pulliainen, VIHR, ptk 97/2007 vp) 
In the debate on the school shooting, a vast solutions category was society, and how 
to change attitudes and behavior on a societal level. The economy aspect was an 
important element in the debate concerning all four events:  
The recent heavy floods have clearly proven that there is a need to earmark a 
considerably much larger amount of resources to covering the losses of floods. 
In my opinion the amount of grants aimed at covering these damages is not 
sufficient. (Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, PS, ptk 107/2012 vp) 
The debate following the Boxing Day storm had no specific economy solutions, 
however the policy change debate contributions dealt with questions of how to change 
the compensation policy to represent a more equal level and how to lower costs in the 
future.  
Concerning the change of legislation following the storm which brings with it 
the challenges of laying cables, I might point out as an important point the fact 
that the Minister of Transport and Communications has been susceptible 
enough to consider a change in the legislation that would make it possible to 
place electrical cables close to roads when possible. This would lower the costs 
with one third. In other words the more common use of cables, and legislation 
that makes it possible, is a part of the future. (Minister of Employment and the 
economy Jyri Häkämies, KOK, ptk 83/2012 vp) 
The research aspect that advocates new methods and evaluation was frequently used 
during the debate on the two natural disasters.  
But it is important to build readiness so that the companies have enough 
electricians on call that are capable of doing work in the terrain, to do preventing 
work between storms and to remove trees that are close to electric wires that 
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might fall on them so that the customers are not subjected to losses. (Lauri 
Heikkilä, PS, 23/2012 vp) 
At this moment various plans concerning the risks of floods are made, and in 
these plans the high risk areas of flooding in Finland, where the damages could 
be the worst, are evaluated. (Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Jari Koskinen, 
KOK, ptk 82/2012 vp) 
The debates following the two man-made crises were instead more divided between 
different aspects of solutions.  
	
7.8 Discussions and conclusions 
 
Crises and disasters provide a different surrounding than everyday politics. As such, 
the political debate following focusing events might serve as a space whereby policy 
change is permitted, due to the emotional impact of these events and because of a 
motivation for attributions of blame. Moreover, the parliamentary debate is important 
since the meaning-making process affects what is portrayed as the problem and what 
should be done, creating a struggle amongst political actors regarding the definition 
of the event (Birkland, Camileeri & Warnement 2014, 2). This study focused on a 
previously understudied research area, a textual analysis of the political discourse 
surrounding focusing events with a varying degree of strength and origin. The 
framing, blame attribution, emotional arguments, and solutions put forward were 
empirically assessed through a quantitative content analysis of the Finnish 
parliamentary plenary sessions during a nine month period following the events. The 
analysis showed differences between the four events, and a summarization of the most 
important findings is presented in Table 16. 
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Table 16. The politicization of focusing events during the plenary sessions. 
  Blame  Framing  Emotions  Solutions 
Man‐made, stronger  Low  Attribution of resp.  Compassion/sadness  Economic  
Man‐made, weaker  Low  Attribution of resp.  Positive emotions  Economic 
Nature, stronger  Low  Attribution of resp. 
Positive emotions, 
anger, 
compassion/sadness 
Research 
Nature, weaker  Low  Attribution of resp., Economic  Compassion/sadness  Economic 
 
The main differences in the political discourse found between natural disasters and 
man-made events are firstly that the man-made events received a lengthier debate 
with a higher amount of contributions (Jokela n = 55 and Nokia n = 35, versus the 
storm n = 14 and the floods n = 28). Starting from the basic characteristics of the 
debate, there is a difference between the man-made disasters and the natural disasters 
depending on who is speaking. The three most dominant parties contributing to the 
debate following the school shooting and the water crisis are the three biggest parties 
in the parliament. However, when debating the natural disasters, two of the most 
dominating parties were the opposition parties PS and KESK. This is particularly 
visible after the flooding, where a vast majority of the debate contributions are made 
by the opposition. However, one explanation might be that the opposing Centre Party 
emphasizes rural issues. 
When discussing how the events were portrayed through either episodic or 
thematic frames (e.g. Iyengar, 1989), the storm and the floods were more often 
discussed through an episodic frame, as such, the discussions focused on the specific 
event in question. In comparison, the man-made focusing events were discussed with 
a thematic framing, emphasizing a broader societal perspective. Especially the school 
shooting was discussed in a societal context on a more general level. Regarding the 
second research question, addressing whether the strength of the event affects the type 
of political discourse, the only result pointing to a difference concerns the solutions 
presented: more severe events are often discussed in terms of policy change (Rochefort 
& Cobb, 1994).  
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However, when answering the question posed in the title of this article, i.e. whether 
the politicization process of these events leads to a threat or an opportunity framing – 
the answer is that all the four focusing events were, to a great majority, discussed as 
critical threats, demanding a political response in the form of economic help to the 
affected actors of regions or research evaluations. Proceeding from the theoretical 
background discussed earlier in the paper, in conclusion with the results from the 
study, I suggest that the politicization processes in the formal political arena can be 
understood as follows (Figure 13). The bold marking represents the most common 
input during the Finnish parliamentary debates:  
 
Figure 13. The politicization of focusing events in the Finnish parliament. 
 
Whether an event is labelled as a ‘disaster’ or an ‘accident’ can have a major difference 
– especially when it comes to allocation of responsibility (Millar & Heath, 2004). This 
dimension is interesting when talking about man-made disasters in the form of 
accidents. Some of the examined plenary session contributions highlighted the fact 
that the water crisis in Nokia was the city’s ‘own fault’. Even though the case in Nokia 
was initially an accident, the city of Nokia was held responsible. This is an important 
link in the legitimacy of the political system. The aftermath of a focusing event can be 
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discussed in terms of constructing severity, agency or responsibility (Brändström et 
al., 2008). All of the events were portrayed as severe crises that violated core values in 
society, in combination with a construction of responsibility, visible through a high 
amount of attributions of responsibility frameworks used. Although, in this study, the 
construction of responsibility did not result in attributing blame to an actor (e.g. 
Brändström et al., 2008, 166), the question of accountability in the event of a crisis or 
disaster can be about an economic responsibility. This dimension was highly present 
in the Finnish parliamentary discourse, which brings us to the question of 
generalization to a broader context. Even though the events studied might not be seen 
as severe in a global comparison, in a Finnish context they are amongst the most severe 
crises during recent years. Although this study took a much needed step toward 
identifying the variables inside the politicization processes, I would like to call for 
further research on the combination of emotions, framing, blame attributions and 
their link to the solutions presented.   
The dominant view of crises as threats included the use of human interest framing, 
i.e. positive feelings as well as sadness and compassion. Such feelings make the 
avoidance of blame more manageable, for instance by appealing to national solidarity 
(Boin et al., 2008: 98). In this light, anxiety might reduce the likeliness to blame others 
and instead favor information-seeking policies (Atkeson & Maestas, 2010: 181−182; 
188). Keeping the status quo also means focusing mainly on research and economic 
solutions. An opportunistic interpretation with a result of policy change would 
probably focus more on conflict framing, blame attribution and feelings of anger. This 
study shows a statistically significant association between the conflict framework and 
feelings of anger. The uses of attribution of responsibility and economic frames were 
found in the views connected to both threats and opportunities.  
 
This study identifies differences between different kinds of disasters. However, it does 
not compare disaster aftermaths to the “normal politicization process”. Therefore, the 
question remains as to whether the politicization process continues to be the same 
during different types of events.  Future research may expand these findings by 
comparing the politicization process in the media arena to the parliamentary 
discussion – are the same techniques used by politicians in the media to avoid blame, 
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and do the citizens accept a threat framing? More research going beyond the 
identification of frames is needed, in order to demonstrate how the behavior and use 
of different politicization processes affect public perception (e.g. Iannarino et al., 
2015). It would also be of interest to compare different political contexts; while the 
Finnish system emphasizes consensus, other systems may favor two dominant parties. 
As such, an alternative system may provide more opportunities where power struggles 
can be studied.  Hence, a question to consider is whether some of the answers to crisis 
communication and management are bound to specific political cultures, or do they 
recur in different systems.  
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8. Another brick in the wall – 
Concluding discussion 
 
 
Are crises and disasters really something that need to trouble the minds of political 
scientists? I was once asked a very similar question during a seminar, and indeed, 
looking back, it is easy to see that political scientists have been restrictive in their study 
of focusing events. However, if we start with the Greek word polis, meaning city, 
citizenship or body of citizens, and the derivate English word politics, the starting 
point is the human being. In this light, consideration needs to be given to the fact that 
the mind of a citizen has a negativity bias, i.e. people respond with greater attention 
to negative events, either unconsciously or through cognition. Furthermore, the 
structure of our society includes many actors and institutions acting as watchdogs in 
terms of investigating errors and looking out for disasters. Whenever a focusing event 
strikes –the result of either a natural disaster with great physical destruction or 
through the fear and sadness spread after a man-made event – citizens respond with 
emotions, allocating attention to this important issue.  Focusing events differ from 
routine politics in many aspects; people approach the coverage by trying to 
understand a dangerous and threatening situation rather than by evaluating political 
positions. As such, the information processing, opinion formation and responsibility 
attribution are all linked to emotions (Kühne & Scheme 2015; Valentino et al. 2008). 
During a disaster or crisis, most participants in a community receive their information 
through similar media channels. Thus, a special meaning is given to the event in focus. 
The media will provide the initial information about what has happened as well as a 
possible blame and responsibility attribution during later stages. Naturally, both 
citizens and the media turn to the political leaders – asking questions concerning how 
this unthinkable event occurred and what will be done to avoid similar situations in 
the future. In this manner, the politicization game begins; i.e. the competition between 
the actors as to how the problem can be defined and framed. Moreover, to a great 
extent, it is during this process that possible solutions and how resources are to be 
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allocated are determined. As such, focusing events are political at heart (e.g. Boin et 
al. 2005).   
 
This thesis sets out to discuss the concept of focusing events, and explores how 
different types of crises and disasters affect society. Focusing events are an important 
attribute of societal and political life. Although early political scientists acknowledge 
how society consists of systems that are interacting with each other, and how the 
feedback loop from the surrounding arenas affect the political agenda (Easton 1965; 
Lundquist 1971), few studies have gone beyond the (American) policy agenda, or the 
combination of the media arena and the political arena. Hence, an important starting 
point for this dissertation was to include all three societal arenas in disaster research.  
Moreover, an important first stepping stone was to shed some light into the jungle 
of similar and overlapping concepts used to discuss crises and disasters, since a 
theoretical discussion and conceptualization are needed, not more concepts (e.g. 
Perry 2007). Hence, the theoretical discussion in this thesis eventuated into two 
aspects influencing focusing events, which are recapped in the two overall research 
questions below:  
 
1. How does the magnitude of focusing events affect societal processes? 
2. How does the origin of focusing events affect societal processes? 
This concluding chapter will discuss the answers to the questions in the light of the 
specific research themes emphasized in the three studies. Looking at how focusing 
events affect politics, an emotional and a cognitive side emerge – albeit both tracks 
are closely related. Emotions in politics is a research area that has been gaining 
increasing recognition recently (e.g. Atkeson & Maestas 2012; Neuman et al. 2007). 
Furthermore, there is an affect effect in human political behavior, connecting 
emotions and thoughts, as well as influencing motivation, perception and judgment 
(McDermott 2007, 375). Hence, political science is approaching theories of 
neuroscience and psychology. At the same time, the framing of an event as a crisis, 
a natural disaster or as an event caused by human actions, affects possible solutions. 
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In conclusion, this dissertation has analyzed the meaning-making processes of 
politics in the aftermath of four focusing events. The main empirical findings are 
presented separately in Chapters 5−7. Let us now briefly recall the main themes in 
the three studies.  
Study 1: Citizens’ Emotional and Cognitive Responses to Focusing Events – An 
Experimental Study, aimed at including the citizen arena into the concept political 
processes. Citizens are ultimately the people who legitimize the political system by 
having trust in the leaders in crisis situations. By using a controlled laboratory 
experiment (N = 30), the study analyzed both the unconscious reactions to 
disasters, in the form of skin conductance and pulse, as well as the self-reported 
emotions. This gives the study a unique opportunity to look at how these two 
measurements are related. Moreover, a questionnaire provided information about 
the subjects’ views on responsibility and blame attribution following crises and 
disasters.  
 
Study 2: Media framing and blame attribution of focusing events analysed the media 
coverage following the four disasters during the initial phase of the aftermath. As 
the theoretical discussion has emphasized thoroughly, the framing of the problem 
in the media is of uttermost importance for the political process. On the one hand, 
the coverage affects citizens’ perception of the problem, and on the other hand, the 
media plays a role in attributing blame, thus paving the way to the solution debate. 
A quantitative content analysis of the leading Finnish newspaper Helsingin 
Sanomat, concerning both textual and visual coverage, was carried out during a 
two-week period. The aim of the study was to investigate the framing, blame 
attributions and solutions presented in the coverage. Moreover, the study provides 
a brief overview of the third phase of the media coverage.  
 
Study 3: Threat or opportunity? The politicization of focusing events in the 
parliamentary arena analysed the formal political arena. When a focusing event has 
passed through the media channel, awoken feelings in the citizens, and finally 
reaches the arena where political action is possible, what happens next? The aim of 
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the dissertation is to analyse the discourse that precedes possible policy change. 
Hence, to locate emotional appeal, blame attribution and the different solutions 
discussed in the formal political arena– the study turned to the plenary debates.  
 
8.1 Magnitude of an event   
 
This concluding section will combine the findings from the empirical studies to 
answer the two overall research questions. The first questions highlighted the 
magnitude of focusing events. In the theorisation of the concept, an empirical tool 
was constructed to identify a variation in magnitude. In this first attempt, the 
magnitude was divided into events with a stronger and weaker degree of focus. In 
the real world, the strength of a focusing event is probably better represented by a 
floating index, than by two categories. Social sciences lie on the fine line between 
making sense of societal situations that are not necessary either simple or complex. 
“On the contrary, the perceived complexity of a situation depends in part on how 
well we can simplify reality, and our capacity to simplify depends on whether we 
can specify outcomes and explanatory variables in a coherent way” (King, Keohane 
& Verba 1994, 10). The three studies can thus be seen as an evaluation of the 
empirical tool – how well did the categories intercept the magnitude of an event? 
The laboratory study showed that concerning the self-reported emotion fear, the 
two events with a stronger degree of focus also scored higher. Moreover, looking at 
the amount of space given to the events in the media coverage, the magnitude is a 
good determination of how extensive the coverage of the event is. However, to 
really test the tool, more cases must be analyzed – preferably with a variance in 
geographical position.  
The results from the first study, concerning citizens’ reactions, showed 
tentatively that it was the magnitude of an event that affected the emotional 
reactions – a stronger degree of focus made the test subjects react more strongly. 
Statistically significant differences were found between man-made events, but not 
between the natural disasters. However, even if not statistically significant, the 
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relationship indicates that the same tendencies are present for natural disasters. 
From an evolutionary perspective, this finding is rather logical. It is the magnitude 
of danger we face that determines how strongly we react, and not specifically what 
caused the danger. The second study, analyzing the media coverage, shows a clear 
difference between events with a stronger and weaker degree of focus concerning 
how much space the issue was given. Revisiting the theoretical chapter concerning 
the media arena – the more attention an issue receives in the media, the more 
important the issue is perceived to be by the citizens (Strömbäck 2000). Another 
visible effect on the media arena is that a stronger magnitude is connected to an 
affective debate including possible solutions to the problem. This suggests that it is 
more likely that events with a strong degree of focus are connected to policy 
changes, since the events are seen in a bigger picture and remedies are actually 
discussed. However, if we compare events with a varying magnitude, the blame 
attribution and framing of the events differ. In the media arena, it appears that 
more powerful events receive more attention, as well as the important discussion 
on how to solve the problems. Contrarily, in the parliamentary arena, the empirical 
results point in a different direction. There are no clear differences between events 
with a weaker and stronger degree of focus – instead all four crises received a 
similar treatment, and the variance between the events can be explained by the 
origin of an event. When a focusing event passes the threshold to the parliamentary 
arena, it receives a fairly similar handling. The main difference was that events with 
a stronger degree of focus initiated a lengthier discussion about policy change. 
 
8.2 Origin of an event 
 
Turning attention to the second research question, which concerns how the origins 
of focusing events affect political processes, it is possible to see that, initially, the 
man-made disaster category differs internally, depending on whether the focusing 
event was the result of an accident or through the intentional use of violence. This 
is also the case in this dissertation, as the school shooting produced different 
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emotions than the water crisis, i.e. the water problems were caused by human error, 
while the school shooting was a planned and violent attack. The attributions of 
blame are inevitably different, and it is possible that despite being two man-made 
disasters, these difference show through in the empirical result. However, both 
events can be discussed in terms of prevention, and a clear actor being responsible 
for the event: Thus, I still find it fruitful to make the separation between natural 
disasters and man-made events, since the man-made events are different than the 
natural disasters. However, including several cases of both accidental cause and 
intended use of violence will make it easier to generalize the findings in future 
studies.  
The theoretical expectations were contradictive, demonstrating that natural 
disasters often have visible, physical damage (Keshishian 1997; Williams 2008), 
while man-made disasters are easier to discuss in terms of a clear actor being 
responsible (Alexandrova 2015; Eriksson & Noreen 2004). The experimental results 
show mixed results; whereas there were some statistically significant differences 
between man-made and natural disasters when looking at events with a stronger 
degree of focus, only certain differences were found amongst the events with a 
weaker degree of focus. Moreover, there was a civic agreement that focusing events 
in general should have a high social responsibility. When the media coverage is 
examined according to origin, the main difference is that the two man-made 
disasters received a more even coverage during the six-month period, while the 
discussions of the natural disasters fade away more quickly. Even though the 
natural disaster with a stronger degree of focus was discussed in terms of an 
affective reporting and solutions, the coverage focused on the specific event with 
no broader implications for the society. As such, especially the six-month check 
showed tentatively that natural disasters were discussed in terms of economic 
frames, while man-made events were covered from a human interest angle or as a 
responsibility question. Nevertheless, in the parliamentary arena there were visible 
differences between events with different origins. The man-made events attracted 
debate contributions from almost all the coalition parties, while the natural 
disasters were discussed by the three biggest coalition parties and the majority of 
opposition parties. Emotionally, the natural disasters evoked more anger than the 
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man-made disasters, and interestingly, this was made through the use of appeals 
for compassion and sadness by the opposition party. This probably explains the 
relatively low number of blame attributions following all four events. Instead, the 
parliamentary debate emphasized positive feelings, or compassion and sadness, to 
discuss the problems – taking a clear responsibility for sorting out the situations, 
but mostly by giving economic help to the region or individuals affected by the 
situations. It is possible that other factors also affected the debates, such as the 
timing in terms of there being no upcoming elections in the near future. Hence, the 
events did not spark a competition or mudslinging between the parties. Moreover, 
a further explanation might be the Finnish context, which has a relatively strong 
hierarchal policy-making process and no strong traditions in terms of criticism.  
 
8.3 Emotions and cognition in interaction 
 
There can be no doubt that disaster research is an important political subject, and 
that many studies have meritoriously developed the theory of focusing events 
(Alexandrova 2015; Birkland 1996; 2006; Kingdon 2003). This dissertation 
contributes to the disaster field by analyzing focusing events in a broad perspective, 
as well as by comparing different types of events. Moreover, an important emphasis 
of the dissertation is to combine affection and cognition. Unconscious emotional 
responses provide the brain with clues about how to react to a situation. Should we 
fear a problem, draw back and evaluate our options? Should we be angry and find 
the person to blame? Or do we choose to focus on the positive aspects, despite 
having to face hard times ahead – looking for heroes, moving on together as a 
community? After the first emotional hours or days of a disaster situation, we turn 
to cognition. The politicization process of understanding what happened, why, and 
how to solve the problems has started. All three studies have looked at some aspect 
of emotions; the psychophysiological responses and the self-reported emotions, the 
visual material used to describe the events in the media, and verbal emotional 
appeals in the parliamentary debate. Thus, combinations of both our unconscious 
 202 
 
emotional reactions, as well as the cognitive side of expressing emotions are 
addressed. As discussed in the first study, the best measurement of emotions in 
politics is still difficult to conclude, since psychophysiological reactions measure 
something other than what we say we feel. The theory of affective intelligence and 
researchers looking at emotions and political behaviour has mostly used the verbal, 
self-reported variables (e.g. Brader & Valentino 2007; Huddy et al. 2007; Marcus et 
al. 2000). Hence, these measurements fit better with the theory of AI. On the other 
hand, emotional appeal affects all of us equally, i.e. emotions also significantly 
affect highly educated intelligent people (Brader 2006), giving the use of 
psychophysiological methods an important contribution to political science 
studies.  
Another interesting question concerns how emotional reactions are connected to 
the cognitive responses. This question will be discussed by showing a coordinate 
grid of emotions, on a scale from high to low, and cognition, in the form of blame 
attribution on an equal scale reaching from high to low, for each arena. At this 
point, since the N representing focusing events are low, I will only discuss how 
emotions and cognitions relate, and not include the separation of origin and 
magnitude of focusing events. In the citizen arena, I use the self-reported negative 
emotions, as well as skin conductance and pulse (see Table 1). The emotional 
appeals in the media arena are presented as the visual framing concerning the 
proportion of pictures during the first two days. The initial reporting is often 
extensive, and the first pictures are the symbolic ones, staying with us for a long 
period of time (Jokela N = 45/high, Nokia N = 2/low, the Storm N = 22/medium, 
the Floods N = 6/low). The percentage of debate contributions using some kind of 
emotional appeals in the parliamentary arena were 45 % for Jokela (medium), 26 % 
for Nokia (low), 57 % for the Storm (medium), and 45 % for the Floods (medium).  
Figures 14−16 show the three diagrams; note that a) represents man-made/strong, 
b) man-made/weak, c) nature/strong and d) nature/weak. 
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Figure 14. The emotional and cognitive responses in the citizen arena. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. The emotional and cognitive responses in the media arena.  
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Figure 16. The emotional and cognitive responses in the parliamentary arena.  
The citizen arena is the scene with the highest share of emotions, and also the arena 
where blame is fairly present. In the media arena, we still see appeals to emotions, 
and medium amounts of blame. However, moving on to the parliamentary arena, 
we discover the arena with the lowest number of attributions of blame, even though 
a medium appeal to emotions was present. Comparing the three arenas, it is evident 
that both the emotions and cognitions fade away the higher up in the political 
process we reach. Hence, a focusing event needs to gather extensive attention in the 
media, as well as in the minds of citizens, to actually reach the formal political 
arena. Once an event has made it to the parliamentary debates, the handling of the 
disasters is quite similar. Nevertheless, solutions and possible policy change is 
discussed more frequently when we are dealing with an event that has a stronger 
degree of focus.  
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8.4 Limitations and future studies 
 
Every scientific study chooses a methodology, which means there will inevitably be 
limitations to consider. Studying only one country and one political system makes 
it difficult to produce generalizations (Carramani 2011: Harrop & Hauge 2003). 
However, analyzing only one country was a conscious choice in this dissertation: 
to meet the aims of the study and compare focusing events with a variance in origin 
and magnitude, initially the context needed to be held constant. The aim was never 
to say anything about school shootings or storms in general – but locate the 
differences between natural disasters and man-made disasters and events with a 
stronger versus weaker degree of focus in particular. Nevertheless, it would indeed 
be of interest to include further cases in this kind of research. Previous disaster 
studies often emphasize one disaster context, such as Hurricane Katrina (Atkeson 
& Maestas 2012), 9/11 (Entman 2003; Leffler 2011), or American school shootings 
(Fleming 2012). Birkland’s seminal work on focusing events (1997; 2006) builds 
heavily on a few case studies. Using this methodological approach produces a global 
character that says something in depth, rather than in width (Swanborn 2010). 
Moreover, due to the economic and the timely aspects of a laboratory experiment, 
the number of cases had to be kept rather low. 
One issue that is clearly apparent concerns the variation in magnitude that 
different focusing events can create. Previous research has solved this problem by 
using different concepts, such as catastrophe or disaster, whereby a catastrophe is 
more profound than a disaster (Birkland 1997; 2006; Nord & Strömbäck 2005). Yet, 
what is lacking in previous research is a clear operationalization of the concepts. 
We also encounter a linguistic problem when translating the concepts. We can 
probably agree that focusing events become more powerful with a stronger 
magnitude, as when the number of deceased increases (Alexandrova 2015). 
Nevertheless, using death tolls (Oh & Oetzel 2011) or economic losses (Yan & 
Bissell 2015) is problematic when conducting comparisons between focusing events 
with a different origin, as well as when comparing different geographical areas. In 
the Nordic context, or even in a European comparison, focusing events would not 
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be considered very strong according to such measurements. At the same time, on a 
national and European level, these events have political implications and should be 
viewed as strong focusing events. This dissertation tries to take a first step in the 
direction of defining the magnitude of focusing events. The studies tested the 
empirical tool on a small sample (four focusing events) within one context (the 
Finnish). Undoubtedly, the empirical tools will need more testing on a global scale 
with a higher N. Due to the nationalization and internationalization of disaster 
coverage in the news, we should care about global focusing events and how these 
events influence national and international political processes (Atkeson & Maestas 
2012). The example of the earthquake and tsunami in Japan that was used in the 
introduction can be highlighted once again. The Japanese event had a strong 
influence on the global policy discussion concerning nuclear power, and 
highlighted the vulnerability of this energy form when disasters strike. Public 
attention to the issue was raised around the globe, e.g. the German response was to 
design a strategy for the abandonment of nuclear power over the next 11 years 
(Baetz 2011). In today’s world, it is seldom enough to focus only on national 
solutions, since many disasters and crises are transboundary. Hence, it would be 
central to compare different political contexts. For future research, Alexandrova 
(2015) takes an important step when looking at the political implications of 
focusing events over a longer time period, in a broad perspective.  
 
8.5 Final remarks  
 
Despite its quite recent entry into political science, disaster research is a growing field 
of research due to the increasing number of disasters reported in the media. Within 
the field, this thesis pinpoints the importance of emphasizing emotions in social 
sciences. Contrary to popular belief, emotions are not the opposite of rationality or 
imply a lower standard (Brader 2005). Instead, the ability to recognize different 
emotions and how they influence political participation is a necessity in 
understanding social and political life. In a world filled with issues, problems, events 
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and actors seeking your attention or support, the fastest way to awareness is through 
emotions. Although it has been nearly ten years since the Jokela School shooting 
occurred, people still remember what they did when they heard about the event, the 
pictures shown in the newspaper and on television, and the following discussions 
between citizens, in the media and in the government about the explanations to why 
this happened. This study on citizens’ emotional and cognitive reactions to four events 
showed that people place a high responsibility on society in times of crisis and disaster. 
However, this responsibility not only refers to the media or the political leaders, it also 
refers to the citizens themselves. This is interesting, because even though focusing 
events are inevitably part of a political framing and blaming game – at the same time, 
they make us vulnerable. They show that when we encounter difficulties, it is not the 
political affiliation that matters. Likewise, when people are sad and scared, it is not 
political promises that are initially required. Instead, people turn to emotions. Citizens 
are part of disaster politics, as can be seen in the fact that they are interested and follow 
the evaluation of governments in crisis situations (Atkeson & Maestas 2012). Thus, a 
collective interaction echoes through all three societal arenas to shape the definition 
of a focusing event. These events are events that will be processed in the minds and in 
the bodies of citizens, the media, as well as on the formal political arena.  Indeed, these 
events are the trees we felt fall.  
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Svensk sammanfattning 
Fokuserande händelser är plötsliga, ovanliga och för med sig negativa konsekvenser 
för ett stort antal människor. Det handlar om det vi i vardagligt tal kallar kriser och 
katastrofer. En intensiv medierapportering i kombination med oroade medborgare 
gör att kriser och katastrofer är viktiga samhällspåfrestningar som beslutsfattare måste 
hantera.  
Syftet med avhandlingen är att öka förståelsen för hur fokuserande händelser 
påverkar samhälleliga processer. Avhandlingens två övergripande forskningsfrågor 
tar fasta på jämförelsen av olika typer av fokuserande händelser. För det första, 
skillnader i hur naturkatastrofer och katastrofer som tillkommit genom mänskligt 
handlade påverkar samhället, och för det andra, hur händelser med olika stark 
fokuseringskraft påverkar samhället. Medborgarreaktioner studeras i en 
experimentell laboratoriestudie, den mediala rapporteringen analyseras genom 
kvantitativ innehållsanalys av texter och bilder, och på den parlamentariska arenan 
analyseras riksdagsdebatten genom kvantitativ innehållsanalys. De temaområden som 
identifieras i den teoretiska referensramen ligger till grund för analysen och tar fasta 
på de känslor som händelsen ger upphov till, hur händelsen kontextualiseras 
(framing), skuldbeläggning samt möjliga lösningar som förs fram. 
   Resultatet från studierna visar att skillnader mellan olika typer av händelser syns 
tydligast hos medborgare, uttryckt genom starkare emotionella reaktioner för 
händelser med stark fokusering, och på den mediala arenan, genom mer utrymme för 
dessa händelser. Då kriser och katastrofer med olika stark fokuseringskraft når 
riksdagen får de däremot ett relativt likadant mottagande. I jämförelsen mellan 
naturkatastrofer och människoskapade händelser visar resultaten att natur-
katastrofer ofta diskuteras som specifika händelser, medan människoskapade 
händelser placeras i en bredare samhällelig kontext och diskuteras under längre tid.  
Avhandlingen bidrar till diskussionen om hur våra känslor och vår kognition 
samspelar i krissituationer. De omedvetna signaler som vår kropp ger oss gällande hur 
vi ska reagera på en farlig situation kan påverka om vi är rädda, oroliga eller till och 
med positivt inställda. I ljuset av de tre studierna är det tydligt att de emotionella 
reaktionerna minskar ju högre upp i den politiska processen vi kommer. Trots att 
medborgare och medier reagerar starkt är de emotionella reaktionerna på den 
politiska arenan relativt milda och skuldbeläggningen näst intill icke-existerande.   
 209 
 
References 
 
Abelson, R. P., Kinder, D. R., Peters, M. 
D. & Fiske, S. T. 1982. ”Affective and 
Semantic Components in Political 
Person Perception”, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 42, 
619–630. 
Albright, E. A. 2011. “Policy Change and 
Learning in Response to Extreme 
Flood Events in Hungary: An 
Advocacy Coalition Approach”, The 
Policy Studies Journal 39 (3), 485−511. 
Alexander, D. M., C. Trengove, P. 
Johnston, T. Cooper, J. P. August, & 
E. Gordon. 2005. “Separating 
Individual Skin Conductance 
Responses in a Short Interstimulus-
interval Paradigm”. Journal of 
Neuroscience Methods 146, 116−123. 
Alexandrova, P. 2015. “Upsetting the 
agenda: the clout of external focusing 
events in the European 
Council”, Journal of Public Policy, 
1−26. 
Ali, A., & Mahmood, S. 2013. 
“Photojournalism and disaster: Case 
study of visual coverage of flood 2010 
in national newspapers”, Academic 
Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 
2(9), 168−176.  
Almond, A., Powell, G. B., Dalton, R. J. 
& Strøm, K. 2008. “Interest 
Articulation”, in  Almond, A., 
Powell, G. B., Dalton, R. J. & Strøm, 
K. (eds.), Comparative Politics 
Today. New York: Pearson 
Longman. 
Altheide, D. 2002. Creating Fear. News 
and the Construction of Crisis. New 
York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Altheide, D. L. 1996. Qualitative media 
analysis. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications. 
Altheide, D. L. 1997. “The News Media, 
the Problem Frame, and the 
Production of Fear”, Sociological 
Quarterly 38(4), 647–668. 
An, S., & Gower, K. K. 2009. “How do 
the news media frame crises? A 
content analysis of crisis news 
coverage”, Public Relations Review, 
35(2), 107−112.  
Arceneaux, K. & Stein, R. M. 2006. 
“Who is held responsible when 
disaster strikes? The attribution of 
responsibility for a natural disaster 
in an urban election”, Journal of 
Urban Affairs 28 (1), 45−53. 
 210 
 
Asp, K. 1986. Mäktiga massmedier. 
Studier i politisk opinionsbildning. 
Stockholm: Akademilitteratur. 
Atkeson, L. R., & Maestas, C. D. 2012. 
Catastrophic politics: How 
extraordinary events redefine 
perceptions of government. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Baetz, J. 2011. Germany decides to 
abandon nuclear power by 2022. 
Available online 7.6.2015 at salon.com. 
Bas, O., & Grabe, M. E. 2015. ”Emotion-
Provoking Personalization of News 
Informing Citizens and Closing the 
Knowledge Gap?”, Communication 
Research, 42(2), 159−185. 
Baumgartner, F. R., Green-Pedersen, C. & 
Jones, B. D. 2006. ”Comparative 
Studies of Policy Agendas”, Journal of 
European Public Policy 13 (7), 
959−974.  
Baumgartner, F. R. & Jones, B. D. 1993. 
Agendas and Instability in American 
Politics. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. 
2005. The politics of 
attention. How government 
prioritizes problems. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Baumgartner, F. R. & Jones, B. D. 2009. 
”Positive and Negative Feedback in 
Politics” , in Baumgartner, F. R. & 
Jones, B. D. (eds.), Policy Dynamics. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. 1966. The 
social construction of knowledge: A 
treatise in the sociology of knowledge. 
New York: Open Road Media. 
Berglez, P. & Olausson, U. 2009. 
“Introduktion”, in Berglez, P. & 
Olausson, U. (eds.), Mediesamhället 
- centrala begrepp. Lund: 
Studentlitteratur. 
Berkeley, G. 1710. A Treatise 
Concerning the Principles of Human 
Knowledge. Dublin: Jeremy Pepyat, 
Bookfeller in Skinner-Row. 
Birkland, T. 1996. “Natural Disasters as 
Focusing Events: Policy 
Communities and Political 
Response”, International Journal of 
Mass Emergencies and Disasters 14 
(2), 221−243. 
Birkland, T. A. 1997. After Disaster. 
Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and 
Focusing events. Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press. 
Birkland, T. A. 1998. “Focusing Events, 
Mobilization, and Agenda Setting”, 
Journal of Public Policy 18(1), 53−74. 
 211 
 
Birkland, T. 2004. “’The World 
Changed Today’: Agenda-Setting 
and Policy Change in the Wake of 
the September 11 Terrorist Attacks”, 
Review of Policy Research 21(2), 
179−200. 
Birkland, T. A. 2005. An Introduction to 
the Policy Process. New York: M. E. 
Sharpe.  
Birkland, T. A. 2006. Lessons of Disaster: 
Policy Change After Catastrophic 
Events. Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press. 
Birkland, T. A. & Lawrence, R. 2009. 
“Media Framing and Policy Change 
After Columbine”, American 
Behavioural Scientist 52, 1405−1425. 
Birkland, T. & Warnement, M. 2013. 
“Defining, Explaining, and Testing the 
Role of Focusing Events in Agenda 
Change: 30 Years of Focusing Event 
Theory”, in APSA 2013 Annual 
Meeting Paper. 
 
Birkland, T. A., Camilleri, S. & 
Warnement, M. K. 2014. “Idea 
Emergence Agenda Change, and 
Learning”, in Meeting of the Western 
Political Science Association Paper. 
 
Birkmann, J., Buckle, P., Jaeger, J., 
Pelling, M., Setiadi, N., Garschagen, 
M., Fernando, N. & Kroppm J. 2010. 
”Extreme events and disasters: a 
window of opportunity for change? 
Analysis of organizational, 
institutional and political changes, 
formal and informal responses after 
mega.disasters”, Natural Hazards 55 
(3), 637−655. 
Bishop, B. H. 2012. “Focusing events 
and public opinion: evidence from 
the Deepwater Horizon disaster”, 
paper, annual meeting of the 
Southern Political Science 
Association, New Oreans, USA. 
Bleiker, R., & Hutchison, E. 2008. “Fear 
no more: emotions and world 
politics”. Review of international 
studies, 34(S1), 115−135. 
Boin, A. 2004. "Lessons from crisis 
research." International Studies 
Review 6(1), 165−194. 
Boin, A. 2009. ”Introduction to the 
Special Issue. The New World of 
Crises and Crisis Management: 
Implications for Policymaking and 
Research”, Review of Policy Research 
26(4), 367−377. 
Boin, A. & ´t Hart, P. 2003. ”Public 
Leadership in Times of Crises: 
Mission Impossible?”, Public 
Administration Review 63(5), 
544−553. 
Boin, A., ’t Hart, P., Stern, E. & 
Sundelius, B. 2005. The Politics of 
Crisis Management. Public 
 212 
 
Leadership under Pressure. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Boin, A. McConnell, A. & t’Hart, P. 2008. 
“Governing after crisis” in Boin, A. 
McConnell, A. & t’Hart, P., (eds.), 
Governing after Crisis. The Politics of 
Investigation, Accountability and 
Learning. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Boin, A., ‘t Hart, P. & McConnell, A. 
2009. “Crisis exploitation: political 
and policy impacts of framing 
contents”, Journal of European Public 
Policy 16(1), 81−106. 
Boin, A., Comfort, L. K., & Demchak, C. 
C. 2010. “The rise of resilience”, in 
Comfort, L. K., Boin, A., & Demchak, 
C. C. (eds.) Designing resilience: 
Preparing for extreme events. 
Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg 
Press. 
Boin, A., Kuipers, S., & Overdijk, W. 
2013. Leadership in Times of Crisis: A 
Framework for Assessment. 
International Review of Public 
Administration, 18(1), 79−91. 
Borah, P. 2009. “Comparing visual 
framing in newspapers: Hurricane 
Katrina versus tsunami”, Newspaper 
Research Journal, 30(1), 50−57.  
Brader, T. 2005. “Striking a Responsive 
Chord: How Political Ads Motivate 
and Persuade Voters by Appealing 
to Emotions”, American Journal of 
Political Science 49 (2), 388−405. 
Brader, T. 2006. Campaigning for hearts 
and minds: How emotional appeals 
in political ads work. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Brader, T & Valentino, N. A. 
2007. ”Identities, Interests, and 
Emotions: Symbolic versus Material 
Wellsprings of Fear, Anger, and 
Enthusiasm”, in Neuman, R., 
Marcus, G. E., Crigler, A. N. & 
MacKuen, M., (eds.), The Affect 
Effect. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Bradley, M. & Lang, P. J. 1994. 
“Measuring emotion: the self-
assessment manikin and the 
semantic differential”, Journal of 
Behavioral Therapy and 
Experimental Psychiatry 25(1), 
49−59. 
Brändström, A., & Kuipers, S. 2003. 
“From ‘Normal incidents’ to 
political crises: Understanding the 
selective politicization of policy 
Failures”, Government and 
Opposition, 38(3), 279−305.  
Brändström, A., Kuipers, S., & Daléus, 
P. 2008. ”The politics of tsunami 
responses: Comparing patterns of 
blame management in Scandinavia”; 
 213 
 
in Boin, A,.’t Har,t, P. & McConnell, 
A. (eds.), Governing After Crisis: The 
Politics of Investigation, 
Accountability and Learning, 
Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Braybrooke, D. & Lindblom, C. E. 1963. 
A Strategy of Decision. New York: 
The Free Press 
Brooks, C. 1986.” Cooperative and 
regional disaster preparedness”, The 
Book and Paper Group Annual, 5, 
139−145. The American Institute for 
Conservation. 
Brosnan, S. F., Jones, O. D., Lambeth, S. 
P., Mareno, M. C., Richardson, A. S., 
& Schapiro, S. J. 2007. “Endowment 
effects in chimpanzees”, Current 
Biology, 17(19), 1704−1707. 
Bucy, E. P. 2003. "Emotion, Presidential 
Communication, and Traumatic 
News Processing the World Trade 
Center Attacks", The International 
Journal of Press/Politics 8(4), 76−96. 
Cahill, L., & McGaugh, J. L. 1995. “A 
novel demonstration of enhanced 
memory associated with emotional 
arousal”, Consciousness and 
cognition, 4(4), 410−421. 
Cairney, P. 2012. Understanding Public 
Policy. Hampshire: Palgrave 
MacMillian. 
Campbell, D.T. & Stanley, J. C. 1963. 
Experimental and Quasi-
Experimental Designs for Research. 
Chicago: Rand McNally.  
Cannon, T. 1994. “Vulnerability 
analysis and the explanation of 
‘natural disasters”, in Varley, A. 
(ed.), Disasters, Development and 
Environment. New York: John Wiley 
& Sons.  
Caramani, D. 2011.” Introduction to 
Comparative Politics”, in Caramani 
D. (ed) Comparative Politics. 
London, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Chamlee-Wright, E. & Storr, V. H. 
2010. “Expectations of government’s 
response to disaster”, Public Choice 
144(1−2), 253−274. 
Cho, S. H., & Gower, K. K. 2006. 
“Framing effect on the public's 
response to crisis: Human interest 
frame and crisis type influencing 
responsibility and blame”, Public 
Relations Review, 32(4), 420−422.  
Chyi, H. I., & McCombs, M. 2004. 
“Media salience and the process of 
framing: Coverage of the columbine 
school shootings”, Journalism & 
Mass Communication Quarterly, 
81(1), 22−35.  
 214 
 
Cobb, R. W. & Elder, C. D. 1972. 
Participation in American Politics – 
The Dynamics of Agenda-Building. 
Boston: Allyn and Bacon Inc. 
Cohen, B. C. 1963. The Press and 
Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  
Cohen, C. & Werker, E. D. 2008. “The 
Political Economy of ‘Natural 
Disasters’”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 52(6), 795−819. 
Conover, P. J. & Feldman, S. 1986. 
“Emotional Responses to the 
Economy: I’m Mad as Hell and I’m 
Not Going to Take It Anymore”, 
American Journal of Political Science 
30, 50–78.  
Damasio, Antonio R. 2003. Looking for 
Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling 
Brain. New York: Harcourt. 
Danielsson, M. 2010. Fängslande idéer – 
svensk miljöpolitik och teorier om 
policyproduktion. Uppsala: Uppsala 
Universitet.  
de Kruif, J. 2009. “Death shall have no 
dominion”. Dutch flood disasters in 
the press. Faces of Death: Visualising 
History, 4, 91−121.  
de Waal, A. 2006. “Towards a 
Comparative Political Ethnography 
of Disaster Prevention”, Journal of 
International Affairs 29(2), 129−149. 
de Wilde, P. 2011. ”No Polity for Old 
Politics? A Framework for 
Analyzing the Politicization of 
European Integration”, Journal of 
European Integration 33(5), 559−575 
Dearing, J. W. & Rogers, E. M. 1996. 
Agenda-Setting. Thousand Oaks, 
Kalifornien: Sage Publications, Inc.  
De Vreese, C.H., Peter, J., Holli, A., 
Semetko, C. 2001. “Framing politics 
at the launch of the euro: A cross-
national comparative study of 
frames in the news”, Political 
Communication, 18(2), 107−122.  
d'Haenens, L., & De Lange, M. 
2001. ”Framing of asylum seekers in 
Dutch regional newspapers”, Media, 
Culture & Society, 23(6), 847−860.  
Dimitrova, D. V., Kaid, L. L., Williams, 
A. P., & Trammell, K. D. 2005. “War 
on the web the immediate news 
framing of gulf war II”, The Harvard 
International Journal of 
Press/Politics, 10(1), 22−44.  
Downs, A. 1972. “Up and Downs with 
ecology: the ‘issue-attention cycle’”, 
The Public Interest 28, 38−50. 
Drabek, T. E. 1991. “The evolution of 
emergency management”, in 
Drabek, T. E. & Hoetmer, G. J. 
(eds.), Emergency management: 
Principles and practice for local 
 215 
 
government. Washington DC: 
ICMA. 
Drotner, K., Bruhn Jensen, K., Poulsen, 
I. & Schrøder, K. 1996. Medier och 
kultur. En grundbok i medieanalys 
och medieteori. Lund: 
Studentlitteratur.  
Dye, T. R. 1978. Understanding Public 
Policy. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall, Inc. 
Easton, D. 1965. A System Analysis of 
Political Life. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Elder, C. D., & Cobb, R. W. 1983. The 
political uses of symbols. New York: 
Longman. 
Enander, A. 2010. Psykologiska 
perspektiv på risk-och 
krishanteringsförmåga: En 
kunskapsöversikt. Stockholm: 
Försvarshögskolan.  
Entman, R. M. 1993. “Framing: Toward 
clarification of a fractured 
paradigm”, Journal of 
Communication, 43(4), 51−58.  
Entman, R. M. 2003. “Cascading 
Activation: Contesting the White 
House’s Frame After 9/11”, Political 
Communication 20, 415−432. 
Eriksson, J. & Noreen, E. 2002. Setting 
the agenda of threats: an explanatory 
model. Uppsala: Uppsala 
Universitet. Institutionen för freds- 
och konfliktforskning.  
Esaiasson, P., Gilljam, M., Oscarsson, 
H., & Wängnerud, L. 2007. 
Metodpraktikan. Konsten att studera 
samhälle, individ och marknad. 
Stockholm: Norstedts juridik. 
Fahmy, S. 2004. “Picturing afghan 
women. A content analysis of AP 
wire photographs during the taliban 
regime and after the fall of the 
taliban regime”, Gazette, 66(2), 
91−112.  
Farley, J., Baker, D., Batker, D., Koliba, 
C., Matteson, R., Mills, R., & 
Pittman, J. 2007. ”Opening the 
policy window for ecological 
economics: Katrina as a focusing 
event”, Ecological Economics, 63(2), 
344−354. 
Fishman, D. A. 1997. “ValuJet flight 
592: Crisis Communication Theory 
Blended and Extended”. 
Communication Quarterly 47, 345–
375. 
Fleming, A. 2012. Gun Policy in the 
United States and Canada. The 
Impact of Mass Murders and 
Assassinations on Gun Control. New 
York: Continium. 
 216 
 
Fossett, W. 1754. Natural States. 
London: R. & J. Dodsley, Pall Mall. 
Fredrickson, B. L., Tugade, M. M., 
Waugh, C. E., & Larkin, G. R. 2003. 
“What good are positive emotions in 
crises? A prospective study of 
resilience and emotions following 
the terrorist attacks on the United 
States on September 11th, 
2001”, Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 84(2), 365−376. 
Freedman, D. 2008. The Politics of 
Media Policy. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Fry, K. 2003. Constructing the heartland: 
Television news and natural disaster. 
Cresskill: Hampton Press. 
Fuentes, V. E. 2009. “Post-Disaster 
Reconstruction. An Opportunity for 
Political Change” in Ensor, M. O. 
(ed.)., The Legacy of Hurricane 
Mitch. Tucson: The University of 
Arizona Press. 
Galtung, J. & Ruge, M. Holmboe. 1965. 
“The Structure of Foreign News”, 
Journal of Peace Research 2(1), 
64−91. 
Gamson, W. A. 1992. Talking politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Ghersetti, M. 2004. 
“Sensationsjournalistikens 
mekanismer”, in Nord, L. & 
Strömbäck, J., (eds.) Medierna och 
demokratin. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
Gomez, B. T. & Wilson, J. M. 2008. 
“Political Sophistication and 
Attributions of Blame in the Wake 
of Hurricane Katrina”, The Journal 
of Federalism 38(4), 633−650. 
Goss, K. A. 2001. “The Smoking Gun: 
How Focusing Events Transform 
Politics”, paper, Political Psychology 
and Behavior Workshop, Harvard 
University, USA. 
Grabe, M. E., Lang, A. & Zhao, X. 2003. 
“New Content and Form”. 
Communication Research 30, 
387−413. 
Graber, D. 2007. “The Road to Public 
Surveillance: Breeching Attention 
Thresholds”, in Neuman, R., 
Marcus, G. E., Crigler, A. N. & 
MacKuen, M. (eds.), The Affect 
Effect. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Graber, D. A. 2009. Mass media and 
American politics. Thousand Oaks: 
SAGE Publications.  
Gross, K., Aday, S. & Brewer, P. R. 2004. 
“A Panel Study of Media Effects on 
Political and Social Trust after 
September 11, 2001”, The Harvard 
 217 
 
International Journal of 
Press/Politics 9(4), 49−73. 
Grossberg, L.. Wartella, E., Whitney, D. 
C. & Wise, J. M. 2006. Mediamaking 
– Mass Media in a Popular Culture. 
Thousand Oaks, California: Sage 
Publications.  
Gruszcynski, M. W., Blazer, A., Jacobs, 
C. B., Smith, K. B. & Hibbing, J. R. 
2013. ”The Physiology of Political 
Participation”, Political Behavior 
35(1), 135−152. 
Haider-Markel, D. P. & Joslyn, M. R. 
2001. ”Gun Policy, Opinion, 
Tragedy, and Blame Attribution: 
The Conditional Influence of Issue 
Frames”, The Journal of Politics 
63(2), 520−543. 
Hamann, S. 2001. “Cognitive and neural 
mechanisms of emotional memory”, 
Trends in cognitive sciences, 5(9), 
394−400. 
Hannigan, J. 2012. Disasters Without 
Borders: The International Politics of 
Natural Disasters. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Harrop, M. & Hauge, R. 2003. The 
Comparative Approach. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan 
Harvey, S. 2002. ”Policy”, in Briggs, A. 
& Cobley, P. (eds.), The Media: An 
Introduction. Edinburgh Gate: 
Pearson Education Limited.  
Heclo, H. H. 1972. ”Policy Analysis”, 
British Journal of Political Science 2 
(1), 83−108. 
Henderson, K., & Sitter, N. 2007. 
“Political Developments in the EU 
Member States”, JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 45(1), 
183−211. 
Hernes, G. 1978. “Det mediavridde 
samfunn”, in Hernes, G., (ed.), 
Forhandlingsøkonomi og 
blandningsadministrasjon. Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget. 
Hetherington, M. J. 1998. ”The political 
relevance of political 
trust”, American Political Science 
Review, 92(4), 791−808.   
Hewitt, C. 1992. “Public’s perspectives”, 
in Paletz, D. & Schmid, A. P. (eds.), 
Terrorism and the media. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications.  
Hinnfors, J. 1995. På dagordningen? 
Svensk politisk stil i förändring. 
Stockholm: Nerenius & Santérus 
förlag.  
Hjarvard, S. 2008. ”The Mediatization 
of Society. A Theory of the Media as 
Agents of Social and Cultural 
Change”, Nordicom Review 29(2), 
105−135. 
 218 
 
Hjerpe, M. & Linnér, B-O. 2006. ”The 
arenas of environmental 
management”, paper, IVA-project 
Environmental Foresight, Linköpings 
universitet: Sverige. 
Hogan, J. & Doyle, D. 2009. “A 
Comparative Framework: How 
Broadly Applicable is a ‘Rigorous’ 
Critical Junctures Framework?”, Acta 
Political 44(2), 211−240. 
Hollnagel, E. 2004. Barriers and accident 
prevention. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. 
Holt, A. 1878. "Review of the Progress of 
Steam Shipping during the last 
Quarter of a Century", Minutes of 
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil 
Engineers 51, 2−11. 
Holt, L. F., & Major, L. H. 2010. “Frame 
and blame: An analysis of how 
national and local newspapers framed 
the Jena six controversy”, Journalism 
& Mass Communication Quarterly, 
87(3−4), 582−597.  
Houston, J. B., Pfefferbaum, B., & 
Rosenholtz, C. E. 2012. “Disaster news 
framing and frame changing in 
coverage of major US natural 
disasters, 2000–2010”, Journalism & 
Mass Communication Quarterly, 
89(4), 606−623.  
Huddy, L., Feldman, S. & Cassese, E. 
2007. “On the Distinct Political Effects 
of Anxiety and Anger”, in Neuman, 
R., Marcus, G. E., Crigler, A. N. & 
MacKuen, M. (eds.), The Affect Effect. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Huddy, L., Feldman, S., Taber, C. & 
Lahav, G. 2005. “Threat, Anxiety, and 
Support of Antiterrorism Policies”, 
American Journal of Political Science 
49(3), 593−608. 
Hunt, P. S., & Campbell, B. A. 1997. 
“Autonomic and behavioral correlates 
of appetitive conditioning in 
rats”, Behavioral neuroscience, 111(3), 
494−502. 
Hutchison, E. 2010. "Trauma and the 
politics of emotions: constituting 
identity, security and community after 
the Bali bombing." International 
relations 24(1), 65−86. 
Hyndman, D. & Hyndman, D. 2014. 
Natural Hazards and Disasters. 
Hampshire: Cengage Learning. 
Igartua, J. J., Cheng, L., & Muňiz, C. 2005. 
“Framing Latin America in the 
Spanish Press: A Cooled Down 
Friendship between Two Fraternal 
Lands”, Communications 30, 359−372. 
Iyengar, S. 1989. “How citizens think 
about national issues: A matter of 
responsibility”, American Journal of 
Political Science, 878−900. 
 219 
 
Iyengar, S. 1994. Is anyone responsible?: 
How television frames political issues. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Iyengar, S., & Kinder, D. R. 1987. News 
that matters: Agenda-setting and 
priming in a television age. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.  
Jääsaari, J. 2009. “Restoring consensus 
after the blame game: The reception of 
Finnish tsunami crisis management 
coverage”, in Kivikuru, U. & Nord, L. 
(eds.) After the tsunami: Crisis 
communication in Finland and 
Sweden. Gothenburg: Nordicom. 
Jansson, A. 2004. ”Motståndets mångfald – 
om medieanvändningens politiska 
dimensioner”, in Nord, L. & 
Strömbäck, J. (eds), Medierna och 
demokratin. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
Jarlbro, G. 2004. ”Krisjournalistik eller 
journalistik i kris? En 
forskningsöversikt om medier, risker 
och kriser”, 
Krisberedskapsmyndighetens 
temaserie, 2004:1. 
Jenkins, W. I. 1978. Policy analysis: A 
political and organizational 
perspective. London: M. Robertson. 
Jensen, C. 2011. “Focusing events, policy 
dictators and the dynamics of reform”, 
Policy Studies 32(2), 143−158. 
Jensen, J. L. 2003. “Public Spheres on the 
Internet: Anarchic or Government‐
Sponsored – A Comparison”, 
Scandinavian Political Studies, 26(4), 
349−374. 
Johansson, B. 2004. “Journalistikens 
nyhetsvärderingar”, in Nord, L. & 
Strömbäck, J., (eds.), Medierna och 
demokratin. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
Jones, B. D., & Baumgartner, F. R. 
2005. The politics of attention: How 
government prioritizes problems. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking, Fast 
and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux. 
Karp, A. 2011. “Estimating civilian owned 
firearms”, Small Arms Survey Research 
Notes 9. 
Kelman, I. 2011. Disaster diplomacy: how 
disasters affect peace and conflict. New 
York: Routledge. 
Kerps, G. A. 1989. “Future Directions in 
Disaster Research: The Role of 
Taxonomy”. International Journal of 
Mass Emergencies and Disasters 7, 
215−241. 
Keshishian, F. 1997. “Political bias and 
nonpolitical news: A content analysis 
of an Armenian and Iranian 
earthquake in the New York Times 
and the Washington Post”, Critical 
 220 
 
Studies in Media 
Communication, 14(4), 332−343. 
Kievik, M. & Gutteling, J. M. 2011. “Yes, 
We Can: Motivate Dutch Citizens to 
Engage in Self-protective Behavior 
with Regard to Flood Risks”. Nat 
Hazards 59: 1475−1490. 
King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. 
1994. Designing social inquiry: 
Scientific inference in qualitative 
research. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Kingdon, J. W. 2003. Agendas, 
Alternatives, and Public Policies. New 
York: Longman. 
Kivikuru, U., & Nord, L. 2009. After the 
tsunami. Crisis Communication in 
Finland and Sweden. Göteborg: 
Nordicom.   
Kraemer, H. C. & Thiemann, S. 1987. 
How Many Subjects? Statistical Power 
Analysis in Research.  London: Sage.  
Krippendorff, K. 2004.”Reliability in 
content analysis”, Human 
Communication Research, 30(3), 
411−433. 
Kroll-Smith, J. S., & Couch, S. R. 1993. 
“Technological Hazards”, in Wilson, J. 
P. & Raphaeal, B. (eds.) International 
handbook of traumatic stress 
syndromes. New York: Springer. 
Kubany, E. S., Haynes, S. N., Leisen, M. 
B., Owens, J. A., Kaplan, A. S., 
Watson, S. B., & Burns, K. 2000. 
“Development and preliminary 
validation of a brief broad-spectrum 
measure of trauma exposure: The 
Traumatic Life Events Questionnaire”, 
Psychological Assessment 12, 210−224. 
Kühne, R., & Schemer, C. 2015. “The 
Emotional Effects of News Frames on 
Information Processing and Opinion 
Formation”, Communication Research 
42(3), 387−407. 
Kunelius, R., Noppari, E., & Reunanen, E. 
2009. Media vallan verkoissa. 
Tampere: University of Tampere. 
Lasswell, H. D. 1936. Politics: Who Gets 
What, When, How. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Lawrence, R. G. 2001. “Defining Events: 
Problem Defenition in the Media 
Arena”, in Hart, R. P. & Sparrow, B. 
H. (eds.). Politics, Discourse, and 
American Society: New Agendas. 
Boston: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc. 
Lawrence, R. & Birkland, T. A. 2004. 
“Guns, Hollywood and School Safety: 
Defining the School-Shooting 
Problem Across Public Arenas”, Social 
Science Quarterly 85(5), 1193−1207. 
Leffler, M. P. 2011. “9/11 in Retrospect”, 
Foreign Affairs 90(5), 33−44. 
 221 
 
Leivik Knowles, B-M. 2001. 
“Myndigheters och mediers 
kommunikation i samband med 
extraordinära händelser – 
Sekundäranalys av två fallstudier”, 
paper, 15: e nordiska konferensen för 
medie- och 
kommunikationsforskning, Island. 
Li, X. 2007. “Stages of a crisis and media 
frames and functions: US television 
coverage of the 9/11 incident during 
the first 24 hours”, Journal of 
Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 
51(4), 670−687.  
Lindholm, J., Carlson, T., Djupsund, G., 
Högväg, J., & Strandberg, K. 2015. 
”Citizens’ Emotional and Cognitive 
Responses to Focusing Events”, 
International Journal of Mass 
Emergencies and Disaster 33(3), 
407−427. 
Lippmann, W. 1922. Public Opinion. New 
York: The Free Press. 
Lombard, M., Reich, R. D., Grade, M. E., 
Bracken, C. C. & Bolmarcich Ditton, 
T. 2000. ”Presence and Television. 
The Role of Screen Size”, Human 
Communication Research 26(1), 
75−98. 
Lounasmeri, L. 2013. “Power 
Investigation’Neglected: The case of 
the Finnish newspaper Helsingin 
Sanomat”, Journal of Contemporary 
European Studies, 21(3), 382−395.  
Louw, E. 2010. The Media & Political 
Process. London: SAGE Publications 
Inc. 
Lundquist, L. 1971. Förvaltningen i det 
politiska systemet. Lund: 
Studentlitteratur. 
Lundquist, L. 1992. Förvaltning, stat och 
samhälle. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
Macbeth, G., Razumiejczyk, E. & 
Ledesma, R. D. 2009. “Cliff’s Delta 
Calculator: A Non-parametric Effect 
Size Program for Two Groups of 
Observations”. Universitas 
Psychologica 10, 545−555. 
Madera, J.M. & Smith, D.B. 2009. “The 
effects of leader negative emotions on 
evaluations of leadership in a crisis 
situation: the role of anger and 
sadness”, The Leadership Quarterly 20, 
103−114. 
Maestas, C.D., Atkeson, L. R., Croom, T. 
& Bryant, L.A. 2008. “Shifting the 
Blame: Federalism, Media, and Public 
Assignment of Blame Following 
Hurricane Katrina”, The Journal of 
Federalism 38(4), 609−632. 
Maguire, B., Weatherby, G. A., & 
Mathers, R.A. 2002. “Network news 
coverage of school shootings”, Social 
Science Journal 39, 465−470. 
 222 
 
Mahl, G. F. 1952. “Relationship between 
acute and chronic fear and the gastric 
acidity and blood sugar levels in 
Macaca mulatta 
monkeys”, Psychosomatic 
Medicine, 14(3), 182−210. 
Malhotra, N. & Kuo, A. G. 2008. 
”Attributing Blame: The Public’s 
Response to Hurricane Katrina”, The 
Journal of Politics 70(1), 120−135. 
Maor, M. 2014. “Policy bubbles: Policy 
overreaction and positive feedback”, 
Governance, 27(3), 469−487. 
Marcus, G. E., MacKuen, M., & Neuman, 
W. R. 2011. “Parsimony and 
complexity: Developing and testing 
theories of affective 
intelligence”, Political 
Psychology, 32(2), 323−336. 
Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R. & 
MacKuen, M. 2000. Affective 
Intelligence and Political Judgment. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Matthes, J. 2009. “What's in a frame? A 
content analysis of media framing 
studies in the world's leading 
communication journals, 1990−2005”, 
Journalism & Mass Communication 
Quarterly, 86(2), 349−367.  
Matthes, J., & Kohring, M. 2008. “The 
content analysis of media frames: 
Toward improving reliability and 
validity”; Journal of Communication, 
58(2), 258−279. 
McCombs, M. & Shaw, D. 1972. “The 
agenda-setting function of mass 
media”, Public Opinion Quarterly 36, 
176−187. 
McCombs, M. 2004. Setting the Agenda. 
The Mass Media and Public Opinion. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
McCombs, M. E., Shaw, D. L., & Weaver, 
D. H. 1997. Communication and 
democracy: Exploring the intellectual 
frontiers in agenda-setting theory. 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
McCombs, M. E., Shaw, D. L. & Weaver, 
D. H. 2014. “New Directions in 
Agenda-Setting Theory and 
Research”, Mass Communication and 
Society 17, 781−802.  
McDermott, R. 2007. “Cognitive 
Neuroscience and Poltitics”, in 
Neuman, W. R., Marcus, G. E., 
Crigler, A. N. & MacKuen, M. (eds.), 
The Affect Effect, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
McEntire, D. A. 2001. ”Triggering agents, 
vulnerabilities and disaster reduction: 
towards a holistic paradigm”, Disaster 
Prevention and Management 10(3), 
189–196. 
 223 
 
Merchant, J. A. 1986. “Preparing for 
disaster”, Am J Public Health 76(3), 
233–235. 
Merolla, J. L. & Zechmeister, E. J. 2009. 
Democracy at risk: How terrorist 
threats affect the public. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Messaris, P. & Abraham, L. 2001. “The 
role of images in framing news 
stories”, in Reese, S.D., Gandy, O.H. & 
Grant, A. E. (eds.), Framing public life: 
Perspectives on media and our 
understanding of the social world. 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum  
Associates.  
Millar, D. P. & Heath, R. L. (eds.) 2004. 
Responding to crisis: A rhetorical 
approach to crisis communication. 
Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Miller, N. E. 1961. ”Some recent studies of 
conflict behavior and drugs”, 
American Psychologist, 16(1), 12−24. 
Mitchell, W. C. 1962. The American 
Polity: A Social and Cultural 
Interpretation. New York: The Free 
Press. 
Morton, R.B. & Williams, K. C. 2010. 
Experimental Political Science and the 
Study of Causality. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Mral, B. 2013. ”Retorik, risk och kris”, in 
Mral, B. & Vigsø, O. (eds.), 
Krisretorik. Retoriska aspekter på 
kriskommunikation. Ödåkra: 
Retorikförlaget. 
 Mral, B., Hansson Nylund, H., & Vigsø, 
O. 2010. ”Risk communication from a 
rhetorical perspective”, in S. A. 
Nohrstedt (ed.) Communicating risks: 
towards the threat society. 
Gothenburg: Nordicom. 
Muilis, J-P. & Duval T. S. 1997. “The PrE 
Model of Coping and Tornado 
Preparedness: Moderating Effects of 
Responsibility”. Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology 27, 1750−1766. 
Muschert, G. W. 2007. “Research in 
School Shootings”, Sociology Compass 
1 (1), 60−80. 
Mutz, D. C. 1994. “Contextualizing 
personal experience: The role of mass 
media”, The Journal of Politics, 56(03), 
689−714.  
Neuman, W. R.,  Marcus, G. E., Crigler, 
A. N. & MacKuen, M. 2007. 
“Theorizing Affect’s Effects”, in 
Neuman, R., Marcus, G. E., Crigler, A. 
N. & MacKuen, M. (eds.), The Affect 
Effect. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Neuman, W., Just, M., & Crigler, A. 1992. 
Common knowledge: News and the 
construction of social meaning. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 224 
 
Nieminen, H. & Pantti, M. 2009. 
Medierna på marknaden – en 
introduktion till massmedier och 
massmedieforskning. Helsingfors: 
Loki-Kirjat.  
Nohrstedt, D. & Weible, C. M. 2010. “The 
Logic of Policy Change after Crisis: 
Proximity and Subsystem 
Interaction”, Risk, Hazard & Crisis in 
Public Policy 1(2), 1−32. 
Nohrstedt, D. 2007. Crisis and Policy 
Reformcraft. Advocacy Coalitions and 
Crisis-induced in Swedish Nuclear 
Energy Policy. Uppsala: Uppsala 
Universitet. 
Nohrstedt, S. A. 1999. 
”Forskningsöversikt: 
kommunikationsproblem i samband 
med katastrofer och allvarliga 
samhällsstörningar”, Statens offentliga 
utredningar, 1999:68. 
Nord, L. & Strömbäck, J. 2002. Tio dagar 
som skakade världen – En studie av 
medias beskrivningar av 
terrorattackerna i USA och kriget i 
Afghanistan hösten 2001. Stockholm: 
Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar. 
Nord, L. & Strömbäck, J. 2004. 
”Journalistik, medier och demokrati”, 
in Nord, L. & Strömbäck, J. (eds), 
Medierna och demokratin. Lund: 
Studentlitteratur. 
Nord, L. & Strömbäck, J. 2005. “Hot på 
agendan. En analys av 
nyhetsförmedling om risker och 
kriser”, Krisberedskapsmyndighetens 
temaserie, 2005:7. 
Norris, P., Kern, M., & Just, M. 2003. 
Framing terrorism: The news media, 
the government and the public. 
London: Routledge.  
Nylund, M. 2003. “Quoting in front-page 
journalism: Illustrating, evaluating 
and confirming the news”, Media, 
Culture & Society, 25(6), 844−851.  
Oatley, K. 1999. “Foreword”, in Dalgleish, 
T. & Power, M. J. (eds), Handbook of 
Cognition and Emotion. Chichester, 
UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  
Odén, T. A., Ghersetti, M., & Wallin, U. 
2009.” Independence-then adaption. 
How Swedish journalists covered the 
tsunami catastrophe”, ”, in Kivikuru, 
U. & Nord L (eds.), After the 
Tsunami. Crisis Communication in 
Finland and Sweden. Göteborg: 
Nordicom. 
OECD 2003. Emerging Risks in the 21st 
Century. An Agenda for Action. 
Paris: OECD. 
Oh, C. H. & Oetzel, J. 2011. 
”Multinationals’ Response to 
Disasters: How Does Subsidiary 
Investment Vary in Response to the 
 225 
 
Type of Disaster and the Quality of 
Country Governance?”, Strategic 
Management Journal 32 (6), 
658−681.  
Olofsson A., & Öhman S. 2009. (eds.). 
Risker i det moderna samhället. Lund: 
Studentlitteratur. 
Olson, R. S. 2008. "Toward a politics of 
disaster: Losses, values, agendas, and 
blame”, in A. Boin (ed.), Crisis 
Management, Volume III. London: 
SAGE Publications Ltd.  
Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding 
Institutional Diversity. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Paletz, D. 1998. “The media and public 
policy” in Graber, D., McQuail, D, & 
Norris, P. (eds.), The politics of news. 
The news of politics. Washington DC: 
Congressional Quarterly.  
Palomba, D., Sarlo, M., Angrilli, A., Mini, 
A. & Stegagno, L. 2000. ”Cardiac 
responses associated with affective 
processing of unpleasant film stimuli”, 
International Journal of 
Psychophysiology 36, 45−57. 
Pan, Z., & Kosicki, G. M. 1993. ”Framing 
analysis: An approach to news 
discourse”, Political Communication, 
10(1), 55−75.  
Pantti, M. K., & Wahl-Jorgensen, K. 
2011.” ‘Not an act of God’: anger 
and citizenship in press coverage of 
British man-made disasters”, Media, 
Culture & Society, 33(1), 105−122. 
Pantti, M. 2010. “Disaster news and 
public emotions”,. in Döveling, K., 
von Scheve, C. & Konijn, E.A. 
(eds.), The Routledge handbook of 
emotions and mass media.  London: 
Routledge. 
Parsons, W. 1995. Public Policy. An 
introduction to the theory and 
practice of policy analysis. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited. 
Pedhazur, E. J., & Schmelkin, L. P. 2013. 
Measurement, design, and analysis: 
An integrated approach. New York: 
Psychology Press.  
Perry, R. W. 2007. “What Is a Disaster” 
in Rodriguez, H., Quarantelli, E. L. 
& Dynes, R. R. (eds.), Handbook of 
Disaster Research. New York: 
Springer. 
Pidgeon, N. 1998. “Risk assessment, risk 
values and the social science 
program: why we do need risk 
perception research”, Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety 59, 
5−15. 
Pressman, J. L. & Wildavsky, A. 1984. 
Implementation: how great 
expectations in Washington are dashed 
 226 
 
in Oakland. Berkley & LA: University 
of California Press.  
Princen, S. 2009. Agenda-Setting in the 
European Union. Houndsmills, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Princen, S. & Rhinard, M. 2006. 
“Crashing and creeping: agenda-
setting dynamics in the European 
Union”, Journal of European Public 
Policy 13(7), 1119−1132. 
Protess, D. & McCombs, M. 1991. “Part 1: 
The Public Agenda” in  Protess, D. & 
McCombs, M. (eds.), Agenda Setting – 
Readings on Media, Public Opinion, 
and Policymaking. Hillsdale, New 
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associated, 
Inc. 
Quarantelli, E. L. 1987. “Disaster studies: 
An analysis of the social historical 
factors affecting the development of 
research in the area”, Internation 
Journal of Mass Emergencies and 
Disasters 5, 285−310. 
Quarantelli, E. L. 1998. What is a disaster? 
Perspectives on the question. New 
York: Routledge.  
Raittila, P., Haara, P., Kangasluoma, L., 
Koljonen, K., Kumpu, V. & 
Väliverronen, J. 2009. Kauhajoen 
koulusurmat mediassa. Tampere: 
University of Tampere. 
Raittila, P., Johansson, K., Juntunen, L., 
Kangasluoma, L., Koljonen, K., 
Kumpu, V., Prenu, I. & Väliverronen, 
J. 2008. Jokelan koulusurmat mediassa. 
Tampere: University of Tampere. 
Reese, S. D. 2007. The framing project: A 
bridging model for media research 
revisited. Journal of Communication, 
57(1), 148−154.  
Renn, O. 2008. Risk governance: Coping 
with uncertainty in a complex world. 
London: Earthscan. 
Renshon, J., Lee, J. J., & Tingley, D. 2015. 
"Physiological arousal and political 
beliefs", Political Psychology, 36(5), 
569−585. 
Riffe, D., Lacy, S. & Fico, F. 2014. 
Analyzing Media Messages Using 
Quantitative Content Analysis in 
Research. New York: Routledge. 
Riker, W. H. 1993. ”Introduction”, in 
Riker, W. H. (ed.), Agenda Formation. 
Michigan: The University of Michigan 
Press. 
Rochefort, D. & Cobb, R. W. 1994. 
“Problem Definition: An Emerging 
Perspective” in Rochefort, D. & Cobb, 
R. W. (eds.), The Politics of Problem 
Definition. Shaping the Policy Agenda. 
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 
 227 
 
Rochefort, D. A., & Cobb, R. W. 1994. 
The politics of problem definition: 
Shaping the policy agenda. Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas.  
Roggeband, C., & Vliegenthart, R. 2007. 
“Divergent framing: The public debate 
on migration in the Dutch parliament 
and media, 1995–2004”, West 
European Politics, 30(3), 524−548. 
Rosenthal, U. 1998. “Future disasters, 
future definitions”, in Quarantelli, E. 
(ed.) What is a Disaster? Perspectives 
on the question. London: Routledge. 
Rosenthal, U., Boin, R. A. & Comfort, L. 
K. 2001. Managing Crises. Springfield: 
Charles C Thomas Publisher. 
Rothstein, B. 2003. Sociala fällor och 
tillitens problem. Stockholm: SNS 
fölag. 
Rushefsky, M. E. 1994. “Testing Models of 
Agenda Bilding”, Applied Behavioral 
Science Review 2 (2), 95−113. 
Sabatier, P. A. & Jenkins-Smith, H. 1993. 
Policy Change and Learning: An 
Advoacacy Coalition Approach. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Sabatier, P. A. & Weible, C. M. 2007. “The 
Advocacy Coalition Framework: 
Innovations and Clarifications” in 
Sabatier, P.A.,, (eds.), Theories of the 
Policy Process. Cambridge: Westview 
Press. 
Sabatier, P. A. 2007. “The Need for Better 
Theories” in Sabatier, P. A., (ed.), 
Theories of the Policy Process. 
Cambridge: Westview Press. 
Sabato, L., Stencel, M., & Lichter, S. R. 
2000. Peepshow: Media and politics 
in an age of scandal. Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield.  
Salwen, M. B. 1995. News of hurricane 
andrew: The agenda of sources and 
the sources' agendas. Journalism & 
Mass Communication Quarterly, 
72(4), 826−840.  
Saylor, C., Cowart, B., Lipovsky, J., 
Jackson, C. & Finch, A. J. 2003. 
“Media Exposure to September 11: 
Elementary School Students’ 
Experiences and Posttraumatic 
Symptoms”, American Behavioural 
Scientist 46, 1622−1642. 
Scherer, K. 2001. “Emotional expression 
is subject to social and technological 
change: Extrapolating to the future”. 
Social Science Information 40(1), 
125−151. 
Semetko, H. A., & Valkenburg, P. M. 
2000. ”Framing European politics: A 
content analysis of press and 
television news”, Journal of 
Communication, 50(2), 93−109.  
Shaw, D. L., & McCombs, M. E. 1977. 
The emergence of American political 
 228 
 
issues: The agenda-setting function of 
the press. New York: West Group. 
Shoemaker, P. J., & Cohen, A. A. 2006. 
News around the world: Practitioners, 
content and the public. New York: 
Routledge. 
Smith, B. C. 1976. Policymaking in British 
government. An analysis of power and 
rationality. London: Martin 
Robertson. 
Smith, C. 1996. “Fire Issues and 
Communication by the Media”, i 
Brown, J. K., Mutch, R. W., Spoon, C. 
W. & Wakimoto, R. H., red., 
Proceedings: Syposium on Fire in 
Wilderness and Park Management. 
Darby: DIANE Publishing. 
Snider, L. 2004. “Resisting neo-liberalism: 
The poisoned water in Walkerton, 
Ontario”, Social and Legal Studies 
13(2), 265−289. 
Soroka, S. N. 2002. “Issue Attributes and 
Agenda-Setting: Media, the Public, 
and Policymakers in Canada,” 
International Journal of Public 
Opinion Research 14(3), 264-85. 
Soroka, S. N. 2014. Negativity in 
democratic politics: Causes and 
consequences. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Stern, R. M., Ray, W. J. & Quigley, K. S. 
2001. Psychophysiological Recording. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Stone, D. 1989. ”Causal Stories and the 
Formation of Policy Agendas”, 
Political Science Quarterly 104 (2), 
281−300. 
Stone, D. 2002. Policy Paradox –The Art 
of Political Decision Making. New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 
Stone, D. 2002. Policy Paradox –The Art 
of Political Decision Making. New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 
Strömbäck, J. 2008. På nyhetsmediernas 
agendor: En studie av hot och risker i 
det svenska nyhetsurvalet i 
morgonpress, kvällspress och TV. 
Studier i Politisk Kommunikation 18, 
1−50. 
Strömbäck, J. 2000. Makt och medier. 
Lund: Studentlitteratur.  
Strömbäck, J. 2001. Gäster hos 
verkligheten – en studie av journalistik, 
demokrati och politisk misstro. 
Stockholm: Brutus Östlings Bokförlag.  
Strömbäck, J. 2008. ”På nyhetsmediernas 
agendor. En studie av hot och risker i 
det svenska nyhetsurvalet i 
morgonpress, kvällspress och TV”, 
Studier i Politisk Kommunikation 18, 
1652−3865. 
 229 
 
Strömbäck, J. 2009. Makt, medier och 
samhälle. Stockholm: Studieförbundet 
Näringsliv och Samhälle. 
Swanborn, P. 2010. Case study research: 
what, why and how?. London: Sage. 
t Hart, P., & Boin, A. 2001. Between crisis 
and normalcy: The long shadow of 
post-crisis politics, in Rosenthal, U., 
Boin, A. & Comfort, L. K. (eds.) 
Managing Crises: Threats, Dilemmas, 
Opportunities (28−46). Springfield, IL: 
Charles C Thomas.  
Terpstra, T., R. Zaalberg, J. de Boer and 
W. J. W. Botzen. 2014. “You Have 
Been Framed! How Antecedents of 
Information Need Mediate the Effect 
of Risk Communication Messages”. 
Risk Analysis 34, 1506−1520. 
The National Diet of Japan. 2012. The 
official report of Executive summary 
The Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
Independent Investigation 
Commission. Tokyo: The National 
Diet of Japan. Available online 
15.9.2015 at 
https://www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic
_report.pdf. 
Ulmer, R. R., Sellnow, T. L., & Seeger, M. 
W. 2010. Effective crisis 
communication: Moving from crisis to 
opportunity. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications.  
Uscinski, J. E. 2009. “When does the 
Public’s Issue Agenda Affect the 
Media’s Issue Agenda (and Vice-
Versa)? Developing a Framework for 
Media-Public Influence”, Social 
Science Quarterly 90(4), 796−815. 
Valentino, N. A., Hutchings, V. L., 
Banks, A. J., & Davis, A. K. 2008. “Is 
a worried citizen a good citizen? 
Emotions, political information 
seeking, and learning via the 
internet”, Political Psychology, 29(2), 
247−273. 
Van Aelst, P., Brants, K., Van Praag, P., 
De Vreese, C., Nuytemans, M. & 
Van Dalen, A. 2008. ”The fourth 
estate as superpower? An empirical 
study of perceptions of media power 
in Belgium and the Netherlands”, 
Journalism Studies 9(4), 494−511. 
Van Assche T. 2012. “When do New 
Issues Appear? Punctuations in the 
Belgian Executive Agenda”, Acta 
Politica 47(2), 128–150. 
van Dijk, T. 2002. “Political discourse 
and political cognition”, in Chilton, 
P. & Schäffner, C. (eds.), Politics as 
Text and Talk: Analytic approaches 
to political discourse. Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins Publishing. 
Vánê, J. & Kalvas, F. 2012. “Focusing 
Events and Their Effect on agenda-
 230 
 
setting”, paper, WAPOR 
Conference, Hongkong, Kina.   
VanVoorhis, C. R. & & Morgan, B. L. 
2007. “Understanding Power and 
Rules of thumb for Determining 
Sample Sizes”. Tutorials in 
Quantitative Methods for Psychology 
3, 43−50.  
VanVoorhis, C. R. and B. L. Morgan 
2007, ‘Understanding Power and 
Rules of thumb for Determining 
Sample Sizes’, Tutorials in 
Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 
3(2), 43-50.  
Walgrave, S. & Van Aelst, P. 2006. ”The 
Contingency of the Mass Media´s 
Political Agenda Setting Power: 
Towards a Preliminary Theory”, 
Journal of Communication 56, 
88−109. 
Walgrave, S., & Varone, F. 2008. 
“Punctuated Equilibrium and 
Agenda‐Setting: Bringing Parties 
Back in: Policy Change after the 
Dutroux Crisis in Belgium”, 
Governance, 21(3), 365−395. 
Walker, L. D. & Waterman, R. W. 2010. 
“Gubernatorial elections and 
attitudes towards the police: State 
elections as focusing events”, 
Electoral Studies 29(2), 117−127. 
Wall, E. 2011. Förväntningar på den 
enskildes ansvar och insatser vid 
plötslig förekomst av cryptosporidium I 
drickvattnet. Östersund: 
Mittuniversitetet: Myndigheten för 
samhällsskydd och beredskap. 
Walton, D. 2010. The place of emotion in 
argument. Philadelphia: Penn State 
Press. 
Wanta, W. 1997. The Public and The 
National Agenda: How People Learn 
About Important Issues. Mahwah, 
New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc. 
Weathers, F. W., Keane, T. M & Foa, E. B. 
2009. “Assessment and Diagnosis of 
Adults”, in Foa,E.B, Keane, T. M., 
Friedman, M. J & Cohen, J. A., (eds.), 
Effective Treatments for PTSD. New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Westen, D. 2008. The Political Brain: The 
Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of 
the Nation. New York: PublicAffairs. 
Wheeler, M. 1997. Politics and the Mass 
Media. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 
Ltd. 
Williams, S. 2008. “Rethinking the Nature 
of Disaster: From Failed Instruments 
of Learning to a Post-Social 
Understanding”, Social Forces 87(2), 
1115−1138. 
 231 
 
Wittneben, B. 2012. “The impact of the 
Fukushima nuclear accident on 
European energy policy”, 
Environmental Science & Policy 15, 
1−3. 
Wolfe, M. 2012. ”Putting on the Brakes or 
Pressing on the Gas? Media Attention 
and the Speed of Policymaking”, The 
Policy Studies Journal 40(1), 109−126. 
Wolfe, M., Jones, B. D., & Baumgartner, 
F. R. 2013. “A failure to communicate: 
Agenda setting in media and policy 
studies”, Political 
Communication, 30(2), 175−192. 
Volkmer, I. 2008. Conflict-related media 
events and cultures of proximity. 
Media, War & Conflict, 1(1), 90−98. 
Wood, R. S. 2006. “Tobacco’s Tipping 
Point: The Master Settlement 
Agreement as a Focusing Event”, The 
Policy Studies Journal 34(3), 419−436. 
Worrall, J. L. 1999. “Focusing Event 
Characteristics and Issue 
Accompaniment: The Case of 
Domestic Terrorism”, Criminal Justice 
Policy Review 10, 319−341. 
 
 
 
 
Wu, H. D. 1998. “Investigating the 
determinants of international news 
flow: A meta-analysis”, Gazette 
60(6), 490–510. 
Yan, Y., & Bissell, K. 2015. “The Sky Is 
Falling Predictors of News Coverage 
of Natural Disasters 
Worldwide”, Communication 
Research, 1−25. 
Zhou, S. 2005. “Effects of Arousing 
Visuals and Redundancy on 
Cognitive Assessment of Television 
News”, Journal of Broadcasting & 
Electronic Media 49(1), 23−42. 
Öhman, A., & Dimberg, U. 1984. ”An 
evolutionary perspective on human 
social behavior”, in W. M. Waid 
(ed.), Sociophysiology. New York: 
Springer 
 
 
 
 232 
 
Appendix A. Coding scheme, media coverage 
 
Fokuserande händelse:  [ 1 ] Jokela   [ 2 ] Nokia  [ 3 ] Stormen  [ 4 ] Översvämning 
Rubrik: ____________________________________________________________ 
Datum: ________Dag: _____  (om texten förekommer inom första två veckorna)   
Placering: [ 1 ] parad, [ 2 ] Kotimaas parad, [ 3 ] inne i tidning               
Sidnummer: _________    
Spalt höjd: ______________        Antal ord: _______________  
 
1.1 Producent 
[ 1 ] Eget material [ 2 ] Nyhetsbyrå [ 3 ] Kombination av  
   båda 
[ 4 ] Insändare  [ 5 ] Expertkommentar 
 
1.2 Typ av text 
[ 1 ] artikel   [ 2 ] ledare 
[ 3 ] redaktionell krönika  [ 4 ] insändare   
[ 5 ] notis utan ingress   [ 6 ] första parad 
[ 7 ] andra parad  [ 8 ] parad ingång 
[ 9 ] vieräskynä  [ 10 ] läsarbild 
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2. Tema. Sakfråga 
Texten handlar om: I rangordning. Det tema som klassas som nummer ett får mest 
utrymme i texten, ingår i rubrik och ingress.  
1.__________________________________________________________________ 
2.__________________________________________________________________ 
3.__________________________________________________________________ 
4.__________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Karaktär  
[ 1 ] descriptive vad har hänt? Utgår från fas ett och mediernas roll som 
informationsspridare. 
[ 2 ] attributive, försöka förklara och förstå situationen. Utgår från fas två. 
[ 3 ] affective sätter händelsen i relation till bredare samhällelig kontext i fas tre.  
 
4.1 Dominerande aktör 
[ 1 ] akademiker/expert   [ 2 ] intressegrupp/förening 
[ 3 ] journalister  [ 4 ] kommunal- eller statstjänsteman 
[ 6 ] drabbad/ögonvittne  [ 7 ] medborgare 
[ 8 ] politiska partier  [ 9 ] företag 
[ 5 ] polis/räddningsverk/militär [ 10 ] annan  
 
4.2 Andra aktör (samma alternativ som 5.1) 
4.3. Tredje aktör (samma alternativ som 5.1) 
4.4 Fjärde aktör (samma alternativ som 5.1) 
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5. Blame attribution 
 
5.1 Vem för fram anklagelse:  
[ 1 ] akademiker/expert   [ 2 ] intressegrupp/förening 
[ 3 ] journalister  [ 4 ] kommunal- eller statstjänsteman 
[ 5 ] polis/räddningsverk/militär  [ 6 ] drabbad/ögonvittne 
[ 7 ] medborgare  [ 8 ] politiska partier 
[ 9 ] företag   [ 10 ] annan 
[ 11 ] Auvinen   [ 12 ] samhället 
[ 13 ] medier/underhållningsbranch 
 
5.2 Vem är ansvarig: (samma alternativ som 6.1) 
 
5.3 Tidsaspekt gällande problem, beror problemet på:  
[1=ja, 0=nej] dåliga förberedelser ansvarstillskrivning utgår från aktioner före 
händelsen. 
[1=ja, 0=nej ] händelsens hantering ansvarstillskrivning utgår från aktioner efter 
händelsen. 
 
Anledning till ansvarstillskrivning (i text): 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________ 
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6. Framing  
[0 = nej, 1 = ja]  
6.1 Attribution of Responsibility Frame 
[ ] 6.1.1 Does the story suggest that some level of government has the ability to alleviate 
the problem?  
[ ] 6.1.2 Does the story suggest that some level of the government is responsible for 
the issue/problem?  
[ ] 6.1.3 Does the story suggest solution(s) to the problem/issue?   
[ ] 6.1.4 Does the story suggest that an individual or group is responsible for the 
issue/problem? 
[ ] 6.1.5 Does the story suggest the problem requires urgent action?  
6.1.6 Frame present 1 = yes, 0 = no 
 
6.2 Human Interest Frame 
[ ] 6.2.1 Does the story provide a human example or “human face” on the issue? 
[ ] 6.2.2. Does the story employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings 
of outrage, empathy-caring, sympathy or compassion?  
[ ] 6.2.3 Does the story emphasize how individuals and groups are affected by the 
issue/problem?  
[ ] 6.2.4 Does the story go into the personal or private lives of the actors?  
[ ] 6.2.5 Does the story contain visual information that might generate feelings of 
outrage, empathy-caring, sympathy or compassion?  
6.2.6 Frame present 1 = yes, 0 = no 
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6.3 Conflict frame 
[ ] 6.3.1 Does the story reflect disagreement between parties-individuals-groups-
countries?  
[ ] 6.3.2 Does one party-individual-group-county criticize another?  
[ ] 6.3.3 Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem or 
issue?  
[ ] 6.3.4 Does the story refer to winners and losers?  
6.3.5 Frame present 1 = yes, 0 = no 
 
6.4 Morality frame 
[ ] 6.4.1 Does the story contain any moral message?  
[ ] 6.4.2 Does the story make reference to morality, God and other religious tenets?  
[ ] 6.4.3 Does the story offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave?  
6.4.2 Frame present 1 = yes, 0 = no 
 
6.5 Economic consequences frame 
[ ] 6.5.1 Is there a mention of financial losses or gains now or in the future?  
[ ] 6.5.2 Is there a mention of the cost/degree of expense involved?  
[ ] 6.5.3 Is there a reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a 
course of action?  
6.5.4 Frame present 1 = yes, 0 = no 
7 Bilder och grafik 
7.1.1 Bild 1 höjd   
7.1.2 Bild 1 spalt 
 237 
 
7.1.3 Aktörer som syns på bild 
[ 1 ] akademiker/expert   [ 2 ] intressegrupp/förening 
[ 3 ] journalister  [ 4 ] kommunal- eller statstjänsteman 
[ 5 ] polis/räddningsverk/militär   [ 6 ] drabbad/ögonvittne 
[ 7 ] medborgare   [ 8 ] politiska partier 
[ 9 ] företag    [ 10 ] ansvarig person 
[ 11 ] annan 
 
7.1.4 Framing för bild 1 
[ 1 ] lives lost, döda [ 2 ] lives saved, reder upp efter 
händelsen ex. brandmän, räddningsverk 
polis – bildtexten fokuserar på dessa 
aktörer om även drabbade finns med på 
bilden 
[ 3 ] physical, images of destruction [ 4 ] human interest, drabbade personer 
– om bilderna visar starka känslor sätt i 
nästa kategori 
[ 5 ] emotional, sörjande människor,  
starka känslor   [ 6 ] vanliga människor, åskådare 
[ 7 ] politiker, beslutsfattare, expert [ 8 ] annat 
[ 9 ] Auvinen/annan skolskjutare 
 
Samma för bild 2−5. 
7.6.1 Grafik 1 höjd 9.6.2 Grafik 1 spalt 
7.7.1 Grafik 2 höjd 9.7.2 Grafik 2 höjd 
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Appendix B. Coding scheme for the parliamentary 
debate 
 
I. Basic characteristics  
Datum:_____________ 
FH händelse: Jokela [1] Nokia [2] Stormen [3] Översvämning [4] 
Vilket slags ärende: [1] ptk ... + fler kategorier efter hand 
Vad diskuteras: _______________________________ 
Vem pratar: [1] minister [2] riksdagsledamot [3] president [4] annan, vem?  
Parti: [1] Saml [2] C [3] SDP [4] VF [5] SFP [6] Gröna [7] KD [8] Sannf [9] annat 
Regeringsparti [1] Opposition [2] 
Antal ord: ___________ 
Andel av inlägg: [1] mycket liten, [2] liten [3] rätt så stor [4] mycket stor 
Tema: ______________________________________________________________ 
 
II. Blame attribution 
Vem för fram anklagelse:  
[ 1 ] akademiker/expert   [ 2 ] intressegrupp/förening 
[ 3 ] journalister  [ 4 ] kommunal- eller statstjänsteman 
[ 5 ] polis/räddningsverk/militär  [ 6 ] drabbad/ögonvittne 
[ 7 ] medborgare  [ 8 ] politiska partier 
[ 9 ] företag   [ 10 ] annan 
[ 11 ] Auvinen   [ 12 ] samhället 
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[ 13 ] medier/underhållningsbranch 
Vem är ansvarig: (samma alternativ): _____________________________________ 
Tidsaspekt gällande problem, beror problemet på:  
[1=ja, 0=nej] dåliga förberedelser ansvarstillskrivning utgår från aktioner före 
händelsen. 
[1=ja, 0=nej ] händelsens hantering ansvarstillskrivning utgår från aktioner efter 
händelsen. 
Anledning till ansvarstillskrivning (i text): 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
III. Framing  
[0 = nej, 1 = ja] 
  
6.1 Attribution of Responsibility Frame 
[ ] 6.1.1 Does the comment suggest that some level of government has the ability to 
alleviate the problem?  
[ ] 6.1.2 Does the comment suggest that some level of the government is responsible 
for the issue/problem?  
[ ] 6.1.3 Does the comment suggest solution(s) to the problem/issue?   
[ ] 6.1.4 Does the comment suggest that an individual or group is responsible for the 
issue/problem? 
[ ] 6.1.5 Does the comment suggest the problem requires urgent action?  
6.1.6 Frame present 1 = yes, 0 = no 
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6.2 Human Interest Frame 
[ ] 6.2.1 Does the comment provide a human example or “human face” on the issue? 
[ ] 6.2.2. Does the comment employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate 
feelings of outrage, empathy-caring, sympathy or compassion?  
[ ] 6.2.3 Does the comment emphasize how individuals and groups are affected by the 
issue/problem?  
[ ] 6.2.4 Does the comment go into the personal or private lives of the actors?  
6.2.5 Frame present 1 = yes, 0 = no 
 
6.3 Conflict frame 
[ ] 6.3.1 Does the comment reflect disagreement between parties-individuals-groups-
countries?  
[ ] 6.3.2 Does one party-individual-group-county criticize another?  
[ ] 6.3.3 Does the comment refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem 
or issue?  
[ ] 6.3.4 Does the comment refer to winners and losers?  
6.3.5 Frame present 1 = yes, 0 = no 
 
6.4 Morality frame 
[ ] 6.4.1 Does the comment contain any moral message?  
[ ] 6.4.2 Does the comment make reference to morality, God and other religious 
tenets?  
[ ] 6.4.3 Does the comment offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave?  
6.4.2 Frame present 1 = yes, 0 = no 
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6.5 Economic consequences frame 
[ ] 6.5.1 Is there a mention of financial losses or gains now or in the future?  
[ ] 6.5.2 Is there a mention of the cost/degree of expense involved?  
[ ] 6.5.3 Is there a reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a 
course of action?  
6.5.4 Frame present 1 = yes, 0 = no 
 
III. Problems and solutions (Birkland & Warnement 2013; Vliegenthart & 
Roggeband 2007) 
What is represented as the problem? 
What to do? Which action is deemed necessary and why? 
 
IV. Semantics – emotional debates (Brader 2006) 
[0 = no attempt, 1 = some appeal, 2 = strong appeal] 
 
Amusement/humor appeal. [0, 1, 2] 
Fear appeal (fear/anxiety). [0, 1, 2] 
Enthusiasm appeal (hope/joy). [0, 1, 2] 
Anger appeal (anger/contempt/disgust). [0, 1, 2] 
Pride appeal (satisfaction in what’s been accomplished/who we are). [0, 1, 2] 
Compassion appeal (sympathy). [0, 1, 2] 
Sadness appeal (disappointment/regret). [0, 1, 2]  
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Appendix C. Plenary session contributions 
The school shooting in Jokela 
Tähän edellä sanomaani viitaten näen erittäin perustelluksi tehdä perusopetuslakiin 
lisäys oppilashuollon järjestämisvelvoitteista. Esitän, että kyseiseen pykälään lisätään 
uusi momentti, joka kuuluu: "Oppilashuolto tulee järjestää kouluissa niin, että oppi-
laalla on mahdollisuus saada oppilashuollon palveluja”. (Tuula Peltonen, SDP, ptk 
4/2008 vp) 
Hallituksemme on nyt ryhtynyt toimenpiteisiin aivan erityisellä tavalla näissä asioissa 
ohjaamalla lisäpanostuksia erityisopetukseen, tukiopetukseen, ryhmäkokoihin, joihin 
liittyvät ongelmat ovat selkeä osa tätä pahoinvointia. (Timo Heinonen, KOK, ptk 
39/2008 vp) 
Miksi näin tapahtuu? Voimmeko jotain oppia tästä? Samalla on selvää, että me emme 
halua syyllistää ketään. Me tiedämme meidän koulun korkean tason, tiedämme sen 
hyvän työn, jota opettajat tekevät. Mutta aina jää miettimään, onko jotain, mitä 
voidaan oppia. (Eero Heinäluoma, SDP, ptk 75/2007 vp) 
Viimeviikkoiset Jokelan tapahtumat ovat viimeistään herättäneet meidät kaikki sii-
hen, että jotain on lasten ja nuorten pahoinvoinnin ehkäisemiseksi tehtävä. Tulon-
siirtojen korottaminen on tärkeä, mutta ei yksin riittävä toimenpide. Perheiden, lasten 
ja nuorten ennalta ehkäisevien palvelujen rapautuminen on pysäytettävä. (Outi 
Alanko-Kahiluoto, VF, ptk 81/2007 vp) 
Tuusulan kunnalle Jokelan koulukeskuksen tragedian vuoksi jo tälle vuodelle ehdo-
tetaan miljoonan euron harkinnanvaraista valtionosuutta erilaisten tästä tragediasta 
kohdistuvien kustannusten maksamiseen, samoilen tapauksen tutkimiseen 100 000:ta 
euroa. (Minister of Finance Jyrki Katainen, KOK, ptk 87/2007 vp) 
Oikeusministeriössä on käynnistynyt onnettomuustutkintaprosessi, ja siinä tutkin-
nassa myös onnettomuustutkinnan normaalien pelisääntöjen mukaan arvioidaan 
voimassa oleva lainsäädäntö ja sen muutostarpeet. On tietysti selvä, että jo nyt käyty 
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keskustelu ja asiantuntijalausunnot viittaavat siihen, että tutkimuksessa arvioidaan 
vakavasti aselainsäädännön muutosta. (Minister of Justice, Tuija Brax, G, ptk 97/2007 
vp) 
Mutta myös lapsiperheisiin panostusta on jatkettava. Asian tärkeys on auennut uu-
dessa valossa meitä kaikkia koskettaneiden Jokelan koulusurmien jälkeen. Lasten tai 
lapsiperheiden pahaa oloa ei pidä väheksyä, sillä juuri perheiden ongelmat heijastavat 
sitä, miten meillä ylipäänsä menee. (Katri Komi, C, ptk 101/2007 vp) 
 
The water crisis in Nokia 
Nyt käsiteltävässä lisätalousarvioesityksessä tältä samaiselta momentilta ehdotetaan 
valtuuksia myöntää Nokian kaupungille vesijohto-onnettomuudesta ja Tuusulan 
kunnalle Jokelan traagisista koulutapahtumista aiheutuneisiin kustannuksiin mo-
lemmille avustuksia enintään miljoonan euron verran. Tarve näihin avustuksiin on 
kiistaton. Molemmat tapahtumat olivat katastrofeja, joiden hoitamisesta osa kuuluu 
ehdottomasti valtiolle. (Elsi Katainen, C, ptk 58/2008 vp) 
Nokian vedenjakelussa tapahtunut onnettomuus ja siitä tiedottaminen ovat puhut-
taneet viime viikkoinasuomalaisia. Tuhannet nokialaiset ovat saaneet terveyshaittoja 
tämän tapahtuman johdosta. Tapaus osoittaa sen, kuinka häiriöaltis järjestelmä itse 
asiassa Suomessakin voi kriittisimmillään olla. Tapaus osoittaa myös sen, että on-
nettomuuden tapahduttua tehokas, nopea ja tosiasioihin perustuva tiedotus on aivan 
ratkaisevassa roolissa. Kolmanneksi tapaus osoittaa sen, että yksittäisten kuntien 
resurssit eivät kerta kaikkiaan riitä, kun tällainen onnettomuus tapahtuu tietyillä 
paikkakunnilla. (Harri Jaskari, KOK, ptk 97/2007 vp) 
Tosiaan Nokialla eletään edelleen erittäin vaikeassa tilanteessa. Siellä on ihmisiä jo 
toista ja kolmatta kertaa vatsataudissa, ja he myöskin kärsivät jälkitaudeista niveltu-
lehduksina jnp. Myöskin tämä paikallinen elinkeinoelämä on kärsinyt kohtuuttomia 
taloudellisia tappioita. Tässä nyt kysyttiinkin jo sitä, tuleeko valtio näissä jollain tapaa 
avuksi, mutta kysyisin vielä lisäksi: Kun tässä on tämä viranomaisten tiedotus ollut 
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aika heikkoa ja kun tsunamionnettomuuden jälkeen puhuttiin tästä massateks-
tiviestijärjestelmästä, niin mikä sen tilanne on nyt? Voisiko se olla nyt tulevaisuudessa 
sitten se väline, millä saadaan tietoa mahdollisimman nopeasti levitettyä aina 
tämmöisissä vaikeissa tilanteissa? Sitten vielä yksi myönteinen asia tähän loppuun, ja 
se on tämä Nokian kaupungin vesiongelma. Näinhän juuri pitää toimia, nopeasti, 
varmasti, ja yhteiskunta sitten kokonaisuutena varmaan tulee apuun, jos semmoinen 
tarve tulee rahoituspuolella. Mutta tällaista valmiustilaa tietysti Puolustusvoimilta 
edellytetään jatkossa ja ilman nurinoita. (Erkki Pulliainen, G, ptk 97/2007 vp) 
 
The Boxing Day storm 
Muutostarve sähkömarkkinalain eräisiin kohtiin tuli ilmi viime kesän ja vuoden-
vaihteen myrskyjen aiheuttamien sähkökatkojen yhteydessä. Monin paikoin ihmiset 
saivat olla vailla sähköä jopa viikkoja. Sähkökatkokset aiheuttivat monin paikoin 
suuria taloudellisia tappioita niin yksityisille ihmisille kuin yrityksillekin. Monille 
henkilöille on syntynyt jopa terveydellistä uhkaa lämmityksen ja vedensaannin kes-
keytyksistä. Sähkömarkkinalain mukaisen luvan saaneet yhteisöt ja laitokset, sähkö-
yhtiöt, ovat olleet puutteellisesti valmistautuneita katkosten ennaltaehkäisyyn ja 
niiden korjaamiseen. Nykyinen sähkömarkkinalaki ei turvaa sähköyhtiöiden asiak-
kaille kuin osakorvauksia kärsityistä vahingoista. Eräillä muutoksilla saadaan säh-
kömarkkinalaki paremmin vastaamaan nykyajan käytännön vaatimuksia korvaus-
vastuista myös sähköyhtiöiden osalta. (Lea Mäkipää, PS, ptk 23/2012 vp) 
Mutta tärkeää on varautuminen siihen, että pidetään yhtiöllä riittävästi sähkömiehiä, 
jotka kykenevät maastokelpoiseen työhön ja voivat myrskyjen välillä tehdä ennalta 
ehkäisevää työtä ja poistaa linjojen läheltä mahdollisesti linjoille kaatuvia puita etu-
käteen, ettei asiakkaille aiheudu vahinkoja. (Lauri Heikkilä, PS, 23/2012 vp) 
Kyllä ministeri Häkämies on toiminut poikkeuksellisen mallikkaasti tämän myrsky-
asian hoidossa. (Timo Heinonen, KOK, ptk 23/2012 vp) 
Ehkä voisi sanoa hyvin tärkeänä pointtina sen, että kun liikenneministeri on ollut 
niinkin myötämielinen, että on valmis harkitsemaan tieliikennelain muutosta niin, 
että ne kaapelit silloin, kun liikutaan teiden läheisyydessä, voidaan siihen välittömään 
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yhteyteen, siihen pientareelle laittaa, niin tuo on kolmanneksen halvempaa. Eli siinä 
mielessä se on tulevaisuutta, että kaapelointia lisätään, sitä vauhditetaan ja myöskin 
lainsäädännöllä sitä edellytetään. (Minister of Employment and the economy Jyri 
Häkämies, KOK, ptk 83/2012 vp) 
 
The floods in Ostrobothnia 
Österbotten svämmar över igen, och staten drar sig ur ersättningarna. I stället för 
staten träder försäkringsbolagen till, men frågan uppstår: vem är det som ska betala 
bolagens premier? Det borde inte vara oklart för någon att översvämningarna i Ös-
terbotten inte förorsakas av de personer som bor i Österbotten. Ärade talman! Över-
svämningarna beror på vattenflödet uppströms. (Lars-Erik Gästgivars, SFP, ptk 
45/2013 vp) 
Mitä tulee sitten tähän vallitsevaan tilanteeseen ja varmaan niihin tuleviinkin tulviin, 
niin syksyllä 2011 maa- ja metsätalousministeriö päätti 21 erillisestä alueesta, joihin 
kohdistuu suurimmat tulvariskit. Näille alueille tehdään paraikaa suunnitelmia, millä 
tavalla sitten varaudutaan mahdollisesti tulevaisuuden tulviin. Tietysti aikanaan ne 
suunnitelmat valmistuvat ja niitä lähdetään sitten toteuttamaan. Valtiolla on oma 
vastuunsa, ja myös kunnilla on oma vastuunsa, ja joissakin tapauksissa myös 
kiinteistöjen omistajien pitää huolehtia omasta omaisuudestaan. (Minister of 
Agriculture and Forestry Jari Koskinen, KOK, ptk 45/2013 vp 
Nyt budjetissa on kuitenkin rahaa liian vähän näihin vahinkoihin verrattuna, kun 
niitä on muuallakin tapahtunut. Nyt tarvitaan tietysti selkeä viesti ministeriltä, että 
vahingot korvataan lakien mukaisesti mahdollisimman nopeasti, ja olisi toivottavaa, 
että tässä tilaisuudessa se viesti saataisiin. (Antti Rantakangas, C, ptk 82/2012 vp) 
Tällä hetkellä tehdään erilaisia suunnitelmia näistä tulvariskeistä, joissa arvioidaan ne 
Suomen kannalta vaarallisimmat paikat, joissa tulvavahinkoja voisi eniten tulla. 
(Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Jari Koskinen, KOK, ptk 82/2012 vp) 
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Viimeaikaiset poikkeuksellisen kovat tulvat […] ovat hyvin osoittaneet, että on syytä 
varata selvästi nykyistä runsaammat resurssit tulvien aiheuttamien vahinkojen kor-
vaamiseen. Hallituksen lisätalousarviossa poikkeuksellisten tulvien aiheuttamien 
vahinkojen korvaamiseen suuntaama määräraha on mielestämme alimitoitettu. 
(Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, PS, ptk 107/2012 vp) 
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Every day, an extensive number of events 
occurs. What gives some events strong focal 
power, whereas others fade away without 
political impact? From a political science 
perspective, issues that are important for the 
general public, issues related to serious societal 
problems and issues receiving extensive 
attention in the media are all plausible issues 
that will rise onto the formal political agenda. 
From a neurological perspective, people 
pay more attention to negative events. The 
combination of these criteria gives us focusing 
events. These events are sudden, unusual, 
and have negative consequences to a large 
number of people – and are generally referred 
to as crises and disasters. 
This dissertation examines how different types 
of focusing events affect societal processes 
by comparing man-made disasters to natural 
disasters, and events with a stronger versus 
weaker degree of focus. By analyzing citizens’ 
emotional and cognitive reactions, the media 
coverage as well as the parliamentary debates 
following four focusing events, a broad ap-
proach to disaster research has been applied.
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